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Chapter 1
General introduction and thesis
outline
Economic phenomena are characterized by a strong mutual dependence between the
choices of economic actors, e.g. individual consumers or firms, and the economic envi-
ronment in which these choices are made and evaluated. The origin of this dependence
lies in the fact that the economic environment is formed by the aggregation of all individ-
ual choices, while at the same time individual choices are affected by the overall economic
environment.
In order to clarify the nature of this dependence, consider the following examples
which will be recurrent throughout this thesis. In a market of a perishable consumption
good, firms have to decide today how much to produce to supply to the market tomorrow.
On the one hand, firms base their production decision upon tomorrow’s expected profits.
On the other hand, tomorrow’s profits will depend on the total amount firms produce.
In fact, given consumer demand, profits are a function of market clearing prices, which
depend on total supply. Financial markets are another well-known example of this mutual
dependence between choices and environment. The demand of investors for an asset is
driven by expected future returns, while at the same time asset returns are determined,
through realized asset prices, by investors’ demand. Another example, with the advantage
of appealing to everyone’s experience, is the El Farol problem proposed by Arthur (1994).
El Farol is a bar where a live music show takes place on a fixed day, say Thursday,
every week. There are 100 people who would like to go to the bar on Thursday evening,
but the El Farol bar is not big enough for all of them. In fact, the bar is too crowded
when there are more than 60 people. Each Thursday evening everyone decides whether
to go to the bar or not. Each decision maker is directly influencing the number of agents
present at the bar, and at the same time, since that number affects his or her utility,
expectations about the number of agents present at the bar influence each individual
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decision. Notice that in all these examples the mutual dependence between individual
decisions and economic environment is mediated through a feedback relation between
expectations and realizations of some variable, e.g. prices, returns, or attendance level.
For this reason we can call these systems expectational feedback systems.
Traditional analysis in economics, i.e. neoclassical economics, has circumvented the
complications arising through the type of interaction of many individuals outlined above,
by assuming that all agents are rational. Modeling human behavior as rational implies
that, in making the decision that maximizes their objectives, agents take into account
the choices of others, assuming that others are doing the same. When expectations are
involved, agents are actually supposed to solve the expectational feedback system and
find a “fixed point” or equilibrium outcome where expectations and realizations of the
same variable coincide. Assuming rational thinking leads directly to an equilibrium where
choices need not be corrected, unless unanticipated changes of the exogenous parameters
characterizing the environment or the decision makers, take place. Thus, if agents were
rational, observed changes of economic variables, which are a function of agents’ choices,
should come from a response to unexpected changes in some exogenous characteristics, or
fundamentals, of the economy. Empirical analysis, both of real world data as well as of
laboratory experiments with human subjects, is at odds with this statement and shows
that economic variables fluctuate, even when changes in the fundamentals of the economy
do not occur.
In this thesis we investigate the possibility that economic fluctuations can be explained
through the interaction of boundedly rational agents, that is, agents are not assumed to
be rational and are not necessarily able to solve the mutual dependence implied by the
expectational feedback. Boundedly rational agents use simple behavioral rules and adapt
their behavior over time, switching from time to time to better performing rules. Since
it is not a priori clear which of these simpler rules should be used, we explicitly assume
that agents are heterogeneous and employ different rules to address the same decision
problem. We let a selection mechanism, such as “survival of the fittest”, discipline the
class of behavioral rules.
In departing from the traditional rational approach we have two main goals. First, we
want to appraise if an argument used in favor of rationality, namely that rationality is the
outcome of the repeated interaction of heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, is justi-
fied. This part of the analysis has thus a theoretical motivation. Second, having shown
in what respect our results differ from the rational benchmark, we want to characterize
whether our interacting agents framework can reproduce empirically observed phenomena
in the specific economic settings we consider.
In the context of this general background, this thesis is built around three different
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models discussed in three independent chapters. Every model refers to one of the three
economic frameworks briefly sketched at the beginning of this introduction, for which
the expectational feedback is a crucial characteristic. Chapter 2 uses a classical cobweb
model, i.e. a market for a perishable consumption good, to analyze the trade-off between
benefits and costs of rules with different degrees of sophistication. In fact, if sophisticated
predictions, as rational expectations, are costly, agents could decide to adopt a cheaper,
but simpler predictor, as long as its predictions are not too far from the realized values.
We investigate the impact on commodity prices of the interaction of agents having this
extra degree of freedom in choosing between cheap free riding and costly sophisticated
prediction. In Chapter 3, we characterize the competition of a large group of boundedly
rational agents using different strategies to repeatedly exploit the same scarce resource,
when no market institutions are present to coordinate agents’ actions. This chapter
has been inspired directly by Arthur’s El Farol bar problem. We compare our results
with those of equilibrium rational solutions, agent-based computational simulations, and
laboratory experiment with human subjects. In Chapter 4, we investigate whether, in
financial markets, the interaction of boundedly rational agents, triggered by informational
differences, can help explaining time series properties of empirical financial data.
In the remaining part of this introductory chapter, Section 1.1 offers a more detailed
review of the theoretical background of this thesis, i.e. bounded rationality and interaction
of heterogeneous agents. Section 1.2 presents each of the three remaining chapters. In
that section we also offer a brief introduction to nonlinear dynamics, the main technical
tool that will be used throughout this thesis. Section 1.3 concludes this introductory
chapter discussing an interesting common feature of our models, namely the presence of
negative expectational feedback. This feature proves to be helpful to interpret chapters’
results.
1.1 Theoretical background
Economic theory has always faced the issue of how to model human behavior, in particular
how to model individual decision making in an interactive framework. Assuming that an
economic actor, e.g. an individual consumer or a firm, wants to make the decision in his
best interest and that he is capable of making this judgment, the two approaches that are
currently in use rely on different levels of the decision maker’s rationality.
The approach of neoclassical economics, which we will refer to as rational, can be
summarized using two requirements. First, the decision maker is assumed to be able to
choose the alternative that maximizes utility or profit, given his beliefs about the economic
environment and the actions of the other actors in the economy. Second, each decision
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maker is assumed to be able to predict exogenous as well as endogenous variables, so
that his original beliefs are self-fulfilling. The first requirement is mostly related to the
rationality of preferences and choices. The second requirement is mostly related to the
rationality of expectations, that is, of agents’ prediction of future variables, including other
agents’ actions. An implication of these two requirements is that a rational decision maker
knows as much as the modeler regarding the economic framework of interest. Moreover,
the rational agent is also assumed to be able to “solve” this model, that is, to make
decisions such that all predictions and beliefs are consistent with the outcome of all agents’
choices. Stated differently a rational agent is supposed to solve for the equilibrium of the
expectational feedback system. Thus, the primary effort of a rational agent consists of
searching for an equilibrium1. At the equilibrium rational agents do not need to revise
their decisions unless an exogenous change in some variables of the model, such as an
unanticipated change in the agents’ preferences or in the structure of the economy, comes
about.
The bounded rationality approach (see e.g. Conlisk, 1996 for a survey) considers the
requirements that rationality poses on peoples’ characteristics, both in terms of knowledge
of the economic environment and of their computational capabilities, unrealistic because
they are too demanding. Different notions of bounded rationality have been formulated
in the literature. For example, in Simon (1957) and in Rubinstein (1998) the emphasis
is on limitations of human knowledge and computational abilities in decision making,
whereas Sargent (1993) questions the second aspect of rationality, that is the capability
of individuals to form rational expectations. Generally speaking, a boundedly rational
agent is modeled as able to choose what he perceives as the best for himself, but he
does not know the exact structure of the environment. Put differently, we can think of a
boundedly rational decision maker as one choosing only from a set of alternatives which is
bounded by his individual perception. In particular, when predictions of future variables
or choices of other economic agents are involved, bounded rationality implies that ex-ante
predictions and ex-post outcomes need not coincide perfectly. Therefore a boundedly
rational agent is not assumed to be able to “solve” the model. That is, he is not able
to choose equilibrium outcomes where all beliefs are self-fulfilling so that his decisions
are, both ex-ante and ex-post, optimal. On the contrary, a boundedly rational agent uses
simple rules of thumb and keeps revising his choices as he learns about the economic
environment in which he is operating, through feedback about his past decisions. In
particular, expectational feedbacks relates agents’ expectations about relevant variables,
1When more equilibria are presents, it remains to be seen if agents are able to coordinate on the
same equilibrium. Coordination games are the simplest example of this problem. We do not raise this
important issue in this thesis as in all the model we investigate only one equilibrium typically stands out.
See also Section 1.3 of this introdusction
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e.g. prices, to their realizations. As a result of the feedback structure and learning, models
of bounded rationality are structurally dynamic and may or may not settle down to an
equilibrium where agents have learned how to coordinate their actions.
The decision whether to model agents as rational or boundedly rational is part of the
assumptions of an economic model. The scholars opting for rationality argue that it is a
helpful assumption to describe the equilibrium outcome of people’s economic interaction.
This defence of rationality is known as the “as if” argument and goes back to Friedman
and Savage (1948), Friedman (1953), and Alchian (1950). In particular, Friedman (1953)
argues that a model should not be judged in terms of the realism of its assumptions but
in terms of the realism of its predictions, and that modeling agents as rational is justified
because the repeated interaction of heterogeneous boundedly rational agents leads to the
same outcome as if agents are rational. The general underlying idea is that agents who
are not rational would learn to be rational over time since incentives to behave rationally,
such as higher profits or utility, are constantly at work. In fact, agents who adopt non-
rational rules would be out-performed by agents using rational rules, since rational rules
come from optimization and lead to higher economic performance. In summary, assuming
rationality is often based on the presumption that this approach offers the equilibrium
outcome of repeated interaction, the details of which are not worth being modeled.
Part of the recent interest in models of bounded rationality has been motivated by the
attempt to put some structure on the “as if” argument. Does the interaction of bound-
edly rational agents leads to the same outcome as if agents are rational? Convergence
to rational behavior has been the object of investigation of many theoretical papers in
the last two decades. In macroeconomics, Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) address the possibility of agents learning to form rational expectations. The main
message is that “. . . some rational expectations equilibria are learnable while others are
not. Furthermore, convergence will in general depend on all economic parameters of the
system, including policy parameters” (Bullard 2006, p. 205). Learnability of equilibria
thus needs to be investigated case by case. In microeconomics, more specifically in game
theory, a related issue is the possibility of learning Nash equilibria, i.e. the equilibria
played by rational agents, as investigated in Fudenberg and Levine (1998). Evolutionary
game theory explores the ”as if” argument when the process of converging is regulated
by evolutionary forces driven by “survival of the fittest”, rather than by adaptive learn-
ing, see e.g. Weibull (1995). Whereas, according to the “as if” argument agents who are
closer to rationality should make larger profits and thus overcome other types of behavior,
cases exist, as summarized e.g. in Weibull (1994), where convergence is not attained and
fluctuations around the equilibrium never vanish. In this thesis we will also encounter
some examples of this behavior.
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Together from appraising whether modeling the interaction of different groups of
boundedly rational agents supports the “as if” argument, modeling agents as boundedly
rational can be an important step in narrowing the differences between the predictions of
economic theory and empirical data. Much evidence has been collected in the last thirty
years against the practice of modeling human behavior as rational. For example, Conlisk
(1996) classifies this evidence as either direct, through rationality tests on individuals,
or indirect, when models assuming rational agents are at odds with empirical data. Di-
rect evidence against rationality consists, for example, in showing that, when faced with
decisions involving uncertainty which have an objectively correct answer, agents show psy-
chological biases and failure in rationalizing the problem (see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman,
1974). As already argued by Simon (1957), agents rather use simple rules of thumb or
heuristics than engage in difficult, more rational, computations. Moreover, when deciding
whether to use more sophisticated rules, agents take into account deliberation costs, such
as information gathering costs or information processing costs as those costs associated
with the extra effort they are putting into the decision making. Indirect evidence against
rationality has been collected from empirical testing of economic models built under the
assumption that agents are rational. Consider the following examples that are related to
the economic frameworks investigated in the rest of this thesis. In experiments of market
entry games, which are similar to the El Farol game discussed previously, at the aggregate
level agents seem to be able to coordinate on a Nash equilibrium of the game, but, at the
individual level, use different simple rules which do not coincide with rational behavior.
Furthermore, their interaction generates excess variability of the entry percentages with
respect to the game theoretical predictions, (see e.g. Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale, 1995
or Ochs, 1990). In financial markets, prices seem to be much more volatile than justi-
fied by the movement of the underlying fundamentals (see e.g. Shiller, 1989) and returns
are correlated (see e.g. Fama and French, 1988b). Moreover, expectational surveys, as
Frankel and Froot (1987) or Chow (1989), argue that agents do not use rational expec-
tations. However in general, it is still under debate whether macroeconomic fluctuations
of unemployment, business cycles and growth rates are partly driven by expectations as
argued in Grandmont (1985), see also Grandmont (1998) and Hommes (2004).
In deviating from rationality, and modeling agents as boundedly rational it is often
assumed that agents are heterogeneous. Kirman (1992, 2006) summarizes some of the
reasons why the assumption that agents are homogeneous, or that their heterogeneity is
not relevant as their choices can be summarized by the choice of a so-called representative
agent, should be discarded. One commonly referred to reason is the “no trade” argument,
which states that homogeneous agents, as agents with homogeneous expectations, would
have no reasons to trade among themselves. Another reason, which is particularly relevant
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to our theoretical background, involves an evolutionary explanation. That is, evolution
and adaptation necessarily requires some variety of behavior, if one wants the selection
mechanism to indicate which is the “surviving” trait. Denying heterogeneity in models
with boundedly rational agents gives rise to limitations as it is not clear a priori which kind
of boundedly rational behavior each agents should be endowed with. For these reasons,
modeling agents as heterogeneous is becoming more and more popular in economics,
as shown e.g. by the extensive surveys on analytical and computational models with
heterogeneous agents in Hommes (2006) and LeBaron (2006).
In this thesis we assume that agents are heterogeneous, in the sense that they choose
different simple decision rules to address the same decision problem. Generally speaking,
rules can differ in terms of sophistication, where the most sophisticated rule corresponds
to rationality. We also assume that the higher the sophistication of a rule, the higher
the deliberation cost an agent pays in order to use it. Rules can also differ in terms of
the information they use, where information can also be costly. Instead of considering
fixed fractions of agents employing each rule, we let them evolve over time as a function
of their “fitness”. Thus, we employ an evolutionary approach where a “survival of the
fittest” mechanism is at work. A rule that has performed better according to some
measure, to be defined case by case, is used by a higher fraction of agents. In our
models, we use two different updating mechanism for fractions. In Chapter 2 we use a
discrete choice mechanism along the lines of Manski and McFadden (1981) and Anderson,
de Palma, and Thisse (1993) (see also Brock and Hommes, 1997, for an early application).
This updating mechanism assumes that in choosing between different strategies, agents
have an idiosyncratic component that, together with the fitness measure, determines how
individual choices are distributed among the different alternatives. In Chapters 3 and 4,
we use the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978). The replicator dynamics is
related to biological reproduction and the number of agents using a certain rule evolves
both as a function of the current number of agents using that rule, and of the fitness of each
rule. The replicator dynamics can also be motivated in the context of boundedly rational
agents learning and imitating strategies in a strategic environment (see e.g. Weibull, 1995,
Chapter 5 or Binmore and Samuelson, 1997).
1.2 Thesis Outline
This thesis is built around three main economic frameworks, which are developed in
separate chapters. Each chapter is self-contained, with its own introduction, conclusion,
notes, and appendices as needed. For this reason each chapter can be read independently
from the others. A common bibliography is collected at the end of the thesis. A working
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paper has been extracted from each chapter: Brock, Dindo, and Hommes (2006) is based
on Chapter 2, Dindo and Tuinstra (2006) on Chapter 3 and Diks and Dindo (2006) on
Chapter 4. This section briefly discusses each chapter and the mathematical tools used
for their analysis.
1.2.1 Deliberation costs in a cobweb model
In Chapter 2, we use the classic example of the cobweb model (see e.g. Ezekiel, 1938)
to investigate the impact of endogenizing agents’ choices between a costly sophisticated
prediction rule, such as rational expectations, and a cheap prediction rule, such as naive
expectations.
The cobweb model describes the production decisions of a producer of perishable con-
sumption goods which take one period to be produced, such as crop or cattle. Producers
want to maximize their next period’s profit, which depends on the next period’s market
price of the good. Assume that the production technology is convex so that optimal
output is an increasing function of the agent’s prediction of market price. Also assume,
as usual, that the aggregate demand function is downward sloping. In this case market
equilibrium implies that a high (low) supply leads to a low (high) market price. Summa-
rizing, high (low) expected prices result in a high (low) supply which clears the demand
at a low (high) realized price in this system. The characteristic of this system is that the
ex-post realized price is “opposite” to the ex-ante expected price.
This example offers a typical case of an economic system with a mutual dependence
between individual choices and aggregate outcome. The dependence is due to the fact that
producers’ expectations of prices affect realized prices. When the ex-ante expected price
is equal to the average ex-post realized price, that is, when the expectational feedback is
at a fixed point, we have an expectational equilibrium price.
Historically, the cobweb model is an important example, because Muth (1961) uses this
framework to introduce the concept of rational expectations. Muth argues that rational
agents, in order to effectively optimize realized profits, should use a rational expectations
predictor. This is the same as the expectational equilibrium or the “prediction of the
relevant economic theory” (Muth, 1961, p. 316). Muth shows that in a cobweb model,
the rational expectations predictor is the one with the highest realized profits. In other
words, rational expectations are optimal expectations. Agents using other predictors
would perform worse than those using rational expectations, and would, sooner or later,
be wiped out of the market. However, Muth assumes that agents can choose among all
possible predictors, rational or not, at no cost. Muth ignores the presence of deliberation
costs, or information gathering costs, associated with more sophisticated prediction rules.
In Chapter 2, we concentrate on the cobweb model taking into account deliberation
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costs. Early contributions along the same line are Conlisk (1980), Sethi and Franke
(1995), and Brock and Hommes (1997). In particular, in their paper Brock and Hommes
introduce the concept of adaptive rational equilibrium dynamics (ARED), where agents
choose between a costly rational expectations forecast and a cheap naive forecast. The
fractions of agents using each of the two strategies evolve over time and are endogenously
coupled to the market equilibrium price dynamics. Brock and Hommes show that when
the selection pressure to switch to the more profitable strategy is high, instability and
complicated chaotic price fluctuations arise. Brock and Hommes call this phenomenon a
rational route to randomness.
In their setting, Brock and Hommes assume that agents are backward looking in the
sense that strategy selection is based on experience measured by relative past realized
profits. Implicitly this means that agents, even those employing rational expectations
concerning prices, use naive expectations regarding the amount of profit earned by each
of the strategies. In fact, in deciding which predictor is best at maximizing expected
profit, they use today’s profit as a forecast of expected profit.
In Chapter 2, we model the ARED with forward looking agents, that is, where strategy
selection is based upon expected profits rather than realized profits. As agents’ objective is
to maximize expected profits, assuming that agents choose a strategy based upon expected
profitability seems a natural extension of the original model by Brock and Hommes. Our
aim is to investigate whether forward looking behavior dampens, fosters or eliminates price
fluctuations compared to backward looking behavior. In particular we analyze whether
forward looking behavior has an impact on the rational route to randomness found by
Brock and Hommes.
A second contribution of Chapter 2 consists in establishing an equivalence between
a heterogeneous agents model with switching between two different strategies, and a
representative agent framework, where the representative agent optimally chooses from a
continuum of alternative predictors. As usual, predictors differ for their cost and degree
of sophistication. This analysis aims at finding a correspondence between the mechanism
responsible for the updating of predictor choices in a heterogeneous agents framework,
and the cost function associated with a continuum of predictors in a representative agent
framework. Notice that if such a correspondence exists, price fluctuations driven by
strategy switching of heterogeneous firms may as well being explained by a representative
firm switching between a continuum of predictors with different characteristics.
1.2.2 Competition and coordination in participation games
Chapter 3 is devoted to an analysis of repeated interaction of a large number of boundedly
rational agents that are competing for the same scarce resource, when no coordinating
10 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OUTLINE
market institution is at work. We formalize this general interaction structure, which has
been inspired by the El Farol game, as a participation game. We concentrate on participa-
tion games for which the payoff for participating decreases as the number of participating
agents increases, so that there is negative expectational feedback. Well-known examples
of participation games with negative feedback analyzed in the literature are market en-
try games, where firms have to decide whether to enter a market and compete, or stay
out of it. Another example is given by route choice games, where a group of commuters
repeatedly choose, between two routes, the fastest way from their homes to their offices.
Experimental research in this area (see e.g. Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale, 1995) has
aimed at appraising to which extent the aggregate participation rate emerging from the
competition of many agents can be described using the traditional tools of game theory.
The evidence is mixed. At the aggregate level the time average participation rate is
consistent with the symmetric Nash equilibrium. However, at the individual level agents
do not learn to play that Nash equilibrium, but use different deterministic rules. In
particular individuals seem to employ simple rules, such as always participate, always
abstain, or participate conditionally on the outcome of previous rounds. As a result the
aggregate participation rate is much more volatile than would be in the case where all
agents play Nash. The computational model of Arthur (1994), where 100 heterogeneous
agents are choosing among different decision rules to decide whether to participate or
not, gives the same results. In fact, Arthur observes convergence of the first moment of
the participation rate to the symmetric Nash equilibrium, but he obtains a higher second
moment, and thus a more volatile participation rate series.
Our aim is to obtain a simple analytic model that can replicate the main experimental
and computational findings in the area of participation games with negative feedback.
At this purpose we use the same model building guidelines as Brock and Hommes (1997)
and Droste, Hommes, and Tuinstra (2002). We set up an analytic model with hetero-
geneous boundedly rational agents choosing between simple rules. Fractions of agents
using each rule are endogenous and evolve according to the past performance of each
rule as described by the replicator dynamics. We concentrate on the evolutionary dy-
namics produced by the competition between different deterministic rules that condition
the participation decision on the outcome of the previous rounds. We characterize the
resulting participation rate dynamics as the number of players increases. The interaction
of a large number of players leads to complicated participation rate patterns and our
aim is to check whether the average participation rate along these patterns is consistent
with the symmetric Nash equilibrium and the existing experimental and computational
evidence. We also investigate how the aggregation of agents’ interaction is affected by the
presence of agents choosing rules that try to exploit the linear autocorrelation structure of
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the past participation rates. Agents who try to exploit past inefficiencies of the aggregate
to improve their performances, act as some kind of arbitrageurs and we investigate how
their behavior affects the properties of the system.
1.2.3 Informational differences in an asset market
Asset markets, involving an extremely large number of investors of different character-
istics, are a plausible context for modeling the interaction of heterogeneous boundedly
rational agents. The failure of the traditional representative rational agent framework to
replicate properties of asset returns, such as excess volatility, clustered volatility, corre-
lations of returns, persistent deviations from fundamental values (see e.g. Shiller, 1989
and Fama and French, 1988a, 1988b), explains why most of the research in the area
of bounded rationality and heterogeneity has been pursued in the context of financial
markets as surveyed in Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006) and Kirman (2006).
In Chapter 4 we study a market for a financial asset populated by boundedly rational
agents and we concentrate on the role of informational differences. The starting point is an
asset pricing model in which agents can choose among two different degrees of information
on fundamentals. At the same time agents are also learning the growth rate of the dividend
generating process. An inherent feature of our model is that it contains two important
benchmarks as special cases. When both informational differences and learning are both
discarded, our results coincide with those of the classical Gordon model (see.g. Gordon,
1962). When only informational differences are discarded our model coincides with the
one of Barsky and De Long (1993).
After developing and analyzing the full model, we investigate the extent to which
our model is able to explain empirical properties of asset prices. In particular we aim
at offering theoretical support to the empirical evidence that the log price of a financial
asset is the sum of a persistent component and a nonlinear temporary component, which
switches between two different regimes. The empirical evidence for this so-called nonlinear
mean reversion is documented e.g. by Gallagher and Taylor (2001) and Manzan (2003).
Chapter 4 is also closely related to the work on informational efficiency by Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980). They investigate whether the price is informationally efficient in a
repeated market for a single period living asset, in which agents can decide between two
different degrees of information about the value of the asset return at the end of the period.
They assume that both informed and uninformed agents are rational. In a financial
market where agents face informational differences, the use of rational expectations poses
puzzling consequences. In fact, when the information costs are positive, if agents had
rational expectations the price would fully reveal the available information about future
dividends and nobody would pay for information anymore. This implies that the fraction
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of informed agents would go to zero. However, in the limit the price would not contain
information about the dividend anymore, so that it would pay to buy information again.
The absence of a rational expectation equilibrium has been referred to as the Grossman-
Stiglitz paradox. In a framework with rational agents one needs two sources of noise to
solve the paradox. One source is the presence of noise traders who provide liquidity to
the market, the other is a noisy dividend signal for the informed agents. In this case,
the model of Grossman and Stiglitz leads to a static equilibrium degree of disequilibrium,
where agents’ fractions and price distribution are constant over time and a function of
the exogenous noise parameters.
In Chapter 4 we analyze the case where each agent can decide whether or not to be
informed about next period’s dividend, but we relax the assumption of rationality. We
also endogenize the dynamics of the fraction of agents choosing to buy costly information
or to extract information about future dividends from the price. We investigate whether
the interaction of boundedly rational agents can offer a different solution to the Grossman-
Stiglitz paradox. We argue that the interaction of boundedly rational agents, triggered by
informational differences, can act as a source of endogenous noise to the price dynamics
and no other source of noise needs to be added to the system to obtain a well-defined price
and well-defined fractions. Our dynamic approach aims at offering a dynamic equilibrium
degree of disequilibrium, in contrast with the static case of Grossman and Stiglitz. Our
dynamic case is strictly connected to the endogenous noise created by agents’ switching
between being informed and free riding on public information.
1.2.4 Computational tools for nonlinear dynamics
Whereas in economic models with rational agents there is an emphasis on equilibria, in
models with bounded rationality and heterogeneity there is an emphasis on dynamics.
Since most of these dynamical systems are nonlinear, the theory of nonlinear dynamical
systems is an important tool of analysis. For this reason nonlinear dynamics has become a
widely used instrument in recent years. Day (1994), Gandolfo (1997), and Medio and Lines
(2001) are, among others, introductory textbooks with a particular emphasis on nonlinear
economic dynamics. Mathematical textbooks are e.g. Guckenheimer and Holmes (1991)
and Wiggins (1990). For the convenience of the reader, we here include a brief discussion
of some tools from nonlinear dynamics which will be used in our study.
In this thesis, we model agents’ interaction and decision making taking place at discrete
times separated by a conventional time unit, called one period, and we focus on discrete
time dynamical systems. Typically, one of our model equations is the expectational
feedback map related to the equilibrium pricing condition, and the others are the updating
rules for the fractions of agents using different decision strategies. Whereas the equilibrium
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pricing equation is linear in the fractions of agents, the fact that these fractions are
endogenously determined yields strong nonlinearities.
Occasionally, we investigate the effect of random exogenous shocks upon the dynamics.
In this case, we will refer to the original, noise-free, system as the deterministic skeleton.
Whereas the impact of noise in linear systems is well understood, results concerning the
effect of noise on the local and global dynamics of nonlinear systems is limited, and
therefore we have to rely on simulations.
Once a system of difference equations is derived from agents’ decision making and
from fractions’ evolution, we typically proceed as follows. First, we search for the steady
state(s) of the system. The steady state(s) of our systems typically corresponds to rational
behavior. After a steady state is detected, we use local stability analysis to specify for
which parameters values, the interaction and adaptation of boundedly rational agents
converges to it. If a steady state is unstable, we continue with the analysis of the global
dynamics and investigate the occurrence of periodic or complicated chaotic fluctuations.
Whereas the dynamics in linear systems can only converge to a steady state or diverge
to infinity (except hairline cases), the dynamics of nonlinear systems is richer. In our
examples, the dynamics can be characterized either by convergence to a stable cycle or
by irregular fluctuations and is always bounded. In particular the development of chaos
theory has pointed out that deterministic dynamical systems can generate erratic time
series with ongoing fluctuations whose patterns resemble those of random time series. We
will encounter many of these time series in the following chapters.
In this thesis, when possible, the global dynamics is characterized analytically. How-
ever, often this is difficult or impossible, and we have to use computational tools. A
useful numerical tool for detecting changes in the long run dynamics as one parameter of
the model changes, is the bifurcation diagram. In a bifurcation diagram a parameter is
varied and, for a grid of parameter values, the system of equations is simulated and the
resulting long run behavior plotted. In such diagrams one can see that for some param-
eter values the state variable, say the price, converges to an equilibrium value, whereas
for other parameter values the state variable oscillates along a two cycle, or follows a
more complicated path. An example of a bifurcation diagram is given in the left panel
of Figure 1.1, which is taken from the analysis of participation games in Chapter 3. The
horizontal axes indicates the parameter N , which gives the number of agents playing the
game. The vertical axes represents the participation rate, i.e. the fraction of the entire
population that decides to go to the bar. The bifurcation diagrams allows to compare
the dynamics of the system for different values of the parameter N . One can notice that
when N is small, e.g. N = 50, the long run behavior of the system convergences to a
participation rate of 0.5. As the number of agents N increases, the long run behavior
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Figure 1.1: Simulation of the dynamical systems analyzed in Chapter 3. Left panel: the
bifurcation diagram with respect to the number of participants N gives the long run behavior
of the participation rate as N changes. Right panel: Lyapunov exponents for different values of
N . Parameters values are as in Figure 3.6. For every value of N , 100 iterations are used after
a transient period of 100.
of the interaction is more complicated. For example, when N = 150, the participation
rate is oscillating between two different values. As N increases further other bifurcations
occur and the participation rates follows cycles of period four, eight . . . For future refer-
ence, this particular bifurcation structure with period of the cycle doubling step by step
is called period-doubling bifurcation route to chaos. The bifurcations continue until we
reach a point, N ≈ 250, where many different values between 0.4 and 0.55 are possible.
A useful tool for analyzing whether the black region of the bifurcation diagram corre-
sponds to a cycle of very large period or to more complex chaotic behavior is the largest
Lyapunov exponent plot. Lyapunov exponents are used to characterize sensitive depen-
dence on initial conditions, that is, whether a small change of the initial condition can
lead to a large change of the realized state variable. When the system has a positive
Lyapunov exponent there is sensitive dependence on initial conditions and the dynamics
is chaotic. The right panel of Figure 1.1 gives an example of a Lyapunov exponent plot
for the parameter corresponding to the bifurcation diagram. The horizontal axes indi-
cates the parameter N . The vertical axes represents the Lyapunov exponent. When the
Lyapunov exponent is negative, e.g. for N = 50 or N = 150, the system converges to a
regular attractor, and, in fact, the bifurcation digram shows long run convergence to a
stable cycle. When the Lyapunov exponent is positive, e.g. N ≈ 300, the corresponding
long run behavior is instead chaotic as suggested by the bifurcation diagram at the same
value of N . These numerical tools will be used throughout the thesis to investigate global
dynamics.
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1.3 Negative expectational feedback
An interesting feature of the different economic frameworks analyzed in Chapters 2− 4 is
that they all share the same type of feedback between agents’ expectation of a variable,
e.g. price, and its realization. In general, one can classify this expectational feedback
structure as negative when positive (negative) deviations of the expectations from the
expectational equilibrium price result in negative (positive) deviations of the realized
price from the expectational equilibrium price. Conversely, the expectational feedback
is positive when positive (negative) deviations of the expected price from the expecta-
tional feedback equilibrium result in positive (negative) deviations of the realized price
from the expectational feedback equilibrium. When the expectational feedback map is
differentiable, negative (positive) feedback corresponds to a negative (positive) first order
derivative of the map around the expectational equilibrium. It turns out that all our
examples show a negative expectational feedback structure.
The cobweb model of Chapter 2 is perhaps the best known example of a system with
negative expectational feedback. If a producer expects a high (low) price, his optimal de-
cision is to produce a high (low) quantity that will clear the market at a low (high) price,
“opposite” to the producer’s prediction. Participation games investigated in Chapter 3
also have this characteristic. Consider the El Farol bar problem as a concrete example.
If most (few) agents believe that many agents will go to the bar, few (most) will show up,
contradicting the majority belief. Finally, financial markets where agents have informa-
tional differences, as studied in Chapter 4, are also systems with negative expectational
feedback. In fact when many agents believe that the information is valuable and buy it, an
investor is better off not buying information as the information will be revealed by prices.
On the other hand if nobody buys information, believing that it is better to extract the
information from prices, an investor is better off buying information as there are so few
informed agents that prices do not accurately reveal information. Our three models share
the same expectational feedback structure because they all stem from essentially the same
economic framework: repeated competition for a limited resource. This limited resource
is the demand for crop or cattle in the cobweb model, the number of seats in the El Farol
game, and the information about profitability of the listed firms in a financial market.
The opposite type of expectational feedback, positive feedback, is characterized by
consistency of actions and beliefs. Coordination games are one example of positive feed-
back since when most agents think other player are going to play a certain action they
play the same action thus creating consistency between beliefs and realizations. In gen-
eral, probably both types of feedback play a role. For example, real financial markets have
a negative feedback component due to informational differences, and a positive feedback
component due to the fact that agents’ demand is increasing in the expected (or antici-
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pated) prices. Fashion cycles are also systems with mixed feedbacks, with agents copying
each other at certain stages but also moving to different products at other moments.
A pair of concepts related to the expectational feedback are “strategic substitutabil-
ity” and “strategic complementarity”. These concepts were first developed in studies of
firm interactions in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), but later extended to
the interaction of economic agents with bounded rationality (see e.g. Haltiwanger and
Waldman, 1985). Strategies are substitutes if agents have an incentive to do the opposite
of what most other players are doing as happens to be the case in systems with negative
feedback. Strategies are complementary if agents have an incentive to imitate each other
as in systems with positive feedback.
Recent experimental studies as reported by Camerer and Fehr (2006) and Heemeijer,
Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2006) argue that convergence to a rational expecta-
tions equilibrium is more likely in economic systems with negative feedback and less likely
in economic systems with positive feedback. Theoretical results of this thesis confirm, for
systems with negative feedback, that overall convergence to the rational equilibrium is
on average correct. Nevertheless, we also show that boundedly rational agents’ inter-
action and adaptation trigger ongoing fluctuations around such an equilibrium. This is
consistent with other experiments of systems with negative feedbacks as reported in e.g.
Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and Van de Velden (2007) for a cobweb setting, in e.g.
Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale (1995) for market entry games and in e.g. Selten, Chmura,
Pitz, Kube, and Schreckenberg (2006) for route choice games. This is also consistent with
excess volatility in financial markets summarized in Shiller (1989). In general, these en-
dogenous fluctuations can be characterized as irregular cycles along which rules perform
better than others in different periods of time, but no rule is “dominating” the scene for
every period. In this respect our results also support the observation that within systems
with negative feedback incentives work in the direction of heterogeneity, that is, agents
are better off if they do not imitate each other. In fact, such incentives explain why
the persistence of heterogeneity, and consequently of endogenous fluctuations, is a robust
characteristic of our models.
Chapter 2
Deliberation costs in a cobweb model
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to study a “toy model” of a compromise economy where
it is costly to possess rational expectations but less costly or free to possess “simpler”
expectations. Our key objective is to study prices and expectations dynamics in such
an economy and to address whether switching between two predictors may or may not
lead to coordination and convergence to self-fulfilling expectations. This debate is impor-
tant, because instability of adaptive learning, in this case switching between predictors,
may explain why markets exhibit excess volatility, i.e. are more volatile than justified by
underlying economic fundamentals.
If it were very costly to purchase rational expectations our model economy would
act like a temporary general equilibrium economy. Grandmont (1982) surveys the field
of temporary general equilibrium theory. In this theory, at each date t, agents form
expectations for relevant quantities at date t + 1, and given these expectations, agents
optimize to produce demand functions at date t. Markets then clear at date t, producing
equilibrium prices and quantities at date t. At date t + 1 the process is repeated before
going into date t+ 2. A sequence of prices, quantities, and expectations, is produced. In
principle, there could be feedback from equilibrium prices and quantities into expectations
but the expectations need not be rational. At each date t, the actions of the agents are
coordinated only by the price system. Unlike rational expectations the plans for the future
which are made by the agents are not coordinated. As Grandmont (1982, p. 887) puts
it, “The aim of temporary equilibrium theory is to study the interaction through markets
of different individuals in a given period, and to analyze the behavior over time of the
sequence of these equilibria.”.
Instead, if rational expectations were cheap our economy would act more like a rational
expectations economy. While it would be an excellent research project to study such
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an economy with endogenous rational choice of the “level of rationality” in a general
equilibrium system at the level of generality of Grandmont (1982) and Radner (1982), it
turns out to be challenging enough to study the impact of this extra level of dynamics of
information choice in a simple cobweb economy as we shall do here.
Brock and Hommes (1997), BH henceforth, introduce the concept of Adaptive Rational
Equilibrium Dynamics (ARED), which is an endogenous coupling between the selection
of expectations rules and market equilibrium dynamics. In the ARED, the consistency
requirement that has to be imposed upon learning rules is evolutionary selection of strate-
gies, that is, agents switch to rules that have performed well in the recent past BH (1998)
apply this evolutionary switching mechanism to an asset pricing model with heteroge-
neous beliefs; see Hommes (2006) for an extensive survey of heterogeneous agent models
in economics and finance.
Another type of complicated “learning equilibrium” in which forecasting mistakes are
“self-fulfilling” is the consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE), introduced by Hommes
(1998). In a CEE, agents use a simple linear forecasting rule in an unknown non-linear
economy. A CEE arises when the sample average and sample autocorrelations of the
nonlinear implied law of motion coincide with the corresponding linear belief. One pos-
sibility are chaotic CEE with chaotic price fluctuations with sample average and sample
autocorrelations exactly corresponding to a stochastic AR(1) process. See also Bullard
(1994), Scho¨nhofer (1999) and Tuinstra (2003) for similar complicated learning equilibria.
As a simple illustration of the ARED concept, BH (1997) consider a cobweb model
where agents can choose between two predictors: either a cheap naive predictor, equal
to last observed price, or an expensive rational expectations (perfect foresight) predictor.
In order to choose between the two predictors, agents compare their performance as
measured by relative past realized profit. One of the main results in BH is that, when
the selection pressure to switch between a costly sophisticated rational and cheap simple
naive strategy is high, the price dynamics becomes locally unstable around the steady
state given by the rational expectation equilibrium. As prices diverge, errors from the
simple, naive strategy increase and it becomes worthwhile to switch to the costly rational
strategy, pushing prices back towards the steady state. This interaction between a “close
to the steady state destabilizing force” and a “far from the steady state stabilizing force”
leads to complicated, chaotic price fluctuations. These complicated “learning equilibria”
are driven by past realized net profits of the expectation strategies. More precisely, in
the original BH (1997) model strategy selection is given by a discrete choice model with
a performance or fitness measure based upon past realized profits from earlier choices of
predictors. Strategy selection is thus based on “experience” or “regret”, and agents tend
to switch to strategies that have performed well in the (recent) past. In the original BH
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(1997) model both the naive and the rational agents are backward looking with respect
to the choice of their prediction strategy but forward looking in their production decision
because they want to maximize expected profits. In fact, these agents implicitly use past
profits as a proxy for expected future profits. One might argue that sophisticated agents
should realize that other agents are making their choices in this backward looking manner
and will learn to use a more sophisticated predictor selection strategy attempting to
exploit the backward looking behavior. This reasoning raises the obvious question: Will
the BH (1997) instability results vanish under a concept of sophisticated forward looking
predictor strategy selection?
In this chapter, we investigate ARED with agents who are forward looking concerning
their strategy selection. For this purpose we reconsider the same cobweb model as BH
(1997), in the case where agents evaluate the different predictors based upon their expected
profit instead of their realized profits. As one might expect in hindsight, forward looking
behavior dampens some of the instabilities uncovered by the original BH (1997) work.
The tendency to overshoot when “selection pressure” is high is dampened. Indeed in one
case the erratic dynamics is dampened down to a stable 2-cycle. In other cases however,
small amplitude chaotic price fluctuations persist.
Our setup is also related to the concept of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) intro-
duced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998). They also use a discrete choice model for
strategy selection in a game theoretic setting, with expected payoff as the performance
measure. A similar approach is used by Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2002), who study
repeated games with various levels of rationality. An important difference between these
game theoretic settings and BH (1997) is that in the latter case strategy selection is cou-
pled to the dynamics of an endogenous variable, say the market price, whose realization
affects the performance of all strategies.
A second contribution of this chapter is to formulate a representative agent version of
the model, where the deliberation cost of more sophisticated strategies are endogenized.
This approach is inspired by Simon (1955, 1957) and more recently by Evans and Ramey
(1992) and especially by Dudek (2004). We formulate hybrid models based on Brock
and Hommes (1997) and Dudek (2004), where a representative agent chooses optimally
among predictors of different quality, where each predictor is purchased at a cost which is
increasing and convex in its quality. We establish a close link between the representative
agent optimizing between the benefits of sophisticated prediction rules and deliberation
costs and a heterogeneous agent framework with switching of strategies. See Kirman
(1992) for a critique upon the representative agent approach in economics and Hommes
(2006) and LeBaron (2006) for surveys of heterogeneous agent modeling.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews some facts from BH (1997)
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for comparison purposes. Section 2.3 introduces forward looking behavior with respect to
strategy selection. Two different cases will be discussed, one where agents have perfect
foresight regarding expected profits for strategy selection and one where agents make a
boundedly rational estimate of expected profits. Section 2.4 introduces a representative
agent who weighs expected profits versus deliberation costs. Section 5 concludes and all
proofs are contained in the Appendix to this chapter.
2.2 The BH model
Following BH (1997), we recall some key features of the ARED in the simple economic
setting of the cobweb model with selection of forecasting rules based upon past realized
profits. The cobweb model describes price fluctuations in a competitive market for a
non-storable good which takes one period to be produced. We call pt+1 the price of the
good at time t+ 1 and pet+1 a producer expectation at time t of the market price at time
t+ 1. The demand at time t+ 1, D(pt+1), is a linearly decreasing function:
D(pt+1) = A−Bpt+1, A > 0, B > 0. (2.1)
The supply at time t+ 1, S, is an increasing function of the producers’ forecasts at time
t of the price at time t + 1. More specifically, for every producer, the supply curve S is
derived from expected profit maximization:
S(pet+1) = Argmaxx(xp
e
t+1 − c(x)), (2.2)
where x is the amount of goods he decides to produce at time t and c(x) is the production
cost function. Since the decision is taken at time t, but the price is realized only at time
t + 1, a producer have to condition their decision on their expected price pet+1. Taking a
quadric cost function
c(x) =
x2
2b
, b > 0 (2.3)
gives the linear supply curve:1
S(pet+1) = bp
e
t+1. (2.4)
We assume that agents (producers) can choose between two types of predictors, pe,1t+1 and
pe,2t+1. Let n
1
t and n
2
t be the fractions of agents choosing at the end of time t (or at the
beginning of time t + 1) respectively predictor 1 and predictor 2. The market clearing
1The general case with non-linear demand and non-linear supply is investigated in Goeree and Hommes
(2000). Since it leads to similar results we restrict our analysis to the linear case.
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equation at time t+ 1 is given by:
D(pt+1) = n
1
tS(p
e,1
t+1) + n
2
tS(p
e,2
t+1). (2.5)
We now have to specify how agents choose between the two prediction rules. BH (1997)
assume that agents are “comparing” past realized profits. At time t, the realized profit
of strategy i is a function of both the realized price at time t, pt, and the predictor p
e,i
t ,
i = 1, 2, used at time t−1. The price pt determines the price at which the goods are sold,
while the predictor pe,it determines the amount of good produced by agent i. As a result,
the realized profit at time t under expectations scheme i is given by
piit = pi(pt, p
e,i
t ) = ptS(p
e,i
t )− c(S(pe,it )) = ptbpe,it −
(bpe,it )
2
2b
=
b
2
pe,it (2pt − pe,it ). (2.6)
We consider the realistic case where one predictor, say pe,1, is more sophisticated or
of higher “quality” than the other predictor pe,2, which is just an easy-to-use rule of
thumb. The sophisticated predictor however is more “expensive” than the simple predictor
because it is more difficult to compute, deliberation cost, or requires more information
gathering. We call C ≥ 0 the net costs for obtaining the sophisticated predictor. In this
chapter we will refer to C as to deliberation or information costs.
As mentioned before, the choice of the predictor rule is based on the fitness or perfor-
mance measure for the two strategies. BH (1997) take last period’s net realized profits as
the fitness measure, i.e.2
U1t = pi
1
t − C,
U2t = pi
2
t ,
∆Ut = ∆pit − C = pi1t − pi2t − C,
where ∆Ut is the difference in fitness and ∆pit is the difference in realized profits (ex-cost
for the sophisticated rule). The fraction of agents choosing predictor i at time t is given
by a discrete choice (logit) model:
nit =
eβU
i
t
Zt
, i = 1, 2, (2.7)
2More generally, BH (1997) introduce memory in the fitness measure which is a weighted average of
past realized profits. In this chapter, we focus on the simplest case with fitness determined by last period
realized profit.
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where β is the intensity of choice parameter and Zt =
∑
h e
βUht is a normalization factor
such that n1t + n
2
t = 1. The model (2.7) is derived from a random utility framework
see e.g. McFadden (1973); see also BH (1997) for more details and Anderson, de Palma,
and Thisse (1993) for many economic applications. The intensity of choice parameter β
determines how eager agents are to switch to different strategies as it is inversely related
to the variance noise level in the random utility model. In the extreme case β = 0, there is
no switching at all and both fractions are 0.5, whereas in the other extreme case β =∞,
all agents choose the predictor with the highest fitness. In an evolutionary framework one
can refer to β as the selection pressure. As β increases the selection pressure increases,
so that more and more agents use the strategy with the higher fitness.
If we introduce mt = n
1
t − n2t we can rewrite the market equilibrium equation as:
A−Bpt+1 = b
2
(
pe,1t+1(1 +mt) + p
e,2
t+1(1−mt)
)
where
mt+1 = tanh
(
β
2
(∆pit+1 − C)
)
.
The framework introduced so far is still general in terms of the actual predictors used.
Following BH (1997) we consider the choice between costly rational expectations and
freely available naive expectations:
pe,1t+1 = pt+1,
pe,2t+1 = pt.
The ARED in the case of a rational expectation predictor “versus” a naive predictor is
then given by:
A−Bpt+1 = b2 (pt+1(1 +mt) + pt(1−mt)) , (2.8)
mt+1 = tanh
(
β
2
[
b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2 − C
])
. (2.9)
The timing in the ARED is important. First, the new market clearing price pt+1 is
determined using the old fractions n1t and n
2
t (or difference in fractions mt). Second,
the new realized market price pt+1 is used to update and determine the new fractions
n1t+1 and n
2
t+1 (or difference in fractions mt+1). Notice that in the market clearing equa-
tion (2.8) pt+1 is only implicitly defined, but it can be solved explicitly easily by some
map pt+1 = Fβ,1(pt,mt). The ARED of the cobweb model with rational versus naive
expectations and strategy selection based upon realized profits is thus described by a
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two-dimensional system of nonlinear difference equations (pt+1,mt+1) = Fβ(pt,mt) =
(Fβ,1(pt,mt), Fβ,2(pt,mt)). We discuss the dynamics of Fβ as the intensity of choice, or
selection pressure, β, increases.
A straightforward computation shows that the unique steady state of the system is:
E = (p∗,m∗) =
(
A
b+B
, tanh
(
−βC
2
))
.
Notice that the steady state value of the difference in fractions, m∗ = m∗(β), depends on
β. In particular when costs for rational expectations C > 0, as the intensity of choice β
increases, the steady state fraction of rational agents, n1∗ = (1 + m∗)/2, decreases and
n1∗ → 0 as β → ∞. The economic intuition is that at the steady state p∗ there is no
fitness advantage in buying a rational predictor, since both predictors predict the same,
correct, value. As the intensity of choice increases more and more agents choose the naive
predictor. The following Theorem (Theorem 3.1 in BH (1997)) summarizes the stability
of the steady state.
Theorem 2.1 Assume that the slopes of supply and demand satisfy b/B > 1:
(i) When the information costs C = 0, the steady state E = (p∗, 0) is always globally
stable;
(ii) When the information costs C > 0, then there exists a critical value β1 such that
for 0 ≤ β < β1 the steady state is globally stable, while for β > β1 the steady state
is an unstable saddle point with eigenvalues 0 and
λ(β) = − b(1−m
∗(β))
2B + b(1 +m∗(β))
.
At the critical value β1 the steady state value m
∗(β1) = −B/b.
(iii) When the steady state is unstable, there exists a locally unique period 2 cycle. There
exists a β2 > β1 such that the period 2 cycle is stable for β1 < β < β2.
The assumption b/B > 1 means that if all agents employ naive expectations, the market
will be unstable. The case with b/B < 1 is straightforward since it leads to convergence
to the steady state for all values in the parameter space. In the ARED with b/B > 1, as
soon as deliberation costs are positive an increase in the intensity of choice destabilizes
the system, and yields an unstable saddle point steady state and the creation of a (stable)
two-cycle through a period doubling bifurcation. BH (1997) show that, as the intensity
of choice further increases, the two-cycle also becomes unstable and a rational route to
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randomness, that is, a bifurcation route to complicated chaotic price fluctuations, occurs.
The mechanism responsible for generating complicated price dynamics is the interplay
between a local, close to the steady state, destabilizing force and a global, far from the
steady state, stabilizing force. The interplay is fostered by the evolutionary switching
mechanism. Technically, it is responsible for homoclinic bifurcations and the presence
of strange attractors in the dynamics of prices and fractions as discussed in detail in
BH (1997). Recently, the same mechanism and type of bifurcations have been shown
to generate complicated price fluctuations in other frameworks, for example a Cournot
duopoly model in Droste, Hommes, and Tuinstra (2002) or a financial market where
informed and uniformed agents coexist as in De Fontnouvelle (2000) and in Chapter 4 of
this thesis.
The economic intuition of this phenomenon can be explained in the limiting case
β = ∞. In this case, in each period, all agents choose the predictor with the highest
fitness measure, i.e. past realized profits, no matter how small or big this difference is.
From (2.9), for β =∞, the difference in fractions mt is determined by:
mt =

+1, if
b
2
(pt − pt−1)2 > C,
−1, if b
2
(pt − pt−1)2 ≤ C,
so that pt+1 is given by:
pt+1 = f∞(pt, pt−1) =

p∗, if
b
2
(pt − pt−1)2 > C,
A
B
− b
B
pt, if
b
2
(pt − pt−1)2 ≤ C.
(2.10)
The following Theorem (Theorem 3.2 in BH (1997)) characterizes the price dynamics
in this case.
Theorem 2.2 For β = ∞, even when the market is locally unstable (i.e. b/B > 1) and
when deliberation or information costs C > 0, the system always converges to the saddle
point equilibrium steady state E = (p∗,−1).
The reasoning behind the proof is quite instructive and provides a simple economic
intuition. For β = ∞ in each period either all agents are rational (m = +1) or all
agents are naive (m = −1). Assume e.g. that all agents are naive and let the price be
close to the steady state. For m = −1 the price will diverge from p∗ due to the local
instability. As long as m = −1, price fluctuations become bigger (in absolute value) and
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errors made by the naive forecast will rapidly increase, until the point where the difference
between realized profits of rational and naive expectations exceeds the costs for rational
expectations. At that point, since β = ∞, all agents buy the rational predictor, so that
m becomes +1, and in the next period the price jumps immediately onto the steady state
price p∗, and remains there forever.
For future comparison with the model of Section 2.3, it is instructive to compute the
difference between the maximum and the minimum observable price when β = ∞. We
define this maximum difference ∆f∞, where the superscript fand the subscript ∞ refer to
the map f∞ defined in (2.10).
Lemma 2.1 When β = ∞, the difference between the maximum and the minimum ob-
servable price is ∆f∞ =
2b2
B(B + b)
√
2C/b.
2.3 Strategy switching with forward looking agents
In the original BH-model agents are backward looking in their selection of prediction
strategies since their choice is based upon past realized profits, but they are forward looking
in their production decision because, given their price forecast, they maximize expected
profits. In this section we discuss the model with forward looking agents, with both
strategy selection and production decisions based upon expected profit. In the forward
looking case, at time t the fitness measure difference used for strategy selection between
the rational and naive predictors becomes:
∆U et+1 = ∆pi
e
t+1 − C = pie,1t+1 − pie,2t+1 − C, (2.11)
where, as before, C represents the costs for the rational expectations predictor.
We will discuss two different versions of the model with forward looking agents, de-
pending on the way agents compute their expected profit. In Subsection 2.3.1 all agents,
i.e. both agents using the rational and the naive forecast, have perfect foresight on ex-
pected profits conditional on their production decision. We will refer to this case as
perfectly forward looking agents in strategy selection. In Subsection 2.3.2 we discuss a
different version of the model where agents using the rational price forecast still have
perfect foresight on expected profits, whereas the agents using the naive price forecast
employ their most recent observations to make a simple estimate of their expected profit.
We will refer to this case as boundedly rational forward looking agents.
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2.3.1 Perfectly forward looking agents
Consider forward looking agents and a discrete choice random utility model, with expected
profit as the fitness measure in the following way. As before, given the expected price
pet+1, the optimal supply S(p
e
t+1) = bp
e
t+1 is derived from expected profit maximization
with quadratic production cost function. There are two price forecast strategies available,
the rational forecast at cost C and the freely available naive forecast. As before, market
equilibrium at time t+ 1 is given by:
A−Bpt+1 = n1t bpt+1 + n2t bpt. (2.12)
The fraction of agents who adopt strategy i, nit, is determined via a discrete choice model as
in (2.7), but this time the fitness of each predictor is measured in terms of the expectations
at time t about profits at time t+ 1:
nit =
eβU
e,i
t+1
Zt
, (2.13)
where Zt =
∑
h e
βUe,ht+1 is the usual normalization factor. The rational predictor is evalu-
ated according to:
U e,1t+1 = pi
e,1
t+1 − C, (2.14)
whereas the naive predictor is evaluated according to:
U e,2t+1 = pi
e,2
t+1. (2.15)
In both cases:
pie,it+1 = pi(pt+1, p
e,i
t+1) = pt+1S(p
e,i
t+1)− c(S(pe,it+1)). (2.16)
Notice that the expected profit, pie,it+1, i = 1, 2, depends both on the expected price p
e,i
t+1,
which determines the production decision at time t, and on the price that clears the market
at time t+1, pt+1. We assume that the economy works “as if” agents have perfect foresight
on this second price. This implies that whatever their production decision is, agents have
perfect foresight on expected profits. Stated differently, given the production decisions,
fractions of the strategies are determined “as if” agents compute expected profits without
errors.
At this point it is useful to discuss a potential inconsistency problem in the model. If
agents have perfect foresight on the expected profit, then, at time t, wouldn’t they also
“know” the price forecast pt+1? If they could extract the perfect foresight price forecast
from perfect foresight on expected profits, there would be no incentive left to pay the
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information costs C for the perfect price forecast.
In order to avoid this behavioral inconsistency, we assume that there is an expert man-
ager who has “structural knowledge” about the economy enabling him to have structural
rational expectations. Each agent can choose either to run the business by himself or hire
an expert manager with “structural knowledge” of the economy and rational expecta-
tions. The manager promises the agent a sure net profit, after subtracting an (unknown)
cost C for his service. Agents take the decision to hire or not to hire the rational ex-
pert manager by evaluating the fitness measure difference (2.11) which is computed and
announced by the expert manager and available as public information. The fraction of
agents that chooses to hire the rational expert manager is determined by the difference
in fitness announced by the manager, according to the random utility framework. It is
important that agents do not know the division between profits and costs C in the net
revenue they receive from their manager, because if they did they could derive the perfect
foresight forecast from public information. Notice also that the manager is “credible” in
the sense that, given the production decision of the agents, the manager delivers the net
profits that he announces.
We are aware of the limitations of these assumptions and we do not claim this to be
a realistic description of market behavior. Rather we view this model as an interesting
theoretical benchmark with strategy switching determined by rational forward looking
behavior on expected profits. In this theoretical benchmark, forward looking strategy
switching is not affected by any mistakes of the agents in evaluating their expected profits.
In Subsection 2.3.2 we will consider the probably more realistic case where some forward
looking agents make mistakes in evaluating their expected payoff.
Under the assumption of perfect foresight on expected profits for both types, the
expected profits for rational respectively naive agents are given by
pie,1t+1 = pi(pt+1, p
e,1
t+1) = pt+1S(pt+1)− c(S(pt+1)) =
b
2
p2t+1, (2.17)
pie,2t+1 = pi(pt+1, p
e,2
t+1) = pt+1S(pt)− c(S(pt)) =
b
2
pt(2pt+1 − pt), (2.18)
where we have used pe,1t+1 = pt+1 and p
e,2
t+1 = pt. Notice that the fitness difference (2.11)
becomes:
∆U et+1 =
b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2 − C. (2.19)
The fractions of the two types are determined via a discrete choice model as before,
with fitness measure difference (2.19). Working again with the difference in fractions
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mt = n
1
t − n2t , the system is given by:
A−Bpt+1 = b
2
(pt+1(1 +mt) + pt(1−mt)) , (2.20)
mt = tanh
(
β
2
[
b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2 − C
])
. (2.21)
We define a Managerial Perfect Foresight Equilibrium to be a time path of prices pt,
produced quantities xit, i = 1, 2, fractions of agents choosing strategy i, n
i
t, i = 1, 2, and
point expectation of profits, pie,it+1, i = 1, 2, that, at each date t satisfies equations (2.12–
2.18) with supply equals demand and fulfilled point expectations. Co-evolution of prices
and (difference in) fractions is described by (2.20–2.21). We use the extra adjective,
managerial, because our concept of perfect foresight equilibrium requires both agents
having perfect foresight (i.e. fulfilled point expectations) on the amount of net revenue
(which is the net profit received by the agent after deducting the manager’s operating
cost, C), as well as the manager generating profits consistent with perfect foresight on
the date t+ 1 price pt+1.
It is useful to compare the model with perfectly forward looking agents (2.20-2.21)
to the original model with backward looking agents (2.8-2.9). In the forward looking
case the difference in fractions mt is simply a one period ahead version of the backward
looking case. In fact, in the forward looking case the difference in fractions of the two
strategies, mt, depends upon pt and pt+1, implying that the market clearing equation
(2.20) is only implicitly defined. The following result states that (2.20-2.21) translates
into a well defined, explicit one-dimensional map pt+1 = gβ(pt) (seeFigure 2.1).
Theorem 2.3 Given a linear demand and a linear supply curve, for any value of the
information cost C ≥ 0, the intensity of choice β ≥ 0 and the initial price pt, (2.20-2.21)
determines a well defined map pt+1 = gβ(pt). That is, there exists a unique non-negative
price pt+1 such that, at time t+1, either the market is in equilibrium or the excess supply
is positive at pt+1 = 0. Furthermore the map gβ is continuous.
A straightforward calculation shows that, as before, p∗ = A/(b + B) is always the
unique fixed point of the map gβ. The corresponding fraction difference m is again given
by m∗(β) = tanh(−βC/2). The following theorem characterizes the dynamics:
Theorem 2.4 Assume that the slopes of supply and demand satisfy b/B > 1.
(i) When the information costs C = 0, the steady state E = p∗ is always globally stable.
(ii) When the information costs C > 0, then there exists a critical value β1 such that
for 0 ≤ β < β1 the equilibrium is globally stable, while for β > β1 the equilibrium is
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Figure 2.1: Perfectly forward looking agents. The graph of pt+1 = gβ(pt) for four different
values of β. The three points where all graphs intersect correspond to the steady state p∗ (in
the middle) and points where m(pt, pt+1) = 0, that is, where the profit difference of the two
strategies is equal to the net cost C. Other parameters are: A = 1.5, B = 1, b = 2, C = 0.1.
unstable with eigenvalue,
λ(β) = − b(1−m
∗(β))
2B + b(1 +m∗(β))
.
At the critical value β1 the steady state value m
∗(β1) = −B/b.
(iii) When the steady state is unstable, there exists a unique period 2 orbit {p1, p2}. The
period 2 orbit is globally stable for any value of β > β1.
Compare the local stability of the system with forward looking agents as specified in The-
orem 2.4 with the local stability of the system with backward looking agents as specified
in Theorem 2.1. Points (i) and (ii) of both Theorems imply that for small values of the
switching parameter β the systems behave similarly. When the switching parameter is
smaller than the primary bifurcation value β1 the steady state is stable, while for β > β1 a
(stable) period 2-cycle is created. Notice that the primary bifurcation value β1 is the same
for both systems. For larger values of β, according to (iii), the backward looking and
forward looking cases are different. In the backward looking case the 2-cycle is stable only
when β1 < β < β2, whereas in the perfectly forward looking case the 2-cycle is stable for
all values of the switching parameter β > β1. The rational route to randomness (i.e. the
bifurcation route to chaos) has disappeared due to the perfectly forward looking strategy
switching behavior of the agents. Technically, no homoclinic bifurcation is observed and
the interplay between local instability and global stability is different.
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The reason that complicated dynamics does not arise is that perfectly forward looking
agents do not make mistakes in the estimation of their expected profits. In contrast,
backward looking agents use past realized profits to evaluate which predictor to use,
and therefore may make big mistakes. In particular, these mistakes may lead to big
losses for the agents who choose a naive predictor, especially when β is high. In fact
in the backward looking case, when the cheap naive predictor has performed well in the
last period it attracts many agents. This triggers local instability with prices deviating
more and more from the steady state and bigger and bigger errors in profit estimation.
When these mistakes become sufficiently large and β is high, many agents switch back
to the rational predictor, thus pushing prices back very close to the steady state. But
close to the steady state the cheap naive predictor works fine and is less costly than the
rational predictor, so that the story repeats. When agents are perfectly forward looking
concerning expected profits, big mistakes by the naive predictor are anticipated by the
forward looking behavior, and therefore prices will not deviate from their steady state
very far nor will they be pushed back to the steady state very closely.
An analysis of the case of an infinite switching parameter enables us to make this
point precise. Remember that in the case of backward looking agents for β =∞ the price
always converges to the (locally unstable) steady state value, as stated in Theorem 2.2.
As stated in the next theorem in the case of forward looking agents, in the limit case
β = ∞ prices always converge to a period 2 orbit. For β = ∞ the map gβ defined by
(2.20-2.21) becomes (see Figure 2.2):
pt+1 = g∞(pt) =

p∗, if pt ∈ [0, p∗ − p˜] ∪ [p∗ + p˜,∞),
pt +
√
2C/b, if pt ∈ (p∗ − p˜, p∗ − δp˜),
A
B
− b
B
pt, if pt ∈ [p∗ − δp˜, p∗ + δp˜],
pt −
√
2C/b, if pt ∈ (p∗ + δp˜, p∗ + p˜),
(2.22)
where p˜ =
√
2C/b and δ = B/(B + b) < 1.
Theorem 2.5 For β =∞, when the market is locally unstable (i.e. b/B > 1) and when
information costs C > 0 the system always converges to a period 2 orbit. A continuum of
period 2 orbits exists. Furthermore, the difference between the maximum and the minimum
observable price is:
∆g∞ =
2b
B + b
√
2C
b
.
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Figure 2.2: β = ∞. Comparison of the map pt+1 = g∞(pt) in (2.22) for perfectly forward
looking agents and the corresponding 1-D map in the case of backward looking agents. The
latter has been obtained from the projection of the two dimensional map pt+1 = f∞(pt, pt−1) in
(2.10) with pt−1 given by the inverse-image of (pt,−1) through the map Fβ,1 (see also the Proof
of Lemma 2.1 in Appendix). Other parameters: A = 1.5, B = 1, b = 2 C = 0.1.
that is ∆g∞ =
(B
b
)
∆f∞ < ∆
f
∞.
The last part of Theorem 2.5 points to another difference with the original model concern-
ing the size of fluctuations. Figure 2.2 illustrates this difference between the models with
backward looking and forward looking strategy selection. The backward looking map f∞
has a higher maximum and a lower minimum, that is ∆g∞ < ∆
f
∞. A comparison of the two
maps clarifies that the globally stabilizing forces are different. In the backward looking
case agents make larger errors and it takes one extra time period before agents are ready
to switch to the costly rational strategy. Moreover, if the errors have grown too large, all
agents share the same experience and all switch to the costly rational strategy at the same
time. In the forward looking case, agents anticipate large mistakes and start switching to
the rational strategy already before the errors grow too large. Moreover, forward looking
behavior prevents all agents to switch at the same point in time, but instead ensures a
smooth and gradual switching to the costly rational strategy, leading to smooth dynamics
and an interval of 2-cycles at some not too far away distance from the steady state with
rational and naive agents co-existing (see the parts of the graph of g∞ parallel to the
diagonal). In this model, forward looking behavior based on expected profits instead of
realized profits leads to smoother transitions and dampened fluctuations in the short run
but also prevents the system to return (close) to the steady state price in the long run.
The presence of a regular 2-cycle for a large interval of values of the switching param-
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eter β (e.g. Figure 2.3) raises the question whether boundedly rational agents are able to
detect the regular structure from time series observations and exploit it? Stated differ-
ently, is the 2-cycle equilibrium “evolutionary stable”, that is, will the cycle persist when
other boundedly rational agents “invade” the system? We will not address this problem in
detail here, but investigate the problem by some simple simulations, illustrated in Figure
2.4. The answer depends on whether or not additional boundedly rational rules have costs
associated to them, e.g. higher costs when the rule uses more memory. In what follows,
all agents, including those using the new price forecasting rules, have perfect foresight
on expected profits as before. First consider the case where rational expectations at cost
C versus free naive expectations leads to a stable 2-cycle. Suppose a new forecast rule
pet+1 = pt−1 (call it a period-2 rule), at costs C
′, 0 < C ′ < C, enters the system. Along
the 2-cycle this period-2 rule has in fact perfect foresight, and since it is cheaper than
the rational perfect foresight rule, many agents will start using the period-2 rule. Figure
2.4 shows that the system with rational versus period-2 versus naive locks into another
stable 2-cycle, with smaller amplitude because of the lower costs for the period-2 rule.
The costly rational expectations rule is (almost) driven out of the market and replaced by
the cheaper (but still costly) period-2 rule, but the equilibrium outcome remains a stable
2-cycle (with smaller amplitude).
Next consider the case where costly rational versus free naive expectations leads to a
stable 2-cycle, and a new period-2 rule at zero costs invades the system. Figure 2.4 shows
that the system with costly rational versus free naive versus free period-2 converges to a
stable 3-cycle of smaller amplitude. The intuition is that along the original 2-cycle, agents
switch to the period-2 rule because its forecast is the same as the rational rule but at no
costs. As a consequence, the amplitude of price fluctuations decreases, which leads to
smaller forecasting errors of the naive rule and thus an increase of the fraction of agents
using the naive rule. With the naive and the period-2 rule both having positive fractions
the system locks into a stable small amplitude 3-cycle. We can continue the story and
introduce an additional type using a period-3 rule (i.e. pt+1 = pt−2) entering the market.
This system with 4 different rules locks into a stable 4-cycle with even smaller amplitude
as shown in Figure 2.4. Similarly, adding another new type, a period-4 rule, the system
locks into a stable 5-cycle with very small amplitude. Finally, adding a period-5 rule,
the system stabilizes and locks into the stable steady state price. The intuition is that
with more and more period-k rules at no costs, many rules gain positive weight and the
system behaves as if agents use (a weighed average) of past prices as their forecast, thus
stabilizing price fluctuations.
The key point of this simulation exercise is that when new boundedly rational fore-
casting rules “invade” the system and more memory comes at higher costs, the stable
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Figure 2.3: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β. The case of backward looking agents (top
panel, Section 2.2), perfectly forward looking agents (middle panel, Subsection 2.3.1) and the
case of boundedly rational forward looking agents (bottom panel, Subsection 2.3.2). The other
parameters are A = 1.5, B = 1.0, b = 2.0 (this leads p∗ = 0.5) and C = 0.1.
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Figure 2.4: Forward looking agents with perfect foresight. This figure illustrates the stability
of the 2-cycle when naive and rational predictors are available (first row, left panel) with respect
to “mutation” to other predictors (all the other panels). If a 2-period predictor emerges at a
cost C ′ ∈ (0, C), the 2-cycle is still stable but has a lower amplitude (first row, right panel). If a
2-period predictor emerges at no cost, the interaction of naive, rational and 2-period predictors
leads to a 3-cycle (second row, left panel). In the panels that follow, at every step (from left to
right and from top to bottom) a higher period predictor is introduced. This leads to creation of
a 4-cycle, a 5-cycle and, finally, to the stabilization of the system. In all cases, the parameters
are A = 3, B = 1, b = 5, β = 300, C = 0.1.
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2-cycle persists but has smaller amplitude. In contrast, when there are no costs asso-
ciated to boundedly rational rules with more memory, price fluctuations stabilize. This
situation is similar to the simulations of the El-Farol bar problem described by Arthur
(1994), where “cycles are quickly arbitraged away” by cycle-detector predictors. Another
example, where autocorrelation structure is arbitraged away by adding rules, is presented
in Chapter 3 of this thesis. This may be a characteristic feature of systems with negative
feedback from expectation to realization, as in the cobweb model.
2.3.2 Boundedly rational forward looking agents
In the previous subsection all agents were assumed to be perfectly forward looking con-
cerning expected profits. In this subsection we back off from perfect rationality and
assume that in order to choose their strategy some agents only make a boundedly ra-
tional estimate of expected profits. As in the previous subsection, we assume that each
agent is faced with the choice of either hiring an expert manager to run the business or to
run the business himself. In the first case, the story unfolds as in the previous subsection:
by hiring an expert manager, at time t the owner is promised to receive at time t + 1 a
sure profit U e,1t+1 as computed in (2.14) and (2.17). The manager promising this last payoff
uses rational expectations and keeps an (unknown) amount C of the profit of the firm
for himself. As a result U e,1t+1 = pi
e,1
t+1 − C. Since the agent (the owner of the firm) does
not know C, he is not able to extract the rational expectations price forecast at the time
he compares the two expected net profits. The computation of the fitness in the second
case, when the owner decides to run the business by himself, is done in a different way
than in the previous subsection. Equation (2.15) still holds but, in this case, we assume
that the naive agent makes an estimate of the expected profit. We refer to this case as
boundedly rational forward looking agents. We focus here on a simple case where the
naive agents use their naive forecast both in the production decision and in the forecast
of the expected profit. Instead of (2.18) he uses:
pie,2t+1 = pi(p
e,2
t+1, p
e,2
t+1) = pi(pt, pt) =
b
2
(pt)
2. (2.23)
In Subsection 2.3.1 agents switch between prediction strategies only because one of the
two is granted a higher profit. In the present case, agents are switching between the two
predictors not only because naive agents make price forecasting errors, but also because
they make a wrong estimate of the expected payoff they will get by using the naive
predictor. As we shall see this additional error complicates the qualitative dynamics, but
does not change the amplitude of the price fluctuation significantly.
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Summing up, at time t, the expected fitness difference of the two predictors is:
∆U et+1 =
b
2
(p2t+1 − p2t )− C. (2.24)
The fraction of agents using the predictor i = 1, 2 at time t is as in (2.13). Using
mt = n
1
t − n2t , market equilibrium and the evolution of the fractions’ difference are
A−Bpt+1 = b
2
[pt+1(1 +mt) + pt(1−mt)], (2.25)
mt = tanh
(
β
2
[
b
2
(p2t+1 − p2t )− C
])
. (2.26)
As in the case of perfectly forward looking agents in (2.21), the difference in fractions mt
in (2.26) depends upon pt and pt+1, so that the market clearing equation (2.25) is again
implicitly defined. The following result states that (2.25-2.26) determines a well defined,
explicit one-dimensional map pt+1 = hβ(pt):
Theorem 2.6 Given linear demand and linear supply, for any value of the information
cost C ≥ 0, the intensity of choice β ≥ 0 and the price pt, the system (2.25-2.26) implies
a well defined map pt+1 = hβ(pt). That is, there exists a unique minimum non-negative
price pt+1 such that, at time t+1, either the market is in equilibrium or the excess supply
is positive at pt+1 = 0. Sufficient conditions for continuity of the map hβ are β < 2/(Ap
∗)
or , when β > 2/(Ap∗),
1 + tanh
(
−β
2
C
)
< 2
B
b
2/(Ap∗)
β − 2/(Ap∗) . (2.27)
Notice that (2.27) is always satisfied in the limit as β →∞. Some graphs of the map hβ
and the associated dynamics are given in Figure 2.5. The fixed point of the system is the
same as before: E = (p∗,m∗(β)) = (A/(b+ B), tanh(−βC/2)). The following theorem is
the analogue of Theorems 2.1 and 2.4 in the case of forward looking boundedly rational
agents:
Theorem 2.7 Assume that the slopes of supply and demand satisfy b/B > 1.
(i) When the information costs C > 0, then there exists a critical value β1 such that
for 0 ≤ β < β1 the equilibrium is globally stable, while for β > β1 the equilibrium is
unstable with eigenvalue,
λ(β) = − b(1−m
∗(β))
2B + b(1 +m∗(β))
.
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At the critical value β1 the steady state value m
∗(β1) = −B/b.
(ii) When the steady state is unstable, there exists a locally unique period 2 orbit {p1, p2}.
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Figure 2.5: Boundedly rational forward looking agents. On the left: map and price dynamics
for A = 1.5, B = 1.0, b = 2.0, C = 0.1 and β = 20. The price dynamics converges to a 2-cycle.
On the right: map and price dynamics for A = 1.5, B = 1.0, b = 2.0, C = 0.1 and β = 140. The
price dynamics is chaotic.
Notice the similarity between Theorems 2.1, 2.4 and 2.7. In all cases, the primary
bifurcation leading to local instability is the same. After local instability sets in, the
global dynamics becomes quite different however. Figure 2.3 shows the dynamics of all
three cases, the original backward looking case, the perfectly forward looking case and
the boundedly rational forward looking case. Both forward looking cases clearly have
price fluctuations with smaller amplitude. In contrast to the perfectly forward looking
case, with boundedly rational forward looking agents simulations show that a secondary
bifurcation and a rational route to randomness (i.e. a bifurcation route to chaos) occur,
but for higher values of β than in the original BH-model and with chaotic fluctuations
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with smaller amplitude. The investigation of the case β =∞ helps us to understand the
origins of this difference, the intuition behind it and its economic consequences.
For β =∞, the difference in fractions (2.26) becomes:
mt+1 =

+1, if
b
2
(p2t+1 − p2t ) > C,
−1, if, b
2
(p2t+1 − p2t ) < C,
and, using (2.25), the price at time t+ 1 becomes
pt+1 =

p∗, if pt+1 >
√
p2t + 2C/b,
A
B
− b
B
pt, if pt+1 <
√
p2t + 2C/b,
√
p2t + 2C/b, otherwise.
If we define p¯ such that
√
p¯2 + 2C/b = p∗ and pˆ such that A/B− (b/B)pˆ =√pˆ2 + 2C/b,
the map h∞ becomes:3
pt+1 = h∞(pt) =

p∗, if pt < p¯,√
p2t + 2C/b, if p ∈ [p¯, pˆ],
A
B
− b
B
pt, if pt > pˆ.
(2.28)
Two graphs of the map h∞ are given in Figure 2.10 in the Appendix illustrating the
proofs. The following theorem states that, if the market is sufficiently unstable, in the
case with boundedly rational agents complicated dynamical behavior arises.
Theorem 2.8 For β = +∞, when the market is locally unstable (i.e. b/B > 1) and when
information costs C > 0, there exists a value M > 1 (depending on p∗, C and b) such
that:
(i) when b/B ∈ (1,M ], for an interval of initial conditions, the price dynamics is
bounded away from p∗.
3Notice that p¯ is only defined if C is not too large. If p¯ is well defined, so is pˆ and pˆ ∈ (p¯, p∗).
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of the effect of an homoclinic point in the case of backward looking
agents (left panel) with the case of boundedly rational forward looking agents (right panel).
Notice that even if the price fluctuations are qualitatively similar, they are larger and less
frequent when agents are backward looking. In both cases the parameters are: A = 1.5, B =
0.85, b = 2.15 (this leads to p∗ = 0.5), β = 200 and C = 0.1.
(ii) when b/B > M , there exist infinitely many homoclinic points p, that is, points such
that limn→+∞ hn∞(p) = p
∗ and limn→−∞ hn∞(p) = p
∗.
Recall from Subsection 2.3.1 that in the case with perfectly forward looking agents
local instability always leads to a stable 2-cycle. In the case with boundedly rational
forward looking agents more complicated dynamics arises. Mathematically this difference
is explained by the fact that in the perfectly forward looking case the map g∞ has two
critical points (i.e. points where the map has a local maximum or a local minimum; see
Figure 2.2), whereas in the boundedly rational forward looking case the map h∞ has only
one critical point (a local maximum) and the map is linearly decreasing for all p > p∗. In
particular, if the local instability is strong enough (i.e. b/B is large enough), the steady
state p∗ of the map h∞ has homoclinic points (i.e. points whose time path converges
to p∗ both forward and backward in time). As is well known, existence of homoclinic
points implies complicated, chaotic dynamical behavior as illustrated in the time series of
Figure 2.5 and 2.6.
From an economic viewpoint the key difference is that boundedly rational agents make
errors in their estimation of expected profits. In particular, when the price pt > p
∗ is large,
boundedly rational forward looking agents expect a high profit and therefore stick to the
simple, naive strategy. This profit expectation turns out to be wrong, and the error may
become so large that (almost) all agents switch to the rational strategy, pushing prices
back (close) to the steady state. This interaction between local instability and global
stability generates chaotic price fluctuations when the intensity of choice is high, as in
case of backward looking agents. Nevertheless the size of such fluctuations remains limited
40 CHAPTER 2. DELIBERATION COSTS IN A COBWEB MODEL
as in the case of perfectly forward looking agents. Forward looking behavior thus dampens
the amplitude of price fluctuations, while bounded rationality may lead to chaotic (small
amplitude) fluctuations.
2.4 An optimizing representative agent
Until now we have focussed on a heterogeneous agent framework, where agents switch
between a costly sophisticated and a cheap simple rule. The aim of this section is to
reconcile the heterogeneous agent framework with that of a representative agent optimally
choosing from a continuum of expectation rules of different quality. The representative
agent outweighs the benefits of a better prediction rule against the costs of information
gathering, or deliberation costs, in the spirit of Simon (1955, 1957). Our approach has
been inspired by a recent chapter of Dudek (2004); see also Evans and Ramey (1992).
Consider a cobweb model with a representative supplier. As before the production
decision at time t depends upon the prediction pet+1 for the price at time t + 1. The
representative supplier can optimally choose among a continuum of forecasting rules, each
with different quality and costs. At time t, choosing a predictor with quality q ∈ [0, 1]
corresponds to buy, at a cost C(q), a signal νt such that
νt =

pt+1, with probability q,
pt, with probability 1− q.
(2.29)
The information gathering cost function C(q) is assumed to be increasing and convex.
In order to optimally choose the quality of the signal, the representative agent computes
his expected net profit and maximizes it with respect to q. In general, a better signal
gives a higher gross expected profit at a higher cost. At period t, the trade off between
expected profits and information gathering costs sets the optimal predictor quality, q∗t ,
which determines the optimal supply xt, which, given the demand, determines the realized
price and profit at time t + 1, and so on and so forth. The purpose of this section is to
investigate the equilibrium price dynamics generated by this mechanism and to compare
it with the heterogeneous agent models of the previous section.
Similarly to Subsection 2.3.1, we focus on the case of a perfectly forward looking
representative agent, that is, the representative agent behaves “as if” he has perfect
foresight on expected profit and no systematic errors are made in estimating expected
profits. Expected profits of a representative agent choosing the perfect foresight forecast
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with probability q and the naive forecast with probability (1− q) is then given by:
piet+1(q) = qpi(pt+1, pt+1) + (1− q)pi(pt+1, pt). (2.30)
In this case the fitness measure for using quality q is given by:
U et+1(q) = pi
e
t+1 − C(q). (2.31)
Similarly to the story underlying the managerial perfect foresight equilibrium of Subsec-
tion 2.3.1, we assume that there is a continuum of managers who offer to sell a predictor of
quality q ∈ [0, 1]. The managers have perfect foresight on expected profits. The represen-
tative agent can not compute the expected profit by himself, but compares the fitnesses
announced by the managers without knowing the value of C(q) and thus being unable to
derive pt+1 from public information.
To optimally choose the quality of the signal, the representative agent compares the
fitness associated with each predictor q ∈ [0, 1]. At period t, by choosing the predictor,
that is, the level of q that grants him the higher fitness, the agent behaves “as if” he is
solving:
Argmaxq{U et+1(q)} = Argmaxq{qpi(pt+1, pt+1) + (1− q)pi(pt+1, pt)− C(q)}. (2.32)
If this maximization problem has an interior solution, it is given by the solution of the
first order condition:
pi(pt+1, pt+1)− pi(pt+1, pt) = b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2 = C ′(q). (2.33)
The specific solution depends on the functional form of C(q). In general, given a solution
of the maximization problem at time t, which we shall call q∗t , we can derive the implicit
equation that sets the price at time t + 1. To do that notice that, by the Law of Large
Numbers, on average the representative agent produces:
S¯(νt) = S(ν¯t) = bq
∗
t pt+1 + b(1− q∗t )pt.
At time t+ 1 market clearing (implicitly) defines the price pt+1 according to:
A−Bpt+1 = bq∗t pt+1 + b(1− q∗t )pt. (2.34)
The price is only implicitly defined because the optimal level of q is, in general, a function
of pt and pt+1, that is, q
∗
t = q
∗
t (pt, pt+1). In what follows we investigate the equilibrium
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price dynamics for different functional forms of the information gathering cost function
C(q).
2.4.1 Linear cost function
Consider first the case of a linear information gathering cost function C(q). The following
theorem shows that in the linear case, the price dynamics described by (2.34) exactly
corresponds to the price dynamics of the heterogeneous agent model with perfectly forward
looking agents in Subsection 2.3.1 when β =∞.
Theorem 2.9 When the marginal information gathering costs of the representative agent
is constant, i.e. , C ′(q) = C, the system (2.33-2.34) is equivalent to the heterogeneous
agent system (2.20-2.21) with β =∞. Consequently, when the market is locally unstable
the system (2.33-2.34) always converges to a period 2 orbit.
This is a first interesting correspondence between the models: the representative agent
model with a linear cost function for information gathering corresponds exactly to the
heterogeneous agent model with intensity of choice β =∞. This result may be explained
by observing two key features: (1) in the limit β →∞ all agents choose the best predictor,
so that the heterogeneous agent model reduces to a single agent model (possibly switching
between strategies over time); (2) in the case of a linear information gathering function
in each time period typically it is optimal for the representative agent to use an extreme
signal, that is, to use either q∗ = 0 (naive) or q∗ = 1 (rational expectations).
2.4.2 Nonlinear cost function
What is the relation between a heterogeneous agent and a representative agent framework
in the case of a general, nonlinear information gathering function C(q)? To answer this
question, it is useful to consider an explicit example. Take as cost function:
C(q;α) = Cqα, α > 1,
where C(0) = 0, C(1) = C, C ′(0) = 0 and C ′(1) = αC. In this case the maximization
problem (2.32) may have an interior solution. In order to find it, we solve the first order
condition (2.33) and get:
q∗t =
[b/2(pt+1 − pt)2
αC
] 1
α−1
.
Notice that as long as the cost function is convex (α > 1), the optimal level of q is an
increasing function of pt+1. This turns out to be important for the uniqueness of the
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market equilibrium price. The market equilibrium equation (2.34) becomes:
A−Bpt+1 =
[b/2(pt+1 − pt)2
αC
] 1
α−1
b(pt+1 − pt) + bpt. (2.35)
Theorem 2.10 Let α > 1. For any fixed value of pt ≥ 0, the system (2.35) implies a
well-defined map pt+1 = r(pt). That is, there exists a unique minimum non-negative price
pt+1 such that, at time t + 1, either the market is in equilibrium or the excess supply is
positive at pt+1 = 0.
A straightforward calculation shows that for any α ≥ 1 and C ≥ 0 the fixed point
of the system is p∗ = A/(b + B), as before. Figure 2.7 shows a graph of the map in the
case of a quadratic cost function (α = 2). The following theorem characterizes the price
dynamics.
Theorem 2.11 Let C(q) = Cq2. When b/B < 1, the price dynamics converges to the
steady state equilibrium p∗. When b/B > 1, the steady state is locally unstable and a
unique globally stable 2-cycle exists.
It turns out to be possible to generalize Theorem 2.11 for any increasing and convex
cost function C(q). In fact, the condition for the existence of an interior solution of
(2.32) defines four parallel lines with slope one and intercepts
√
2C ′(1)/b,
√
2C ′(0)/b,
−√2C ′(0)/b, −√2C ′(1)/b; see the Proof of Theorem 2.12 for details. We can use these
lines to define the price dynamics in different regions, for any given C(q). In some regions
delimited by these lines the representative agent is choosing either q = 0 or q = 1 (see
Figure 2.7). For all other values of q the dynamics is implicitly determined by the solution
of the corresponding market equilibrium equation. In terms of the deviation xt = pt − p∗
from the steady state, the map becomes:
xt+1 = r(xt) =

0 if xt ≤ −
√
2C ′(1)/b,
implicit if xt ∈
(
−
√
2C ′(1)/b,−
√
2C ′(0)/b
B
B + b
)
,
− b
B
xt if xt ∈
[
−
√
2C ′(0)/b
B
B + b
,+
√
2C ′(0)/b
B
B + b
]
,
implicit if xt ∈
(
+
√
2C ′(0)/b
B
B + b
,+
√
2C ′(1)/b
)
,
0 if xt ≥
√
2C ′(1)/b.
(2.36)
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Figure 2.7: Graphs of the map xt+1 = r(xt) in (2.36) for different cost functions. Left panel:
C(q) = 0.2q2. Right panel: C(q) = 0.2q2 + 0.1q. In both case, due to the symmetry of the map
around x = 0, the dynamics converges to a 2-cycle. The lines parallel to the diagonal delimit
zones where an implicit solution exists, as specified in (2.36). Other parameters are B = 1 and
b = 2.0.
Figure 2.7 shows the graph of r in two specific cases. The next Theorem shows that
only this partial knowledge of the map r is sufficient to characterize the price dynamic:
Theorem 2.12 Let C(q) be any increasing and convex information gathering cost func-
tion. When b/B < 1 the price dynamics converges to the stable steady state p∗; when
b/B > 1 the steady state is locally unstable and a unique globally stable 2-cycle exists.
Notice that according to Theorem 2.12, in the case of a perfectly forward looking
representative agent concerning expected profit, in the long run the incentives to buy
a perfect foresight predictor are never strong enough, no matter how strong the local
instability of the market is. Stated differently, for any functional form of the cost function,
either (when the market is stable) the agent always chooses a cheap naive predictor (q = 0)
or (when the market is unstable) he switches between a naive predictor and a better, but
non-perfect, predictor with q < 1. Before concluding, we present another interesting
relationship between the representative agent and the heterogeneous agent framework of
Subsection 2.3.1.
Theorem 2.13 There exists a non-decreasing and convex information gathering cost
function C(q) such that the price dynamics driven by the interaction of a group of het-
erogeneous agents choosing between a freely available naive forecast (q = 0) and a costly
perfect foresight forecast (q = 1) at constant cost C as given by (2.20-2.21) is the same
as if a representative agent is operating in the market and optimally chooses a signal
q ∈ [0, 1] with cost C(q) as in(2.33-2.34). For every fixed β and C the cost function C(q)
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is given by:
C(q) =

∫ q
t0
(2 tanh−1(2t− 1)
β
+ C
)
dt, if q ∈ (t0, 1],
0, if q ∈ [0, t0].
where t0 = (1 +m
∗)/2.
It can be shown that this exact correspondence between a heterogeneous agent and
a representative agent framework is not only valid in the perfectly forward looking case
studied in this section, but holds more generally. For example also in the case of boundedly
rational forward looking agents (making mistakes in the estimation of expected profits)
or in the original framework of BH (1997) (with backward looking agents and strategy
switching based on realized profits). Hence, the same trade off between local instability
and global stability when a group of heterogeneous agent is operating in the market exists
when a representative agent optimally chooses the quality of his price predictor. This
kind of theorems show that, for an outside observer, it would be impossible to distinguish
between a heterogeneous agent and the corresponding representative agent economy (cf.
e.g. the discussion in (Kirman, 1992)).
2.5 Conclusion
The Adaptive Rational Equilibrium dynamic can produce complicated equilibrium price
dynamics, due to the interaction between a locally destabilizing force when agents use
simple, cheap strategies and a far from the steady state globally stabilizing force when
errors become so large that most agents switch to the costly rational forecast. In the
original framework, strategy selection is driven by experience or regret, as it based upon
a measure of past realized profits. In this chapter we have investigated how forward look-
ing behavior in strategy selection may affect the co-evolving equilibrium dynamics. With
forward looking behavior, the same local instability due to costly information gathering
and free riding remains, but the amplitude of price fluctuations is dampened. How ex-
actly forward looking behavior affects the globally stabilizing force depends upon how
sophisticated agents are in computing expected profits. When agents are able to make a
perfect forecast for expected profits, prices lock into a stable 2-cycle and the errors of the
cheap naive strategy remain small enough for the population of agents never to switch
completely to the costly rational forecast. If however agents can only make a boundedly
rational forecast of expected profits, errors may grow big enough for (almost) all agents to
switch to the costly rational strategy. In that case, the globally stabilizing force becomes
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strong enough to push prices back close to the (locally unstable) steady state, thus causing
irregular switching between price fluctuations of low and moderate amplitude. Boundedly
rational forward looking agents thus dampen the amplitude of the price oscillations but
a rational route to randomness, as in the backward looking case, remains.
We also have established an equivalence relation between heterogeneous agent models
with evolutionary switching of strategies and a representative agent who optimally chooses
between the benefits of a high quality forecasts and the associated information gathering
costs. To an outside observer it is impossible to distinguish between the heterogeneous
agent model and the corresponding optimal representative agent framework.
We emphasize that we have shown these results to hold in a supply-driven commodity
market, with negative expectational feedback (i.e. a high price forecast leads to high
production and thus a low realized market price). An interesting question for future work
is whether similar results hold for speculative asset markets. In fact, for asset markets
we conjecture that forward looking behavior may actually destabilize the amplitude of
price fluctuations, because of the positive expectational feedback (i.e. high expectations
of future asset prices lead to increased asset demand and thus higher realized market
prices). We leave this conjecture for future research.
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Appendix
2.A Proofs
Proofs of Section 2.2
Proof of Lemma 2.1 The map f∞ defined in (2.10) is two-dimensional. Define f 1∞ as
a one-dimensional projection of f∞ according to
f 1∞(pt) = f∞(pt, (f
−
∞,1)
−1(pt))
where f−∞,1(·) = F∞,1(·,−1) and F∞,1 is the first component of the map Fβ, for β = ∞,
defined in Section 2.2 below equations (2.8-2.9). By applying this definition, one can
easily show that
f 1∞(pt) =
{
A
B
− b
B
pt, if pt ∈ [p∗ − ε, p∗ + ε]
p∗, otherwise
where ε = b
b+B
√
2C/b. The graph of f 1∞ is given in Figure 2.2. The lemma follows by
noticing that the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the map f 1∞ is
2 b
2
B(B+b)
√
2C/b. ¤
Proofs of Section 2.3
Proof of Theorem 2.3 From (2.20) the excess supply function ES(pt, pt+1) is given
by:
ES(pt, pt+1) =
b
2
(pt+1(1 +m(pt, pt+1)) + pt(1−m(pt, pt+1)))− A+Bpt+1, (2.37)
where
m(pt, pt+1) = mt = tanh
(
β
2
[
b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2 − C
])
. (2.38)
Consider for a moment the function ES(pt, y). We define a function y = g˜(pt) such that
ES(pt, y) = 0. A straightforward computation shows that:
∂ES(pt, y)
∂y
=
b
2
(
1 +mt + β
b
2
(y − pt)2(1−mt)(1 +mt)
)
+B > 0.
This implies that given any value of pt we can always find a unique y such that ES(pt, y) =
0. Consequently the function y = g˜(pt) is well defined and, by the implicit function
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theorem, the function g˜ is C1. Define the map gβ as follows
gβ(pt) =
{
g˜(pt) if g˜(pt) ≥ 0
0 if g˜(pt) < 0.
This means that when gβ(pt) = pt+1 > 0, we have ES(pt, pt+1) = 0, whereas when
gβ(pt) = pt+1 = 0, there is excess supply even when the market price is pt+1 = 0. In fact
∂ES(pt, y)/∂y > 0 implies that when g˜(pt) < 0, ES(pt, 0) > ES(pt, g˜(pt)) = 0. Finally
the map g is continuous but in general not differentiable at the lowest price pt for which
gβ(pt) = 0. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.4 In terms of xt = pt − p∗ the system (2.20-2.21) becomes:
−Bxt+1 = b2 (xt+1(1 +mt) + xt(1−mt))
mt = tanh
(
β
2
[
b
2
(xt+1 − xt)2 − C
])
with fixed point x∗ = 0 and corresponding m∗ = tanh(−βC/2). Similarly as in the proof
of Theorem 2.3 it follows that there exists a well defined map xt+1 = g¯β(xt), obtained
from the map pt+1 = gβ(pt) by choosing p
∗ as the origin. To keep the notation simple we
drop the bar, and write g instead of g¯ in what follows. The following properties of the
map g will be useful to prove the Theorem:
(a) g is odd, that is g(−x) = −g(x), and g(x) > 0 when x < 0.
(b) When β > β1 there exists a unique period 2 orbit {a,−a}, satisfying g(g(a)) = a
and g(a) = −a.
(c) g′(0) < g′(x) < 1, for all x.
(d) The map g has two critical points, c and −c. Furthermore g′(x) < 0 iff x ∈ (−c, c),
so that g has a local minimum at x = c and a local maximum at x = −c.
We postpone the proof of properties (a) − (d), and first use them to prove (i) − (iii) in
Theorem 2.4. Notice that, (a) and (d) imply that g(c) is in fact a global minimum and
g(−c) a global maximum. Using the implicit function theorem, we get:
g′(x) = −
∂ES(x,y)
∂x
∂ES(x,y)
∂y
|y=g(x) = −b(1− α)(1−m(x, y))
b(1 +m(x, y) + α(1−m(x, y))) + 2B |y=g(x), (2.39)
where
α =
b
2
β(y − x)2(1 +m(x, y))
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and ES(x, y) is the excess supply function defined in (2.37) and m(x, y) is the difference
of agents’ fractions in (2.38).
Proof of (i). The global stability of x∗ = 0 when C = 0 follows from the fact that in
this case g is a contraction. Indeed using (2.39) one gets g′(0) = −b/(b + 2B) > −1, so
that property (c) implies g′(x) ∈ (−1, 1) for all x.
Proof of (ii). The global stability of the fixed point when β < β1 follows again from
the fact that g is a contraction. In fact
g′(0) = λ(β) = − b(1−m(0, 0))
b(1 +m(0, 0)) + 2B
> −1 iff β < β1,
so that (c) implies g′(x) ∈ (−1, 1). Local instability follows from the fact that g′(0) < −1
when β > β1. The value of β1 is determined by the condition g
′(0) = −1 which gives
m(0, 0) = m∗ = −B/b.
Proof of (iii). Uniqueness of the period 2 cycle follows from (b). In order to show
global stability of the 2-cycle we have to characterize the shape of the map g2. By (d) the
map g has only two critical points, −c < 0 (local maximum) and c > 0 (local minimum).
From now on we concentrate on g2 for x > 0, the results for x < 0 follow by symmetry. We
look for the critical points of g2, that is for the points where (g2)′(x) = g′(g(x))g′(x) = 0.
The positive critical points of g2 are the positive critical point c of g, and points d > 0
such that g(d) = −c. We distinguish two cases.
CASE 1.: g(c) > −c and g(−c) < c (see Figure 2.8). In this case, because c is larger
than the global maximum g(−c), there is no d > 0 such that g(−d) = c. Hence c and
−c are the unique critical points of g2. We claim that (g2)′(x) > 0 when x ∈ (−c, c).
This follows because x ∈ (−c, c) implies both g′(x) < 0 and g(x) ∈ (−c, c) so that
(g2)′(x) = g′(g(x))g′(x) > 0. This, together with g(c) > −c, implies that at the unique
point a > 0 for which g(a) = −a, we have a < c and g′(a) > 0. When β > β1, g′(0) < −1,
so that (g2)′(0) > 1. Hence, x = a is the unique intersection point of g2(x) with y = x
and (g2)′(a) < 1. {a,−a} is therefore a locally stable 2-cycle. Since g2(x) > 0 for all
x > 0 all points (except the unstable steady state) converge and the 2-cycle is globally
stable.
CASE 2.: g(c) < −c and g(−c) > c (see Figure 2.9). In this case there exist two other
positive critical points of g2, d1 and d2, d1 < c < d2, for which g(x) = −c. Moreover,
property (b) implies that a is the unique positive intersection point of g(x) with the line
y = −x, and since g(c) < −c we have d1 < c < a < d2. By symmetry also −d1 and −d2
are critical points of g2 and −d2 < −a < −c < d1. Clearly g2(d1) and g2(d2) are local
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Figure 2.8: Graph of the map g∞ (left panel) and its second iterate g2 (right panel) in the
case when c > a. A = 1.5, B = 1, b = 2, C = 0.1 and β = 20.
maxima and g2(c) is a local minimum, and using (c) and (d) we get 0 ≤ (g2)′(x) < 1, for
all x ∈ [c, d2]. This implies that a ∈ (c, d2) is a locally stable fixed point of g2. From the
global shape of the graph of g2 it follows easily that the 2-cycle is globally stable.
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Figure 2.9: Graph of the map g∞ (left panel) and its second iterate g2 (right panel) in the
case when c < a. A = 1.5, B = 1, b = 2, C = 0.1 and β = 50.
To conclude the proof we have to show that (a), (b), (c), (d) hold.
(a). In deviations x from the steady state the excess supply function is
ES(xt, xt+1) =
b
2
(xt+1(1 +m(xt, xt+1)) + xt(1−m(xt, xt+1))) +Bpt+1. (2.40)
If ES(x, g(x)) = 0 then also ES(−x,−g(x)) = 0, implying g(−x) = −g(x). Moreover,
when x > 0 (x < 0) the only possibility to have ES(x, g(x)) = 0 is g(x) < 0 (g(x) < 0).
(b). We are looking for a point a that g(g(a)) = a. If such a point exists, ES(a, g(a)) =
0 implies ES(g(a), g(g(a))) = ES(g(a), a) = 0 and vice versa. Hence the existence and
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uniqueness of a period-2 orbit {a, g(a)} is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of
a such that ES(a, g(a)) = ES(g(a), a) = 0. Consider the change of variable z = a+ g(a),
w = g(a) − a. We can rewrite ES(a, g(a)) = ES((z − w)/2, (z + w)/2) = E˜S(w, z).
In terms of the new variables and the function E˜S, the existence and uniqueness of
a is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of two points z¯ and w¯ such that both
E˜S(w¯, z¯) = E˜S(−w¯, z¯) = 0. Writing down these two conditions as a function of the new
variables one obtains: 
z¯ = −B+bm(w¯)
B+b
w¯
z¯ = B+bm(w¯)
B+b
w¯
(2.41)
where, with abuse of notation, m(w) is the difference of fraction in (2.38) defined as a
function of g(a) − a = w. Notice that if a solution of (2.41) exists, then z¯ = 0 and
bm(w¯) = −B. Obviously z¯ = 0 implies g(a) = −a. The other equation bm(w¯) = −B is
only possible when β > β1. In fact, when β < β1, m(0) > −B/b so that m(w) > m(0)
implies m(w) > −B/b. When β > β1, bm(w) = −B has two symmetric solutions.
Consequently, a unique symmetric 2-cycle {a,−a} exists for β > β1.
(c). The expression of g′(x) in (2.39) can be rewritten as:
g′(x) =
−b(1− α)
b
(
(1+m(x,y))
(1−m(x,y)) + α
)
+ 2B
(1−m(x,y))
, (2.42)
where
α =
b
2
β(y − x)2(1 +m(x, y))
Since the difference of fractions m is an increasing function of (y − x)2, α is also an
increasing function of (y − x)2. Moreover α ≥ 0 and α = 0 when (y − x)2 = 0. These
properties together with m ∈ (−1, 1) imply that the denominator of g′(x) is a positive
increasing function of (y−x)2 and that the numerator is an increasing function of (y−x)2
which is negative when (y − x)2 = 0. These facts imply that the minimum of g′(x) is
achieved when y − x = 0 that is when y = x which implies x = 0. Moreover when
g′(x) > 0, that is when α > 1, one can easily show that the numerator is always smaller
then the denominator so that g′(x) < 1 for all x.
(d). A critical point c satisfies g′(c) = 0. From (2.42), and from the facts that α is
increasing in (y − x)2 and α = 0 for (y − x)2 = 0, it follows that there exists a unique
(y − x)2 = k such that g′ = 0. In order to show that g has a unique critical point c > 0,
we thus have to show that c is the unique solution of (g(c)− c)2 = k. This translates into
showing that g(c) − c = −√k has a unique positive solution4. We claim here the more
4Since by (a) g(x) < 0 when x > 0, in this case the equation g(c)− c = +√k has no positive solution.
52 CHAPTER 2. DELIBERATION COSTS IN A COBWEB MODEL
general statement that the line y = x − h and the curve y = g(x) intersect only once
when x > 0, ∀h > 0. Change variables from (x, y) to (x, h = x− y), and consider ES as
a function of the new variables. We have ES(x, y) = ES(x, x− h) = ÊS(x, h). One can
easily show that holds:
∂ÊS(x, h)
∂x
=
∂(b/2((1 +m(h))(x− h) + (1−m(h))x) + B(x− h))
∂x
= B + b > 0.
As a consequence we can apply the implicit function theorem and find a function t such
that ÊS(x = t(h), h) = 0. This means that ∀h > 0 it exists a unique x = t(h) and,
as a consequence, a unique y = x − h where ÊS(x, h) = ÊS(x, x − y) = ES(x, y) = 0.
From the last expression it follows that y = g(x), so that, for every given h, there exists
a unique point (x, g(x)) with g(x) = x− h. From this we conlcude that g(x)− x = −√k
has a unique solution c. Property (a) implies c > 0. Since c is the unique positive critical
point, by symmetry also −c is a critical point. Being c and −c the only critical points
and g′(0) < 0 it must be that g′(x) < 0 iff x ∈ (−c, c). This implies that g(c) is a local
minimum and g(−c) a local maximum. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.5 The existence of a 2-cycle can be proven along the same lines
as in Theorem 2.4. Consider the explicit definition of g∞ in (2.22). Let c and −c be the
critical points and d2 > c and −d2 < −c points such that g(d2) = −c and g(−d2) = c as
in the proof of Theorem 2.4. A straightforward computation shows that g2(x) = x for all
x ∈ [−d2, c] ∪ [c, d2]. This implies that g has a continuum of 2-cycles. The computation
of ∆g∞ follows directly from the definition of the map g∞ in (2.22). ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.6 From (2.25) excess supply is given by
ES(pt, pt+1) =
b
2
[pt+1(1 +mt) + pt(1−mt)]− A+Bpt+1 = 0,
where as in (2.26)
mt = tanh
(
β
2
[
b
2
(p2t+1 − p2t )− C
])
.
We are looking for a function h (we drop the subscript β here) such that ES(pt, h(pt)) = 0.
First, we show that there always exists a unique minimum non-negative price pt+1 such
that, at time t+ 1, either the market is in equilibrium or the excess supply is positive at
pt+1 = 0. Second, we show that under certain parameters restrictions h is continuous.
Existence. Write y = pt+1 and x = pt, and let p
∗ = A/(B+ b) as usual and notice that
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ES(p∗, p∗) = 0. Consider y > x, it can be verified that in this case:
∂ES(x, y)
∂y
=
b
2
(
1 +mt +
β
2
by(y − x)(1−mt)(1 +mt)
)
+B > 0. (2.43)
Consequently we can apply the implicit function theorem and there exists a C1 map h
such that ES(x, h(x)) = 0. The case y < x is more difficult, since ∂ES(x, y)/∂y may be
zero. We can rewrite the condition ES(x, y) = 0 as:
2(A− (B + b)y)
b(y − x) = m(y, x)− 1 (2.44)
where
m(y, x) = tanh
(
β
2
b
2
(y2 − x2)− β
2
C
)
.
For y < x, −2 < m− 1 < −1 together with (2.44) imply
A
B
− b
B
x < y <
2A
2B + b
− b
2B + b
x (2.45)
and therefore also x > p∗. Eq. (2.44) and −2 < m− 1 < −1 also imply that when y = 0
there is a value x˜ ∈ (A/b, 2A/b) such that ES(x˜, 0) = 0. Furthermore since
∂ES(x, y)
∂x
|y=0 = b
2
(1−mt − βbx(y − x)(1−mt)(1 +mt)) |y=0 > 0 (2.46)
such a value is unique and ES(x, 0) > 0 for x > x˜, so that we can define h(x) = 0 for
x ∈ [x˜,∞). Notice that for all y ≤ x, ∂ES(x, y)/∂x > 0. By the implicit function theo-
rem there exists a C1 function x = s(y) such that ES(s(y), y) = 0. Clearly s(p∗) = p∗ and
s(0) = x˜. Furthermore by(2.45), s(y) must always be between the lines y = A/b− b/Bx
and y = 2A/(2B+ b)− b/(2B+ b)x. The function h we are looking for is not well defined
yet since many different y values may be mapped to the same x through the map s.
However, when this is the case case, we can always choose the minimum of these y values.
Consequently there always exists a unique minimum non negative price y = pt+1 such
that, at time t+ 1, either the market is in equilibrium or the excess supply is positive at
pt+1 = 0 so that h is well defined. Notice that y = pt+1 is the lowest non negative price
for which ES(pt, y) ≥ 0.
Continuity. The map h defined above may be discontinuous. A sufficient condition for
continuity can be obtained by restricting parameters values such that ∂ES(x, y)/∂y > 0,
also for y < x. In order to obtain such restriction we use (2.43) and (2.44) to evaluate
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∂ES(x, y)/∂y > 0 in those points (x, y) for which ES(x, y) = 0:
∂ES(x, y)
∂y
|ES=0 = B + (1 +m(x, y)) b
2
(1− βy(A− (B + b)y)) > 0. (2.47)
Since (2.45) implies that 0 < y < p∗, we have 1− βy(A− (B + b)y) has a minimum value
1− (βAp∗/4). As a consequence condition (2.47) is satisfied when
B + (1 +m(x, y))
b
2
(1− βAp
∗
4
) > 0. (2.48)
This is clearly always the case when β < 4/(Ap∗). Otherwise, when β ≥ 4/(Ap∗), since
0 ≤ y < x, condition (2.48) is satisfied when
B + (1 +m(0, 0))
b
2
(1− βAp
∗
4
) > 0. (2.49)
which can be rewritten as condition (2.27) in Theorem 2.6. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.7 From Theorem 2.6 one can derive that the map hβ(p) is always
well defined and differentiable in a neighborhood of the point (p∗, p∗). Furthermore one
can use expression (2.43) and (2.46) to compute:
(hβ)
′(p∗) = λ(β) = −(∂ES(x, y)/∂x)|(p∗,p∗)
(∂ES(x, y)/∂y)|(p∗,p∗) = −
b(1−m∗(β))
2B + b(1 +m∗(β))
The value of β1 is found by imposing λ(β) = −1. Local stability follows from λ(β) ∈
(−1, 0) when β < β1. When β > β1, λ(β) < −1 and graphical analysis of h2β shows that
h2β has (at least) two other intersection points with the diagonal than p
∗. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.8 Consider the map h∞ given in (2.28). Call p¯ = a and pˆ = c
that is a solves
√
a2 + 2C/b = p∗ and c solves A/B − (b/B)c = √c2 + 2C/b. One can
show easily that these points always exist, as long as 2C/b < (p∗)2 which we assume here,
are unique, and c > a. In terms of the points a and c, the map h∞ can be rewritten as:
h∞(pt) =

p∗, 0 ≤ pt < a
√
p2t + 2C/b, p ∈ [a, c]
p∗ − (b/B)(pt − p∗), pt > c.
The map h∞ has a global maximum at the critical point c. Let d be the point such
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that h∞(d) = a. Notice that when p > d, h2∞(p) = p
∗. Two examples of the map are
given in Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.10: Graphs of the map h∞. In the left panel (b/B = 1.2) h∞(c) < d implies that the
price fluctuations remain bounded away from p∗ in the long run. In the right panel, (b/B = 2),
h∞(c) > d implies that the map has (infinitely many) homoclinic points and a typical price time
series converges to the locally unstable steady state p∗. Other parameters: A = 1.5, b = 2 and
C = 0.1.
Since b/B > 1, the steady state p∗ is locally unstable. In what follows we show that for
b/B sufficiently large, there are (infinitely many) homoclinic points, whose orbits converge
to p∗ both forward and backward in time. We consider two cases:
CASE 1.: h∞(c) < d (as in the left panel of Figure 2.10). When h∞(c) < d we have
h2∞(c) < h
4
∞(c) < p
∗ < h3∞(c) < h∞(c). Let I1 = [h
2
∞(c), h
4
∞(c)] and I2 = [h
3
∞(c), h∞(c)].
In this case it is easy to show all initial states p0 are “repelled” from p
∗ and mapped in
I1 ∪ I2 after some iterations. The long run dynamics is therefore contained in the set
I1 ∪ I2. and therefore bounded away from p∗.
CASE 2.:, h∞(c) ≥ d (as in the right panel of Figure 2.10). In this case the critical
point c is a homoclinic point. It converges to p∗ forward in time and also backwards in
time (take successive inverse images x ¿ c, with hk∞(x) = c, k = 1, 2, ...). In fact, there is
an interval I of homoclinic points containing c.
To conclude the proof we have to show that there exists an M > 1 such that when
b/B > M then case 2 obtains, i.e. h∞(c) ≥ d. We derive the existence of such a value M
from the dependence of the point d and h∞(c) upon b/B. Define B/b = N , N ∈ (0, 1).
Depending upon N , p∗, C and b, the point d and the image h∞(c) are defined as:
d(N) = p∗ +N
(
p∗ −√(p∗)2 − 2C/b)
h∞(c;N) = p∗ +
p∗
1−N
(√
1 + 1−N
1+N
(2C)/b− 1
)
One can show that d(0) < h∞(c; 0), d(1) > h∞(c; 1) and d′(N) > 0. Furthermore (p∗)2 >
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2C/b, which is assumed here to guarantee the existence of a and c, is a sufficient condition
for ∂h∞(c;N)/∂N < 0. These facts imply that there exists a unique N such that d(N) =
h∞(c;N). It follows that there exists a uniqueM = 1/N such that: (i) when b/B ∈ (1,M ],
case 1. applies, and (ii) when b/B > M , case 2. applies. ¤
Proofs of Section 2.4
Proof of Theorem 2.9 When C ′(q) = C the first order condition (2.33) for the optimal
choice of q becomes:
∆pit+1 =
b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2 = C
Consequently in general there is no interior solution, but q∗t = 1 if ∆pit+1 > C and q
∗
t = 0
if ∆pit+1 < C. This implies that the equilibrium price dynamics (2.34) is governed either
by na¨ıve expectations or by rational expectation, which gives exactly the same dynamical
system as in (2.20-2.21) with β = +∞, or equivalently as in (2.22). ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.10 Consider the market equilibrium equation (2.35):
A−Bpt+1 =
[b/2(pt+1 − pt)2
αC
] 1
α−1
b(pt+1 − pt) + bpt.
Notice that, given the values of the parameters A, B, b, α, C, for any fixed value of pt ≥ 0
the demand (l.h.s) is a decreasing function of pt+1, while the supply (r.h.s) is an increasing
function of pt+1 provided that α > 1. This implies that there exists a unique point x ∈ R
where demand and supply are equal. Notice that this point is negative for those values
of pt for which there is excess supply at pt+1 = 0, that is when
(1−
[ bp2t
2αC
] 1
α−1
)bpt ≥ A
In this case we set pt+1 = 0, and otherwise pt+1 = x. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.11 This is just a special case of Theorem 2.12. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.12 Market clearing in (2.34) implicitly defines a map pt+1 = r(pt)
by ES(pt, r(pt)) = 0, that is,
ES(pt, r(pt)) = q
∗
t b(r(pt)− pt) + bpt −Bpt+1 + A = 0,
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where q∗t solves the maximization problem (2.32), whose F.O.C is
∆pit+1 =
b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2 = C ′(q). (2.50)
The F.O.C. (2.50) gives only the interior optimal solution. From the convexity of C(q) it
follows that C ′(0) is a global minimum and C ′(1) is a global maximum of C ′(q). Hence,
q∗t = 0 if ∆pit+1 ≤ C ′(0) and q∗t = 1 if ∆pi ≥ C ′(1). These two conditions on ∆pit+1
define four parallel lines in the plane (pt, pt+1) with slope 1 and intercepts
√
2C ′(1)/b,√
2C ′(0)/b, −√2C ′(0)/b, −√2C ′(1)/b. The interior solution (2.50) determines the map
r only in the region between the relevant lines in the map (2.36). The implicitly defined
part of r in (2.36) is the function r(xt) that solves
ES(xt, r(xt)) = q
∗
t b(r(xt)− xt) + bxt −Br(xt) = 0, (2.51)
with
q∗t = q(xt, xt+1) = (C
′)−1(
b
2
(xt+1 − xt)2).
Notice that, since C ′(q) is increasing, (C ′)−1 is always a well defined function and is
itself increasing. We claim that the map r has exactly the same properties (a-d) as the
map g in the proof of Theorem 2.4. From property (c) it follows that when b/B < 1,
−1 < g′(x) < 1, so that the map is a contraction and all orbits converge to the steady
state p∗. From properties (a − d) and the proof of Theorem 2.4 it follows that when
b/B > 1 the steady state is locally unstable and a unique globally stable 2-cycle exists.
We conclude the proof by showing that properties (a-d) hold. in this case.
(a). From (2.51) it follows immediately that if ES(x, r(x)) = 0, then ES(−x,−r(x)) =
0. Hence r(−x) = −r(x).
(b) We show that y = r(x) has only one positive intersection a with the line y = −x.
This follows from a change in variables z = x + r(x) and w = r(x) − x as in the proof
of Theorem 2.4. In this case the corresponding system (2.41) has solution only when
b/B > 1.
(c) Obviously when the map in (2.36) is explicitly defined, r′(x) = 0 or r′(x) = −b/B.
In order to compute r′(x) when it is implicitly defined one can use the implicit function
theorem and obtain:
r′(xt) = − ∂ES/∂xt
∂ES/∂xt+1
=
q′(xt, xt+1)(xt − xt+1)2 + q(xt, xt+1)− 1
q′(xt, xt+1)(xt − xt+1)2 + q(xt, xt+1) + Bb
(2.52)
Since both q and q′ are always positive, from the expression above it follows that r′(xt) ∈
[−b/B, 1). Notice that q′ is positive iff C ′(q) is convex.
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(d). Consider the proof of property (d) in Theorem 2.4. One can prove here that the
same statement holds by replacing (2.51) with (2.37) and (2.52) with (2.42). ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.13 Comparing (2.34) and (2.12), we have to show that there
exists a non decreasing, convex, information gathering cost function C(q), such that the
optimal solution of the representative agent problem (2.32) is given by:
q∗t = n1,t =
1 + tanh{β
2
[ b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2 − C]}
2
. (2.53)
From the first order condition in (2.33) for an arbitrary cost function we obtain:
q∗t = (C
′)−1
(
b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2
)
. (2.54)
Combining (2.53) and (2.54) it follows that:
(
b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2) = C ′
(
1 + tanh
(
β[ b
2
(pt+1 − pt)2 − C]
)
2
)
. (2.55)
In terms of the variable z = b/2(pt+1 − pt)2 ≥ 0, (2.55) becomes:
z = C ′
(1 + tanh{β
2
[z − C]}
2
)
.
The change of variable t = (1+tanh(β(z−C)/2))/2 gives an ordinary differential equation:
2 tanh−1(2t− 1)
β
+ C = C ′(t), (2.56)
whose solution is the cost function C(q) we are looking for. The restriction z ≥ 0 implies
t ≥ (1 + tanh(−βC/2))/2 = t0. In integral form, C(q) is given by:
C(q) =
∫ q
t0
(
2 tanh−1(2t− 1)
β
+ C
)
dt+ C0, q ∈ (t0, 1]
Notice that t0 =
1+m∗
2
, C(t0) = C0 and C
′(t0) = 0. This guarantees that when pt = pt+1 =
p∗ the solution of (2.54) is q∗ = (1 +m∗)/2, the minimum fraction of rational agents at
the fixed point in the heterogeneous agent model. When q < t0 one can define without
loss of generality, C(q) = C0, and take the integration constant C0 = 0. As a result one
2.A. PROOFS 59
gets
C(q) =
{ ∫ q
t0
(
2 tanh−1(2t−1)
β
+ C
)
dt q ∈ (t0, 1]
0 q ∈ [0, t0]
By construction, the function C(q) above has derivative C ′(q) = 0 when q ≤ t0, and C ′(q)
as in (2.56) when q > t0. Using this plus the fact that the function (tanh)
−1(2t − 1) is
positive and increasing when t ≥ t0, it follows that the map C(q) is non-decreasing and
convex. ¤

Chapter 3
Competition and coordination in
participation games
3.1 Introduction
In economics and social sciences many strategic decisions can be modeled as participation
games. Market entry, route choice, union membership, voter turnout, public good provi-
sion are only a few examples. We can classify all of them as participation games where the
two actions are either to participate, action 1, or to abstain, action 0. Typically the payoff
associated with participating is a function of the number of other players participating,
while the payoff associated with abstaining is fixed. One key element of participation
games is the shape of the payoff function associated with the action of participating. On
the one hand, cases where a group of agents compete for a limited resource, as in market
entry games and route choice, can be modeled with a decreasing payoff function. The par-
ticipation payoff diminishes as the number of other participating agents increases. On the
other hand, cases where agents profit only if some of them decide to participate, such as
public good provisions, union memberships or technology adoption, can be modeled with
an increasing payoff function. The general participation game can be seen as a combina-
tion of these two types of strategic interaction. Hype cycles, for example, can be modeled
with an initially increasing and thereafter decreasing participation payoff function.
Strictly related to the shape of the participation payoff is the feedback between individ-
ual motives and the subsequent aggregate participation rate. This effect is particularly
relevant in situations where the participation game is played repeatedly over time, as
considered here. When the participation payoff is a decreasing function in the number
of other participating agents there is negative expectational feedback. In fact if, at time
t, one individual believes that the next period few agents will participate, he increases
his willingness to participate. If all agents have the same belief, the t + 1 participation
61
62 CHAPTER 3. PARTICIPATION GAMES
rate will be high, which is the opposite of the individual beliefs at time t. In contrast,
when the participating payoff is an increasing function in the number of participating
agents there is positive expectational feedback. In this case the belief that many agents
will participate is self reinforcing, because, if many agents share this belief, the number
of participating agents will be large. The result is a positive feedback between beliefs or
motives of behavior and the realization of the aggregate outcome.
Related to expectational feedback are the concept of substitutability and complemen-
tarity. (see e.g. Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985). Strategies are substitutes if agents
have an incentive to do the opposite of what other player are doing as it happens in
systems with negative feedback. Strategies are complementary if agents have an incentive
to imitate each other as it in systems with positive feedback. Recent experimental stud-
ies as reported in Camerer and Fehr (2006) or in Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans, and
Tuinstra (2006) show there indeed exist substantial differences between behavior in envi-
ronments characterised by positive expectations feedback and environments characterised
by negative expectations feedback.
In this chapter, we focus on participation games with negative feedback and we leave
the analysis of positive or mixed feedback for future research. Participation games with
negative feedback are interesting because they stem from a basic economic problem, i.e.
exploitation of scarce resources, in the simplest setting, i.e. repeated interaction, without
market institutions acting as coordination devices. In the general participation game with
negative feedback, agents (firms or drivers) repeatedly interact to use the same resource
(a market or a route) without the possibility of communicating with each other or of
coordinating on a certain outcome. Each agent, thus, relies on personal beliefs and/or
on aggregate quantities observed in the previous rounds, such as the participation rate
history, to decide whether to participate or not. An important question we try to answer
when we deal with exploitation of scarce resources is under which circumstances agents
are able to use the resource efficiently. On the one hand each agent would like to exploit
the available resource (a market, a road . . . ) alone and repeatedly. Agents thus fiercely
compete to use the limited resource. On the other hand, knowing that the other agents
have the same objective, agents have an incentive to implicitly coordinate their actions so
that the exploitation of the scarce resource is maintained at a level from which agents can
still profit. Competition and coordination are thus at work at the same time. Interestingly,
competition and coordination are related to two different types of efficiency. Coordination
is related to allocative efficiency: The better the agents are able to coordinate their actions
the more they can profit from the use of the limited resource. Competition is related to
informational efficiency: If patterns of the participation rate contain regularities, there are
profit opportunities to be taken as agents can use these regularities to better forecast the
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future participation rate and use this information to decide when to participate and when
not. If competition works at best, no regularity should be observed in the participation
rate time series, that is an informationally efficient outcome is generated.
The aim of this chapter is to build a theoretical model of the interaction of many agents
who are repeatedly playing a participation game with negative feedback. In particular
we want to use this framework to address issues of informational and allocative efficiency
that we outlined above.
3.1.1 Overview of the literature
Before we present the guidelines of our model building, we review the existing experimen-
tal, computational, and theoretical investigations of participation games with negative
feedback. Existing examples of participation games with negative feedback can be di-
vided in two classes of games. In the first class, usually referred to as market entry
games, the payoff for participating is a decreasing function of the number of other agents
participating while the payoff for absenting is constant. Firms deciding whether to enter
a new market (participating), face competition from other firms, and thus are exposed
to an uncertain payoff, only if they enter the market. When they stay out of the market
(absenting), their payoff is constant and not depending on the number of other firms
which have decided to enter. In the other class of negative feedback games, usually re-
ferred to as route choice games, both the payoff for participating and for absenting are a
decreasing function of the number of other agents taking the same decision. Commuters
traveling every day from their residential area in A to their office facilities in B have to
decide whether to take road 1 (participating) or road 0 (absenting). Their traveling time,
which can be associated to their payoff, is clearly decreasing with the number of other
commuters who take the same route. We will see that results for these two types of games
are similar.
An early experimental investigation of market entry games is Sundali, Rapoport, and
Seale (1995). They consider zero entry cost and linearly decreasing payoff for entering.
The number of agents involved in the experiment is N = 20 and the maximum profitable
capacity of the market changes in the range [1, 19]. For each capacity they run the ex-
periment over 10 periods for 6 different groups. Their main finding is that the average
participation rate is close to the prediction of the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium of the one stage market entry game. Nevertheless, at the individual level, agents are
not playing a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, in particular they are not randomizing
their action. The individual profiles of actions of each player is very diversified, with
players that are, over time and across different capacities, always participating, players
that are always absenting, and players that are changing their action conditionally on the
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outcome of the previous rounds. Furthermore Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale detect excess
volatility, that is the variance of the participation rate is higher than predicted by the game
theoretical solution which is given by the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Other
experiments investigate whether these results are robust to changes of some characteris-
tics of the Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale experimental set-up. Rapoport, Seale, Erev, and
Sundali (1998) repeat the same market entry game for three different absenting payoffs.
Erev and Rapoport (1998) extend the analysis to three different information treatments:
one where agents know only their payoff, one where they know the payoff associated with
both actions and one, called full information treatment, where in addition agents know
the number of players which have chosen each action in the previous round. In a similar
analysis of different information treatments Duffy and Hopkins (2005) consider 100 iter-
ations in order to investigate the long run properties of agents’ interaction. Only in the
case of full information agents are coordinating on the pure Nash equilibrium in the long
run. Zwick and Rapoport (2002) consider an hyperbolic functional form for the payoff for
entering. Even though each of these experiments extends the previous contributions with
respect to its own line of investigation, results from all of them are consistent with the
results of Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale (1995), i.e. the first moment of the participation
rate distribution converges to the prediction given by the symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium, but the second moment is always larger in the experimental data than in the
prediction. These results are also confirmed by experiments whose underlying structure
corresponds to that of route choice games. In an early paper Meyer, Huyck, Battalio,
and Saving (1992) consider a number of suppliers who face the problem of allocating their
common product between two different locations without knowing the decision of other
suppliers. Their main focus is to investigate history’s role in coordinating decentralized
allocation decisions. Their experiments “provide support for the view that disequilibrium
dynamics are an important source of fluctuations in market prices and quantities” and
“nevertheless, the symmetric equilibrium accurately predicted the average quantity sup-
plied, the average price, and the average market efficiency . . . ” (both in Meyer, Huyck,
Battalio, and Saving 1992 p. 315). Similar results are shown in a forthcoming paper
by Selten, Chmura, Pitz, Kube, and Schreckenberg (2006) who report laboratory experi-
ments where a group of 18 agents have to choose period after period between a main road
and a side road. When the experiment is run as long as 200 periods, fluctuations persist
till the end of the session. A significant correlation between the number of road changes
of each individual and the size of the fluctuations is also detected. Individuals seem to
use four different strategies: to use the main road, to use the side road, to switch roads
after having received a payoff lower than the median of the other agents’ payoffs, or to
not switch roads in that same situation. Nevertheless the aggregate road use is consistent
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with the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the underlying one stage game.
Computational models of participation games with negative feedback also reproduce
the results reported above. An influential contribution in this area is Arthur (1994) where
the El Farol bar problem is introduced. El Farol is a bar close to the Santa Fe Institute
(New Mexico, USA) where a live music show takes place on Thursday evening every week.
There are N persons who want to go to the bar (participating) on Thursday evening but
the El Farol bar is not big enough for all of them. In fact the bar is too crowded when
more than bN persons are there (with b between 0 and 1). In this case it would have
been better to remain at home (abstaining). When less than bN persons are attending
the concert the evening is very pleasant. The El Farol bar problem is thus a participation
game with negative feedback. Interestingly, as we will show later in this chapter, the El
Farol game can be modeled both as a market entry game or as a route choice game. Arthur
introduced the El Farol bar problem as a simple model of the interaction of boundedly
rational agents with heterogeneous deterministic rules and used computer simulations
to replicate the interaction of N = 100 agents relying on different predictors to decide
whether to go to the bar or not. Every agent has a set of predictors and keeps track of
the forecasting performance of each of them. Predictors which perform better are more
likely to be chosen in the future. His simulations show that the average participation rate
converges to the capacity of the bar, even if fluctuations persist in the long run. He also
observes that the interaction of agents using different rules leads to a participation rate
dynamics with no regularities because, using his words, “Where cycles-detector predictors
are present, cycles are quickly ’arbitraged’ away so there are no persistent cycles” (Arthur
1994 p. 409).
In order to explain Arthur’s results, as well as the experimental results discussed
above, other theoretical and computational models have been advanced. A class of them
uses variations of standard game theoretical tools. Goeree and Holt (2005) consider a
model based on the concept of quantal response equilibrium as in McKelvey and Palfrey
(1995). Their general approach deals with participation games with negative and posi-
tive feedback and for the case of market entry games they argue that a quantal response
equilibrium better describes the average aggregate participation rate as the capacity of
the market changes. Zambrano (2004) aims at reproducing the main results of the sim-
ulations in Arthur (1994) using the Nash equilibria of a game that underlies Arthur’s
framework. Zambrano shows that what he calls a prediction game is the game theoretical
representation of the bar problem and that the average participation rate of Arthur’s sim-
ulations coincide with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the prediction game.
Both contributions are interesting as they manage to perform an equilibrium analysis of
interactions of boundedly rational agents, but they do not aim at justifying the variance
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around this equilibrium. Both contributions ignore the interaction between the dynamics
of the aggregate and the individual choices in a repeated game framework. As a result
both analysis fail to account for the excess variance that is observed in the experimental
data or in Arthur’s simulations.
Other computational contributions try to explain experimental results employing the
reinforcement learning of Erev and Roth (1998). For example Erev and Rapoport (1998)
show that a simple reinforcement learning model provides a good approximation of the
aggregate behavior for a wide setting of experiments with market entry games. More
recently Duffy and Hopkins (2005) show that reinforcement learning predicts agents to be
divided in those always participating and those always absenting, and thus pure strategy
Nash equilibria, in place of mixed strategy Nash equilibria, to prevail in the long run.
Nevertheless, experiments in the same paper show long run convergence to the pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium only when agents are informed not only about the aggregate
and their performance, as assumed in the reinforcement learning model, but also about the
payoff of all the other agents. Another contribution is Franke (2002) using reinforcement
learning to replicate Arthur’s results on the El Farol bar problem. His simulations show
that the long run distribution of the probability to participate can be centered around the
symmetric mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium or can be binomial with two peaks at very
low and very high probabilities to participate. He concludes that the long run outcomes
are rather sensitive to the model specification. Evidence from reinforcement learning is
thus mixed and quite sensitive to its parameters values.
3.1.2 An evolutionary approach
Summing up, previous investigations of both classes of participation games with negative
feedback, market entry games and route choice games, lead to the same conclusions.
Experimental findings show that at the aggregate level coordination on a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium of the underlying one stage game occurs, as the first moment of the
participation rate is well predicted by the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. At the
individual level however, agents are not randomizing but employ simple rules instead,
such as: always participate, always abstain, or participate conditionally on the outcome
of previous rounds. The interaction of these different rules creates excess volatility for the
participation rate as compared to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, so that the
second moment of the participation rate is always larger than predicted. The variance
is important because it is related to allocative efficiency: the more volatile the series the
more resources are wasted. Simulations of Arthur where agents are using a large number
of forecasting rules to decide whether to participate, reproduce the same results, both
at the aggregate and individual level, but are computationally intensive. Furthermore,
3.1. INTRODUCTION 67
they suggest that the interaction of ‘deterministic’ rules is able to create informationally
efficient participation rate patterns with no regularities. Theoretical models account for
some of these findings but they do not address questions of informational or allocative
efficiency directly. Moreover both the equilibrium models in Zambrano (2004) and Goeree
and Holt (2005) and reinforcement learning models in Erev and Rapoport (1998) and
Franke (2002) assume that agents are deciding whether to participate or not according
to some probabilities, whereas experimental evidence suggests that a majority of agents
uses simple deterministic rules.
In this chapter we model agents’ interaction in a participation game with negative feed-
back as the evolutionary competition of simple deterministic rules that prescribe when to
participate given past aggregate outcomes. The competition of these different behavioral
modes, or heuristics or rules is embedded in an evolutionary setting so that the rule which
has performed better in the recent past attains a higher number of followers. At this stage
of our analysis this competition is governed by the replicator dynamics (see e.g. Weibull,
1995). Our aim is to obtain a relatively simple analytic model which can replicate the
main experimental and computational findings. A similar approach has been applied in
the study of endogenous fluctuation in financial markets (Brock and Hommes, 1998) in
Cournot competition (Droste, Hommes, and Tuinstra, 2002) or in a cobweb model (Brock
and Hommes, 1997) but, to our knowledge, it is new in participation games. The work
on the cobweb model relates particularly to our setting as it also deals with an economic
system with negative feedback between individual motives and aggregate outcome. In
this area recent experimental results confirm the evidence we have summarized for par-
ticipation games. Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and Van de Velden (2007) show that
agents are on average behaving according to the rational expectation equilibrium (the
counterpart of the Nash equilibrium) but are deviating from it at the individual level.
Moreover market price series shows irregular aperiodic fluctuations and excess volatility.
An important dimension of our investigation of participation games with negative
feedback is that we explicitly take into account the size of the participation game, i.e. the
number of players. In particular we are interested in the change of the game dynamics
as the size of the game increases. This an important generalization since a large num-
ber of agents is usually involved at the same time in a participation game. Laboratory
experiments deal with up to 20 − 25 players and natural experiments such as the route
choice problem, with many more. The analysis of the limit of a large number of players
is interesting because if agents were randomizing their action independently according to
the same distribution the law of large numbers would apply and we would fail to observe
fluctuations of the participation rate in the limit. We will see that this is not the case in
our setting, which is therefore consistent with laboratory and natural experiments. An-
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other dimension of investigation is the number of rules used. The evidence from Arthur’s
simulations is that when many rules are used the participation rate series is seemingly
unpredictable. Given a set K of competing rules we measure the linear autocorrelation
of the participation rate and investigate whether it changes as new rules, which try to
exploit the detected linear autocorrelations, are introduced. This part of the analysis is
also related to the notion of evolutionary stability (see e.g. Maynard-Smith, 1974) as
it questions the stability of the original set K of rules against mutation to other rules.
Related issues are how allocative and informationally efficiency change as the size of the
participation game or the number of rules used are increasing.
In Section 3.2 we formalize the participation game with negative feedback and use the
traditional tools of game theory to analyze its equilibria. In Section 3.3 we model the com-
petition between different rules adopted by boundedly rational agents as an evolutionary
process governed by the replicator dynamics. In Section 3.4 we apply this framework to
the competition of two simple rules and we discuss how the participation rate dynamics
changes with the size of the game. In Section 3.5 we investigate how evolutionary compe-
tition is affected by the presence of new rules which try to exploit the regularities of the
participation rate time series. In Section 3.6 we apply the evolutionary framework devel-
oped so far to highlight the differences and similarities between the route choice games
and the market entry games. Section 3.7 concludes. Proofs of all results can be found in
the appendix.
3.2 The participation game
In this section we model the one stage participation game with negative feedback which
corresponds to a market entry game. In market entry games the payoff for participating is
a function of the number of other agents participating whereas the payoff for absenting is
constant. Generalization to the other class of participation games with negative feedback,
route choice games, is considered in Section 3.6. After we model the market entry one
stage game, we use standard game theoretical analysis to characterize its pure and mixed
strategy Nash equilibria and its evolutionary stable strategies. This analysis gives us the
benchmark against which to compare the evolutionary model we develop in Section 3.3.
Consider N agents, each of whom chooses whether or not to participate, that is to
enter a market, to go to a bar, etc. Each agent chooses an action a ∈ {0, 1}, where a = 1
stands for participating and a = 0 for absenting. The action space is given by A = {0, 1}N
and an action profile is given by a ∈ A. The game is thus a N -player game where every
player can choose between 2 actions. We refer to N , which is a parameter in our model,
as the size of the game. A strategy si for player i is the probability in [0, 1] with which
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he chooses action a = 1. As a result, the strategy space is given by S = [0, 1]N and
s ∈ S denotes a strategy profile. Finally, by s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN) we denote
the strategies played by all the players but player i. The payoff function of player i is
determined by the strategies played by the N players and is given by
pii : S → IR+.
We assume that all players want to maximize their expected payoffs. Pure strategy payoffs
of the participation game are given as:
pii (0,a−i;Nc) = α,
pii (1,a−i;Nc) =

α+ β − γ
α− γ
if
∑N
j=1,j 6=i aj < Nc,
if
∑N
j=1,j 6=i aj ≥ Nc.
(3.1)
The parameter Nc (the subscript c stands for capacity) defines the capacity of the market
or the bar. Choosing ai = 0 always gives payoff α. Choosing ai = 1 gives payoff α− γ if
Nc or more of the other N − 1 players have chosen a = 1, and α + β − γ if less than Nc
of the other N − 1 players have chosen a = 1. We assume assume that β > γ, otherwise
playing ai = 0 is a dominant strategy. In this formulation α is a payoff which is always
granted, γ corresponds to the cost or effort of participation and β corresponds to the
(uncertain) participation premium. In the present section, the payoff α could be set to
zero without changing the results. Nevertheless, since in the dynamic approach of the
following sections α does play a role, we have decided to introduce it from this earlier
stage.
In many experimental market entry games, the payoff for participating is linearly
decreasing in the number of other entrants. The present formulation, using a step function
as in 3.1 for the payoffs of the entrants, is equivalent with the payoff function for the El
Farol bar game used in Arthur (1994) and Franke (2002). We chose this stylized version
of the market entry game since it facilitates comparing games with different sizes N and
capacities Nc. Note that for N = 2 and Nc = 1, this payoff structure is similar to the
well-known game of Chicken or Hawk-Dove game (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991,
pp. 18-19).
The expected payoff of playing a mixed strategy si is given by
pii (si, s−i;Nc, N) = (1− si)α+ si (α+ βp (s−i;Nc, N)− γ)
= α + si (βp (s−i;Nc, N)− γ) , (3.2)
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where
p (s−i;Nc, N) = Pr {n (s−i) ≤ Nc − 1}
is the probability that the number of other agents participating, n (s−i), is strictly smaller
than Nc. The value of p (s−i;Nc, N) depends upon the strategy profile s−i.
3.2.1 Nash equilibria
The game with payoff structure (3.1) has many pure strategy Nash equilibria (henceforth
PSNE). Any pure action profile a such that exactly Nc players play a = 1 and the other,
N −Nc, players play a = 0 corresponds to a strict PSNE. There are
(
N
Nc
)
of these PSNE.
Note that these PSNE lead to an asymmetric distribution of payoffs.
Now consider mixed strategy Nash equilibria (henceforth MSNE), that is, equilibria
where some players randomize between the two possible actions. We show that there exists
a unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where all players are randomizing
with s∗ ∈ (0, 1) so that s∗ = (s∗, . . . , s∗) is the corresponding strategy profile. If each
agent is playing action a = 1 with probability s∗, the probability that the number of
players participating is strictly smaller than Nc is given by:
p
(
s∗−i;Nc, N
)
=
Nc−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(s∗)k (1− s∗)N−1−k . (3.3)
Notice that p
(
s∗−i;Nc, N
)
is the cumulative distribution function evaluated at Nc− 1 of a
binomial distribution with N −1 degrees of freedom and probability s∗. By the definition
of a Nash equilibrium, s∗ is a best response for player i only when, given s∗−i, agent i is
indifferent between the action a = 1 and action a = 0, which occurs when, using (3.2):
pii
(
1, s∗−i;Nc, N
)
= α +
(
βp
(
s∗−i;Nc, N
)− γ) = α = pii (0, s∗−i;Nc, N) .
Hence the value of s∗ can be derived by solving the following equation:
p
(
s∗−i;Nc, N
)
=
γ
β
. (3.4)
Since we are interested in the case when N becomes large, but where the relative (mar-
ket, bar) capacity remains the same, we define the parameter b ≡ Nc
N
. The following
proposition summarizes the properties of the MSNE.
Proposition 3.1 For any N , Nc < N , α, γ, β > γ, there exists a unique symmetric
MSNE s∗ of the N-person participation game whose payoff function is specified by (3.1).
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The value of s∗ solves (3.4) and does not depend upon α. Moreover we have s∗ → b as
N →∞ for all γ and β, and s∗ = b for all N when b = 1/2 and γ/β = 1/2.
The exact value of s∗ depends on both the threshold value b and on the ratio γ/β.
Figure 3.1 shows (a numerical approximation of) s∗ as a function of N for different values
of γ
β
in the case of b = 0.5. In the Figure, as stated in Proposition 3.1 s∗ → b as N →∞,
for all ratios γ/β. Furthermore s∗ = b for all N when b = 1/2 and γ/β = 1/2. The case
of γ/β = 1/2 is the one where the payoff for absenting is exactly in between the payoffs
of a successful and a non-successful participation. Because of this symmetry and of the
invariance of s∗ with respect to changes in N , we take b = 1/2 and γ/β = 1/2 as the
benchmark values for our analysis.
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Figure 3.1: Every curve shows an approximation of the MSNE s∗, that is a numerical solution
of eq. (3.4), for N up to 100 and b = Nc/N = 0.5. Each curve corresponds to a different value
of γ/β. The MSNE s∗ is in general different from b, but converges to b as the size of the game,
N , increases. From top to bottom: γ/β = 0.3, γ/β = 0.4, γ/β = 0.5 and γ/β = 0.6. In the
benchmark case, that is when γ/β = 0.5 and b = 0.5, s∗ = b for every game size N .
Other MSNE, where players are randomizing with different probabilities, exist. These
equilibria are asymmetric with a number M < Nc of agents always going and the other
N−M agents are randomizing with the same probability. In fact, the players randomizing
are playing the symmetric MSNE of the participation game with the same payoffs, size
N −M and threshold Nc −M . These asymmetric MSNE are thus a combination of the
two other types of equilibria, asymmetric PSNE and symmetric MSNE.
The PSNE has the characteristic that it distributes all available resources but implies
that a symmetric group of players is able to coordinate on an asymmetric outcome, as
Nc players receive α + β − γ and the others receive α. Asymmetric MSNE also share
this characteristics. The only equilibrium which avoids this problem is the symmetric
MSNE. The symmetric MSNE is in fact the only symmetric equilibrium. When players
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play the MSNE, the total number of participating playersN (which is a random variable)
has mean Ns∗ and variance Ns∗ (1− s∗). A useful variable to consider is the (random)
variable participation rate, xt =
N t
N
, which has mean s∗ and variance s
∗(1−s∗)
N
. Observe
that as the size of the game becomes large, xt will be equal to s
∗ with high probability
since the variance goes to zero. The symmetric MSNE equalizes the expected payoff
of participating and absenting for all players and thus leads to a lower average welfare
than the pure strategy equilibrium. If a group of players were repeatedly playing the
symmetric MSNE the resulting participation rate sequence, {xt}, would be randomly
distributed around s∗ with variance of the order s∗(1 − s∗)/N . Furthermore the series
{xt} would have zero autocorrelation at all lags as agents participation decision is random
and independent over time.
3.2.2 Evolutionary stability
We now discuss the game in terms of evolutionary stability. Consider an infinite popu-
lation of players meeting randomly to play the N size participation game with threshold
value b. Take the strategy s as the possibly mixed strategy played by all players. Suppose
that a fraction ² of the population “mutates” his strategy, that is a fraction ² switches
to play strategy s′. Will the fraction ² disappears against s∗ or survive? The concept of
evolutionary stability has been developed in connection with this question. In particular
a symmetric strategy profile is called evolutionary stable if it cannot be invaded by any
of these mutations. The original definition of evolutionary stable strategy was introduced
in the context of 2-person games by Maynard-Smith (1974). The extension to N -person
games is quite natural (see e.g. Palm, 1984). It turns out that the strategy s∗ is the
unique evolutionary stable strategy.
Proposition 3.2 For any N , Nc < N , α, γ, β > γ, the symmetric strategy profile s
∗,
i.e. the unique solution of (3.4), is the unique evolutionary stable strategy of the N-person
participation game whose payoff function is specified by (3.2).
The concept of evolutionary stable strategy employed here depends on the assumption
of a single infinite population whose players are randomly matched in groups of size N to
play the participation game.
In Section 3.5 we will use the fact that s∗ is an evolutionary stable strategy as the
benchmark case against which to compare the stability of the competition of simple de-
terministic rules when more rules are introduced.
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Figure 3.2: Top left panel: Time series of number of participating players in experimental
group 1. Top right panel: Histogram of the number of participations for the 42 players. The
horizontal axes gives, out of the 50 periods, the total number of times an agent has chosen to
participate, or a = 1. The vertical axes gives the number of agents for each number of total
participations. Bottom left panel: Histogram of the number of switches. The horizontal axes
gives the total number of times an agents has chosen to switch action during the 50 periods.
The vertical axes gives the number of agents for each number total switches. Bottom right
panel: Relation between individual payoffs and total number of participations. For every agent
the number of times he has chosen to participate, a = 1, is plotted against his final payoff.
When everybody plays the MSNE, the expected payoff after 50 rounds is 5000 as given by the
horizontal line.
3.2.3 Some experimental results
We will now briefly describe some experimental results on a negative feedback partici-
pation game from Heemeijer (2006). Our aim is not to provide a full-fledged analysis of
the experimental data, but to illustrate and motivate the model introduced in this paper.
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The experiments were conducted in October 2005 and February 2006 at the CREED lab-
oratory of the University of Amsterdam. It involved 6 groups of N = 7 players, which
had to make a participation decision for 50 subsequent periods. Group composition re-
mained the same over the course of the experiment. Capacity was equal to Nc = 4 and
payoff parameters were given by α = 100, β = 50 and γ = 25. Moreover, a stochastic
term εt from a symmetric triangular distribution on [−25, 25] was added to the payoff for
participating in every period. Subjects did know the value of α, but not those of β, γ
and εt. Following the analysis above we have
(
7
4
)
= 35 PSNE. The symmetric MSNE s∗
is implicitly given by p (s∗; 4, 7) = 1
2
. This gives s∗ ≈ 0.5786, which is slightly larger than
b = Nc
N
= 4
7
≈ 0.5714.
The results from this experiment are consistent with the experimental evidence dis-
cussed in the introduction. The upper left panel of Figure 3.2 shows, for the first ex-
perimental group, the dynamics of the number of participating subjects over 50 periods.
Behavior in the other groups was similar. Aggregate participation decisions are unstable
and keep fluctuating until the end of the experiment. Subjects did not coordinate on one
of the PSNE and, at the aggregate level, the symmetric MSNE seems to provide a better
description of the data. The first row of Table 3.1 shows that average participation rates
in all groups are quite close to s∗ ≈ 0.5786, although there seems to be some ‘underpartic-
ipation’: for five of the six groups the average participation rate is somewhat lower than
predicted by the symmetric MSNE.
gr. 1 gr. 2 gr. 3 gr. 4 gr. 5 gr. 6 mean MSNE
1
50
∑50
t=1 xt 0.574 0.594 0.560 0.563 0.571 0.554 0.570 0.579
group switches 25 14 25 25 26 22 22.8 22.9
individual switches 15.7 8.3 15.6 13 17 14 14 23.9
% naivety 0.736 0.741 0.716 0.824 0.689 0.714 0.733 0.2438
Table 3.1: Experimental results. The first row gives the average participation rate for each
group. The second row gives the number of times, per group, that participation changed from
four or less to five or more subjects or vice versa. The third row gives, per group, the number
of individual switches between participating and not participating, averaged over subjects. The
last row gives the percentage of individual switches that follow directly after a negative payoff
experience. The last column gives the same quantities as expected from the symmetric MSNE
solution.
At the individual level, however, the symmetric MSNE is not supported by the data.
The upper right panel of Figure 3.2, for example, shows a histogram of the number of
times each of the 42 subjects participated. Apparently, some subjects participate almost
always, for example 8 subjects have participated at least 40 times in 50 rounds. Others
have almost never participated, for example 7 subjects have participated no more than 10
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times. This suggests that many subjects do not randomize. Further evidence is given by
the second and third row of Table 3.1, which show that, although the number of switches
in aggregate participation are roughly consistent with the symmetric MSNE, individual
subjects change their participation decision much less frequently than predicted by the
symmetric MSNE. The histogram of the number of individual switches, depicted in the
lower left panel of Figure 3.2 also provides compelling evidence that many subjects are
quite reluctant to change. Instead of playing according to the symmetric MSNE, subjects
seem to condition their decision on past payoffs. The last row of Table 3.1 shows that
about 73% of individual switches were preceded directly by a negative payoff signal (i.e.,
start (stop) to participate when that gave a higher (lower) payoff in the previous period).
A last observation worth noting is the evidence for a ‘participation premium’ in the lower
right panel of Fig 3.2. Subjects that participated more often did, on average, earn higher
payoffs. We will return to this issue in Section 3.6.
3.3 Evolutionary competition of deterministic rules
The experiment discussed above suggests, together with the earlier experimental evidence,
that our negative feedback participating game is inherently unstable, with persistent fluc-
tuations in the participation rate. Moreover, individual subjects do not seem to random-
ize their decisions and these fluctuations therefore cannot be easily attributed to mixed
strategy Nash equilibria. Instead, subjects seem to base their decisions on deterministic
behavioral rules. The existing behavioral models of negative feedback participation games
are complex computational models, and some of them (such as reinforcement learning)
do assume that agents randomize. In this section we introduce a behavioral model which
is analytically tractable and consistent with the experimental findings.
3.3.1 Behavioral deterministic rules
Consider a population of N̂ boundedly rational agents who play the N -person participa-
tion game repeatedly, but possibly in different groups every period (random matching).
For simplicity, we consider the limit N̂ →∞ so that the law of large number applies and
expected values of random variables can be taken as realized values. Period after period,
each player behaves according to one of K different rules. Each rule specifies, given the
information it uses, whether to participate or to abstain, that is p ∈ {0, 1}. A rule which
performs better in period t is adopted by more agents the next period t+ 1. We assume
that the distribution of agents over the different K rules evolves according to the repli-
cator dynamics mechanism. The replicator dynamics can be motivated in the context of
boundedly rational agents learning and imitating which strategy to play in a strategic
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environment (see e.g. Weibull, 1995; Binmore and Samuelson, 1997). Furthermore, its
simplicity lends it considerable appeal. The distribution of agents across rules at period
t+ 1 lead to a different payoff associated to each rule and possibly to a new distribution.
In what follows, after introducing what we exactly mean by rule, and how the replicator
dynamics works in this context, we investigate the properties of the equilibria of such a
process.
Let xt be the participation rate, i.e. the fraction of agents having chosen to participate
in period t. At every period t, a deterministic behavioral rule k specifies whether to
participate or to absent for a given information set:
pk,t = fk (It−1) . (3.5)
where the information set is given by past participation rates:
It−1 = {xt−1, xt−2, . . . , x1, x0} . (3.6)
and where
fk : [0, 1]
t → {0, 1}.
Some examples of simple rules are:
pk,t = 1, pk,t = 0,
pk,t =
{
1,
0,
if xt−1 < b,
if xt−1 ≥ b,
pk,t =
{
1,
0.
if xt−1 ∈ A,
if xt−1 ∈ Ac ≡ [0, 1] /A.
The first rule indicates to always participate, whereas the second specifies to always
abstain. The third and fourth rule are a function of the last participation rate, prescribing
to participate if and only if the previous participation rate is smaller than the threshold
b or lies in a specified set A.
The class of rules we will use most in our analysis can be written in terms of a best
response to predictors of the current period fraction. That is,
pk,t ∈ BR (gk (xt−1, xt, . . . , x0)) , (3.7)
where gk (·) is the prediction of the fraction in the current period. Notice that these
predictor-based rules are a subset of a more general rule fk.
The vector xt represents the distribution of agents over the rules. Each component
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xk,t is the fraction of the entire population that uses rule k in period t. That is Nk,t =
N̂xk,t is the number of players using rule k at time t. Evidently we have xk,t ≥ 0 and∑K
k=1 xk,t = 1, that is xt is in the (K − 1)−dimensional unit simplex, xt ∈ 4K−1 ={
xt ∈ IR+ :
∑K
k=1 xkt = 1
}
. Notice that at time t aggregate participation xt is completely
characterized by xt and pt = (p1,t, . . . , pK,t). The participation rate at time t, xt, is given
by:
xt = xt · pt =
K∑
i=1
xi,tpit.
3.3.2 Evolutionary competition
In the previous subsection we have described a number of rules that agents use to play
the game. Here we characterize how the distribution of agents across these rules evolves
over time. First we define the profit of playing rule fk. The fractions xk,t, the strategies
pk,t and the process of random matching of the N̂ players in groups of N players induce
a probability distribution over payoffs (α− γ, α, α + β − γ), which we denote here by
pik,t = pik (xt,pt (It−1) ;Nc, N) , for k = 1, . . . , K.
Once we take the limit of the number of players of the population to infinity, N̂ →∞, the
realized payoff of the players playing each rule is equal to the ex-ante expected payoff for
playing such a rule. In this case, by using equation (3.2), we can characterize the payoff
associated with each rule k as a function of pk and of the aggregate attendance x as:
pik,t(x, pk,t;Nc, N) = (1− pk,t)pi0 + pk,tpi1(xt;Nc, N), (3.8)
where piO = α is the payoff for not participating (the subscript O stands for out, that is,
abstain) and
piI(xt;Nc, N) = α+ βp(xt;Nc, N)− γ (3.9)
is the payoff for participating (the subscript I stands for in, that is, participate). The
function p(x;Nc, N) is the probability that the number of other agents N−1 participating
is less than Nc when the participation rate is x = x · p, that is
p(x;Nc, N) =
Nc−1∑
j=0
(
N − 1
j
)
(x)j(1− x)N−1−j. (3.10)
We have already noticed that p(x;Nc, N) is the cumulative distribution function evaluated
at Nc − 1 of a binomial distribution with parameters N − 1 and x. Notice that since
equation (3.9) establishes a one-to-one correspondence between x and pi1, the information
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set It defined in (3.6) is equivalent to {piI,t, piI,t−1, . . . , piI,0}.
Adding all these elements together, we can rewrite equation (3.8) as
pik,t(xt, pk,t;Nc, N) = α + (βp(xt;Nc, N)− γ)pk,t, (3.11)
that is, the payoff of each rule is given by the “granted” payoff α plus pk times the profit
coming from the action of participating.
We use the payoff pik,t to characterize the evolution of the vector x. Given the vector
of expected or population average payoffs pit = (pi1,t, . . . , pik,t, . . . , piK,t) at time t, we define
an evolutionary dynamics of the form
xt+1 =H (xt,pit) , (3.12)
whereH : 4K−1×[α− γ, α + β − γ]K →4K−1 is a continuous and differentiable function
with ∂Hk
∂pik
> 0 and
∂Hj
∂pik
< 0 for j 6= k. That is, if the average profit of rule k increases the
fraction of the population which uses rule k in the next period increases, and the fraction
of other rules decreases. Note that we can extend the model into different directions by
also including values of xt−τ and pit−τ , for τ = 1, 2, . . . . An equilibrium of the evolutionary
process (3.12) is defined by:
(x∗,p∗) = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
K , p
∗
1, . . . , p
∗
K) ,
such that:
x∗ =H (x∗,pi∗) ,
where the equilibrium participation rate is x∗ = x∗ ·p∗. In this case p∗k = fk (x∗, x∗, . . . , x∗)
and equilibrium profits are given by pi∗k = pik (x
∗,p∗;Nc, N).
There exist different specifications for Hk in the literature. In this chapter we consider
the replicator dynamics (see e.g. Taylor and Jonker, 1978 and Weibull, 1995) which takes
the following format:
xk,t+1 =
xk,tpik,t∑
j xj,tpij,t
. (3.13)
Such an updating mechanism can be interpreted as a biological reproduction model, where
each period the number of agents using rule k grows proportionally to the performance of
that rule, as measured by its payoff pik. In fact equation (3.13) can be derived by assuming
Nk,t+1 = Nk,tpik,t,
and using that Nk,t = N̂xk,t. Notice that in this formulation, the payoffs pik,t for all
k, and, as a consequence, the parameters α, β and γ, have to be normalized to meet
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the interpretation of a growth rate. In particular pik,t can not be negative, which in our
framework translates into α > γ. Notice that this way of deriving the replicator dynamics
is taken directly from biological replication. Nevertheless equation (3.13) also arises in
imitation processes in large populations of interacting agents, as reviewed in Chapter 4
of Weibull (1995). For this reason the replicator dynamics is a widely used updating
mechanism in evolutionary economic dynamics.
It is useful to use equation (3.11) and equation (3.13) to compute the difference between
today’s and yesterday’s fraction of agents using rule k:
∆xk,t+1 =
xk,t(βp(xt;Nc, N)− γ)(pk,t − xt)
α + (βp(xt;Nc, N)− γ)xt =
xk,t(pik,t − p¯it)
p¯it
, (3.14)
where we have defined p¯it =
∑
j xj,tpij,t. Equation (3.14) explicitly relates the change in
fractions of agents using rule k to a function of other agents payoffs. A characteristic
of the replicator dynamics in discrete time is that equation (3.13) is not invariant under
addition of a constant to the payoffs. In our formulation this is equivalent to say that
changes in fractions of agents using one rule are not invariant under changes of α1. When
α is small, everything else being equal, fractions are changing faster then when α is large.
Moreover, when α → ∞ trajectories of our discrete dynamical system (3.13) approach
the trajectories of the corresponding continuous time dynamical system (see e.g. Weibull,
1995, Chapter 4). For this reason the parameter α can be refered to as the inverse of the
speed of adjustment of the replicator dynamics.
The condition ∆xk = 0, for all k, gives the equilibria of the replicator dynamics. They
correspond both to corners of the simplex (where all agents use the same rule so that
there exists one k with x∗k = 1) and to interior solutions that satisfy pi
∗
j,t = pi
∗
k,t for all k
and j with both x∗k and x
∗
j strictly positive. The first type of fixed point of the dynamics
does not correspond to a Nash equilibrium of the underlying one shot participation game.
Among interior equilibria there are those where all rules prescribe the same action, that
is fk(x
∗, . . . , x∗) = p∗ for all k, so that x∗ = p∗. We call these equilibria non-generic,
since they arise only in the special case where the competing rules are all intersecting
at one point x∗ when they are evaluated at that point x∗. Other interior equilibria are
those where βp(x∗;Nc, N) = γ. This last condition is the same as in equation (3.4) which
characterizes the unique symmetric MSNE of the underlying one stage participation game.
In contrast to the other, we call these equilibria generic. An example of the generic case
occurs when the rule that states to always participate and the rule that states to always
abstain are part of the set K of competing rules because these two rules are always
behaving differently. This is the case which will be investigated in more detail in the next
1We remind the reader that the analysis of Section 3.2 is instead independent from changes of α.
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section. The following proposition summarizes these results and characterizes the generic
equilibria.
Proposition 3.3 The system given by K rules as in (3.5), payoffs as in (3.11) and
updating of fractions as in (3.13) has K fixed points for which the whole population uses
the same rule. Other fixed points satisfy the property that pi∗k = pi
∗
k′ for all k and k
′ that are
being played. In the generic case x∗ = s∗, where s∗ is the symmetric MSNE of Proposition
3.1.
We are interested in the coupled dynamics of the set of rules and their evolutionary
competition. Research questions are: (i) under which conditions will this dynamics lead
to the symmetric Nash equilibrium? (ii) under which conditions does this dynamics lead
to results which are qualitatively similar to the results obtained in the experiments run by,
among others, Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale (1995), and with the computational models
of bounded rationality of, e.g. Arthur (1994)? We address these questions with a concrete
example in the next section.
3.4 Interaction of optimists and pessimists
In this section we study the simplest possible setup that follows from the framework we
have outlined in the previous section. We consider the evolutionary competition between
the following two rules:
p1,t = 1 for all t, (3.15)
p0,t = 0 for all t. (3.16)
The first rule specifies to participate with certainty, we call this the “optimistic” rule.
The second rule specifies to abstain with certainty, which we call the “pessimistic” rule.
As we discussed in the introduction the evidence from most experiments shows that a
large fraction of agents is indeed using one of these rules. The simple rules (3.15) and
(3.16) can also be understood as best reply rules as in (3.7). Rule (3.15) corresponds to a
best reply rule (3.7) where the predictor used predicts a current period participation rate
always below the threshold b; rule (3.16) corresponds instead to a best reply rule with a
prediction of a participation rate always above b.
The value of the payoff associated with each rule can be derived using the general
formula (3.11). As a result pi1,t, the payoff gained by the optimistic rule at time t, is a
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function of xt and given by:
pi1,t (xt; bN,N) = α− γ + βp(xt; bN,N). (3.17)
The payoff gained by the pessimistic rule at time t, pi0,t, is constant and given by piO = α.
Notice that pi1 depends also on the parameters b and N . In particular, for fixed values
of b, the functional form of payoff of the optimistic rule with respect to the participation
rate x is different for different value of the game size N . The left panel of Figure 3.3
shows examples of the payoffs of the two rules for different game sizes when b = 1/2.
Given the payoffs, the fraction x1,t of ‘optimistic’ players evolves according to (3.13)
which gives:
x1,t+1 =
x1,tpi1,t
x1,tpi1,t + x0,tpi0,t
.
Notice that since xt = x1,t and x0,t = 1− x1,t, one can rewrite the evolution of x as a first
order nonlinear difference equation of the form:
xt+1 = f (xt; b,N) =
xt(α+ p(xt; bN,N)β − γ)
xt(p(xt; bN,N)β − γ) + α. (3.18)
The first order difference equation is parametrized by N , the size of the game, by the
relative capacity b = Nc
N
, by the payoff for absenting α, which is the inverse of the speed
of adjustment of the replicator dynamics, by the cost of participating γ and by the return
of a successful investment project β. The right panel of Figure 3.3 shows the function f
for different values of N when the other parameters are fixed.
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Figure 3.3: Left panel: Payoffs of the pessimistic rule (3.16) (horizontal line) and optimistic
rule (3.15) (other curves) for different values of the game size N . Right panel: Graph of the
participation rate updating map (3.18) for the same different values of the game size N . In both
panels the other parameters are α = 1, γ = 1/2, β = 2γ and b = 1/2..
What are the steady states of the dynamics of the participation rate given by (3.18)?
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First notice that, since p1,t 6= p0,t for all t, we are in what we have called a “generic”
case. By applying Proposition 3.3 we know that the steady states are given by the corner
solutions x = 0 and x = 1 and by the the interior solution x = s∗. In fact, at s∗,
pi1 (s
∗; bN,N) = α = pi0,
which is the requirement for the presence of an interior equilibrium. The distribution of
agents which correspond to the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium we found in
Section 3.3, s∗, is the value such that the two rules yield the same payoff. Notice that
the interior equilibrium is polymorphic, that is, it is characterized by the simultaneous
presence of two types of rules, a fraction s∗ are optimists and the rest are pessimists.
3.4.1 Local stability
In order to characterize whether the equilibria are stable or not, it is convenient to define
δ(x; b,N) =
dp(x; bN,N)
dx
.
Using the fact that p(x; bN,N) can be written using the Beta function, as derived in the
Proof of Proposition 3.4, one obtains:
δ(x; b,N) = −x
N(1−b)−1(1− x)Nb−1
B(N(1− b), Nb) ,
where B(·, ·) denote the Beta function which is defined as B(a, b) = (a+b−1)!/((a−1)!(b−
1)!). Notice that δ(x; b,N) < 0 since an increase in the fraction of agents participating
always decreases Pr {n ≤ bN}. We also define δ∗ ≡ δ(s∗; b,N). This partial derivative is
crucial for the stability of the steady state.
The following proposition describes the stability properties of the steady states.
Proposition 3.4 The dynamics of the participation rate given by equation (3.18) has
three steady states: 0, s∗ and 1. The fixed points 0 and 1 are locally unstable. The
interior fixed point s∗ is locally stable when ψ ≡ s∗ (1− s∗) δ∗β
α
> −2.
The stability condition in Proposition 3.4 depends, through δ∗ and s∗, implicitly on b
and N . We are particularly interested in characterizing this stability of s∗ as a function
of N . Figure 3.3 already suggests that s∗ becomes unstable for N large enough. The
following proposition corroborates that.
Proposition 3.5 For any given value of α, γ < β, and b the dynamics of the participation
rate is locally unstable around s∗ in the limit N → ∞. Moreover, if β = 2γ and b = 1
2
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Figure 3.4: Stability condition. Values of ψ ≡ (1− s∗)(s∗)δ∗β/α as a function of the game size
N for two different values of the participation premium β. When ψ is larger then the dotted
line the steady state s∗ is stable. The other parameters are α = 1, γ = β/2 and b = 1/2.
there exists a unique M such that equation (3.18) is locally stable around s∗ if and only
if N < M .
Figure 3.4 shows that ψ is decreasing in N and crosses −2 when N is larger than some
threshold M . The intuition behind Proposition 3.5 is that as N increases the average
population payoff of the optimistic rule gets closer to the step payoff of the underlying
one shot game (see left panel of Figure 3.3). As a result, for any value of the payoff
parameters, α, β > γ, as N increases (3.18) becomes steeper at the steady state s∗ and
the system looses stability. This dependence of the dynamics upon N is due to the
assumption of random matching. In fact, for N = 2 (with Nc = 1) the expected payoff
function is linear in x, since p (x; 1, 2) = 1−x, which is the probability of meeting a player
using the pessimistic rule. However, the probability of having less than half of the players
participating when each player participates (or, is an optimist) with probability larger
than 1
2
becomes small as N becomes large. That is, as N increases (and for given b) the
function p (x;Nc, N) will look more and more like a step function. We can therefore also
interpret the parameter N as a measure of the shape and steepness of the payoff function
at the steady state. In that case a low value of N would present a payoff function which
decreases slowly as the number of participating players increases, similar to the the linear
one used in the early market entry experiments (see, for example, Sundali et al., 1995).
A high value of N , on the other hand, would represent an expected payoff function close
to the step function used in the El Farol bar game, with payoffs at the symmetric MSNE
dropping rapidly as an extra player participates.
Summarizing, given any value of the payoffs α, β > γ and any value of the threshold
b, there always exists a number of players N , or a size of the game, such that the system
does not converge to the MSNE s∗. This is due to an overshooting effect which triggers
84 CHAPTER 3. PARTICIPATION GAMES
instability only when the size of the game N is above a certain threshold.
3.4.2 Global dynamics
In this subsection we try to specify the nature of the fluctuations that characterize the
unstable case. We present results primarily for the benchmark case with b = 1/2 and
γ/β = 1/2.
Figure 3.5 shows the participation rate driven by the interaction of “optimists” and
“pessimists” in the case of N = 300 and Nc = 150. The time series (left panel) looks
aperiodic. In fact one can show that there exists a region in the parameter space where
the dynamics is chaotic. The results follows from noticing that this 1-dimensional system
has a 3-cycle (see for example the left panel of Figure 3.7 for β−γ ≈ 0.6) and by applying
the Li-Yorke theorem (see Li and Yorke, 1975). Even such a simple system is able to
produce complicated times series which resembles what has been obtained using the more
complicated simulation models of Arthur (1994) and others. Figure 3.6 shows the effect
of the change of the game size N on the dynamics of the participation rate, for every even
value of N between 2 and 400 when b = 1/2. The bifurcation diagram (left panel) shows
the long run behavior as N increases.time series of x after an initialization period. Notice
that, consistently with our theoretical results, the system is locally stable if and only if
the game size is lower than a certain threshold. With the parameters value used for this
simulation, using Proposition 3.5, one can show that the participation rate s∗ = 1/2 is
locally stable for sizes N ≤ M˜ = 100 (see also right panel of Figure 3.4). For games of size
larger than M˜ , the participation rates fluctuates along a cycle of period 2. The type of
cycles observed for even larger sizes are typical of a period doubling bifurcation route to
chaos. The right panel of Figure 3.6 shows the Lyapunov exponent of the corresponding
participation rate for each game size N . The Lyapunov exponent is used to characterize
sensitive dependence on initial conditions. When the system has a positive Lyapunov
exponent, e.g. when N ≈ 300, there is sensitive dependence on initial conditions and the
system is chaotic. Figure 3.7 shows the dynamics of x and the corresponding Lyapunov
exponent for different values of the granted payoff α, the inverse speed of adjustment of the
replicator dynamics. With small α, which correspond to an high speed of adjustment, the
overshooting effect causes instability. As α increases, the speed of adjustment decreases,
that is, changes in fractions per period becomes smaller and smaller, and the dynamics
stabilizes to the equilibrium s∗. The right panel of Figure 3.7 shows that, also in this case,
there are many values of α for which the dynamics exhibits sensitive dependence upon
initial conditions. Notice that as the dynamics is independent to a rescaling of the payoffs
α, β and gamma, an change in α by a factor ρ, from α to αρ, with β and γ constant, is
equivalent to a change of beta and gamma to β/ρ and γ/rho respectively with α. This
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allows us to interpret the effect of a decrease of α, other things equal, shown in Figure
3.7, also as the effect of an increase of β and γ, other things equal.
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Figure 3.5: Evolutionary competition of optimist and pessimists. Left panel: 100 iterations
of the participation rate. Right panel: autocorrelation diagram of the series shown in the left
panel. The dotted line shows the significance level of a standard autocorrelation test for 100
observations. Parameters values are N = 300, Nc = 150, α = 1, γ = 0.5 and β = 2γ.
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Figure 3.6: Evolutionary competition of optimist and pessimists. Left pane: the bifurcation
diagram with respect to the game size N gives the long run behavior of the participation rate
as N changes. Right panel: Lyapunov exponents for different values of N . Parameters values
are b = Nc/N = 0.5, α = 1, γ = 0.5 and β = 2γ. For every value of N , 100 iterations are used
after a transient period of 100.
In this setting, the left panel of Figure 3.7 suggests that fluctuations increase and thus
allocative efficiency decreases as α decreases. Nevertheless, if one fixes α, the left panel
of Figure 3.6 suggests that the size of fluctuations of the participation rate is constant in
N when more than, say N = 250 agents, are involved. This is an important difference
with respect to the case when agents are playing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In
that case, since agents are randomizing independently, fluctuations of the participation
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rate approach zero as the number of agents increases. Laboratory experiments that com-
pare fluctuations when different number of agents are playing participation games with
increasing size and constant threshold level b can shed light on this issue.
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Figure 3.7: Evolutionary competition of optimist and pessimists. Left panel: long run behavior
of the participation rate for values of the granted payoff α. Right panel: Lyapunov exponents
for different values of α. Parameters values are N = 300, Nc = 150, γ = 0.5 and β = 2γ. For
every value of α 100 iterations are used after a transient period of 100.
Another question we want to address is how the dynamics relates to the details of the
competing rules. For this purpose we analyze the effect of the optimistic and pessimistic
rule on the time series properties of the participation rate. The autocorrelation plot in
the right panel of Figure 3.5 shows a rather strong negative first order autocorrelation and
positive second order autocorrelation. The simple rules we have implemented so far are
not able to profit from this structure in the data. In particular the positive second order
autocorrelation is consistent with the presence of a noisy two cycle for the participation
rate historical data. Agents who become aware of the two cycle structure can use this
regularity to forecast when it is advantageous to participate and when not. In other words
the participation rate series produced by the interaction of optimists and pessimists is not
informationally efficient. In the next section, we analyze the change of the participation
rate dynamics when a new rule that exploits the regularities produced by the interaction
of optimists and pessimists is introduced in the evolutionary competition.
3.5 The scope for arbitrage
In the previous section we have shown that when the game size is large and/or when the
net profit for a successful participation is large, the evolutionary competition of optimists
and pessimists leads to ongoing fluctuations of the aggregate participation rate around
the fixed point s∗. In this case the linear autocorrelation plot in Figure 3.5 shows that
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there is a positive autocorrelation between participation rates and (even period) lagged
participation rates. One can argue that agents might try to exploit this regularity in
deciding to participate. The aim of this section is to investigate how the presence of new
rules trying to exploit the information contained in the data affects the participation rate
dynamics. A similar analysis is performed in Hommes (1998) and in Chapter 2 for the
similar negative feedback framework given by the cobweb model.
To start with, consider at time t a best response rule as in (3.7) to the prediction
xt = xt−2. In practice, agents using this rule use:
p2,t = BR(xt−2) =
{
1,
0,
if xt−2 < b,
if xt−2 ≥ b.
(3.19)
where the subscript 2 labels the rule. We call this rule “two lags best reply” since it is the
best reply to the observation made two periods before. Notice that this rule is robust to
a change of the information set from It−1 = {xt−1, xt−2} to It−1 = {piI,t−1, piI,t−2} which
is the payoff for participating awarded up to two periods before. As a result, a rule which
prescribe to go if piI,t−2 > α and to stay at home otherwise is equivalent to the two lags
best reply rule. What is the result of evolutionary competition of optimists and pessimists
when some agents mutate to use the two lags reply best response rule?2
We model evolutionary competition of these three rules along the lines of the previous
section. The participation rate at time t is now given by:
xt = x1,t + x2,tBR(xt−2),
where x1 is the fraction of optimists, x2 the fraction of two lags best responders and the
fraction of pessimists is x0,t = 1 − x1,t − x2,t. Payoff for pessimists is always α, payoff
for optimists is given by equation (3.17), whereas profits for two lags best responders are
obtained using the general formula (3.8):
pi2,t = (1−BR(xt−2))piO +BR(xt−2)piI(xt).
Once profits are realized the fractions are updated using the replicator dynamics as in
(3.13) and so on. The resulting dynamical system has dimension 4, two equations govern
the updating of the fraction of agents using two of the three rules and two other equations
specify the lagged and twice lagged value of the participation rate. As explained at the
2The reader might wonder why we do not start this investigation with optimists, pessimists and one lag
best responders who use BR(xt−1). Intuitively, since the interaction of optimists and pessimists generates
a participation rate with strong negative first order autocorrelation, when optimists and pessimists are
present one lag best responders are very often wrong in their prediction, since xt and xt−1 are negatively
correlated. As a result one lag best reply are quickly wiped out. Simulations confirm this intuition.
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end of Section 3.3, due to the presence of optimists and pessimists, the interior equilibrium
of such a system is still non generic, and therefore, according to Proposition 3.3, given by
s∗. When x = s∗ the strategies earn the same payoff so that there are no incentives to
“imitate” other strategies. At s∗ the two lags best responder is not participating because,
having defined in (3.19) p2,t(b) = 0, he behaves like a pessimist. For this reason there is
a continuum of steady state fractions of agents using the three rules where x∗1 = s
∗ and
x∗0 + x
∗
2 = 1− s∗. When is this continuum of steady states stable?
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0  50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400
pa
rti
cip
at
io
n 
ra
te
N
-0.02
-0.01
 0
 0.01
 0.02
 0.03
 0.04
 0.05
 0  50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400
a
ve
ra
ge
 fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 b
es
t r
es
po
nd
er
s
N
 0.498
 0.4985
 0.499
 0.4995
 0.5
 0.5005
 0.501
 0.5015
 0.502
 0  20  40  60  80  100
pa
rti
cip
at
io
n 
ra
te
time
 0.0006
 0.00065
 0.0007
 0.00075
 0.0008
 0  20  40  60  80  100
fra
ct
io
n 
of
 b
es
t r
ep
on
de
rs
time
Two lags BR
Figure 3.8: Evolutionary competition of optimists, pessimists and two lags best responders.
Top left panel: long run participation rate for different game sizes N . Top right panel: 100
periods time average of the fraction of two lags best responders for different values of N . The
time average is computed along the iterations shown in the top left panel. Bottom left panel:
participation rate when N = 50. Bottom right panel: fraction of two lags best responders when
N = 50. In all the cases b = 0.5 β = 2γ, γ = 0.5, α = 1.
Given the fact that the rule p2,t is discontinuous and thus not differentiable, we rely
on numerical simulations. The top left panel of Figure 3.8 shows the dynamics of the
participation rates resulting from the interaction of optimists, pessimists and two lags
best responders, for different values of the game size N . As in the case with only optimists
and pessimists, the evolutionary competition produces persistent endogenous fluctuations
of the participation rate when the game size, N , is large. In particular the system loses
stability at the same size, M˜ = 100, as when only pessimists and optimists are present.
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The top right panel of the same figure shows, for every size of the game, the time average
of the fraction of two lagged best responders along the 100 iterations shown in the top
left panel. Interestingly this average fraction is approaching zero for those sizes where the
participation rate converges to s∗ and stays above zero otherwise. The reason is that when
the system converges to the steady state where x = s∗, that is when N < 100, it does so
along a “shrinking” 3-cycle as shown in the bottom left plot of Figure 3.8. A numerical
observation is that along such cycles a two lagged best responder is more often wrong
than right and slowly disappears (see bottom right panel of Figure 3.8). Notice that, even
if x2 is approaching zero, it might happen that the participation rate x settles to s
∗ before
x2 is equal to zero. At this point x2 stops decreasing as the system has reached a steady
state. A different participation rate dynamics occurs when the game size is above M˜ . In
this case the dynamics is often non periodic and the two lags best responders survive.
The left panel of Figure 3.9 shows the resulting participation rate when N = 300 and
the three rules are competing. Even if the time series is not periodic, the autocorrelation
plot (right panel of Figure 3.9) shows that the overall linear autocorrelation structure of
the participation rate resembles the one of a noisy 3-cycle: a structure that neither the
original nor the new rule can profit from.
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Figure 3.9: Evolutionary competition of optimists, pessimists and two lags best responders.
Left panel: participation rate for game size N = 300. Right panel: autocorrelation plot for
the series shown in the left panel. The dotted line shows the significance level of a standard
autocorrelation test with 100 observations. Parameters as in Figure 3.8.
The natural question at this point is: what if another rule appears, a rule that best
replies to the presence of a noisy 3-cycle. We define the three lags best responders as
those who use:
p3,t = BR(xt−3),
where the subscript 3 labels the rule. The evolutionary competition of the four rules
(optimists, pessimists, two and three lags best responders) can be formalized along the
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Figure 3.10: Evolutionary competition of optimists, pessimists, two and three lags best respon-
ders. Top left panel: long run participation rate for different game sizes N . Top right panel:
100 periods time average fraction of two lags best responders for different values of game sizes
N . The time average is computed along the iterations shown in the top left panel. Bottom left
panel: participation rate when N = 50. Bottom right panel: fraction of two lags best responders
when N = 50. In all the cases b = 0.5 β = 2γ, γ = 0.5, α = 1.
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Figure 3.11: Evolutionary competition of optimists, pessimists, two and three lags best re-
sponders. Left panel: participation rate for game size N = 300. Right panel: autocorrelation
plot for the series shown in the left panel. The dotted line shows the significance level of a
standard autocorrelation test with 100 observations. Parameters as in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.12: Evolutionary competition of optimists, pessimists, two, three, four, five and six
lags best responders. Left panel: participation rate for game size N = 300. Right panel:
autocorrelation plot for the series shown in the left panel. The dotted line shows the significance
level of a standard autocorrelation test with 100 observations. Parameters as in Figure 3.10.
same lines of the previous example and results in a 6 dimensional dynamical system. The
system has 2 dimensions more than the system without three lagged best responders. One
additional dimension is due to the presence of a new rule, and thus of the variable x3,
the other dimension comes from the dependence of a further lag, xt−3, of the aggregate
participation rate. As in the competition of optimists, pessimists and two lags best
responders, there exists a continuum of interior steady states where x1 = s
∗ and x0 +
x2 + x3 = 1− s∗, so that x = s∗. Simulations of this case for different values of the game
size N are shown in Figure 3.10. In the top left panel we show the participation rate
resulting from 100 iterations of the four competing rules, and in the top right panel the
average number of two lags best responders and of three lags best responders along these
iterations. As in the competition of optimists, pessimists and two lags best responders,
when N < M˜ = 100 the participation rate converges to s∗ and the fractions of both
types of best responder rules approach zero. When N > M˜ , instead, the dynamics is
unstable and both types of best responders survive. The bottom panels of Figure 3.10
concentrate on the case of N = 50. The participation rate converges to x = s∗ along
4-cycles (left panel) and both fractions of best responders go to zero (right panel). Along
a 4-cycle both best responders are more often wrong than right in their predictions and
their fractions go to zero. This is not the case when the dynamics is more complicated, in
this case, due to non-regular fluctuations, the best responders manage to survive. Figure
3.11 shows 100 iterations of the participation rate with the corresponding autocorrelation
plot, in the case of N = 300. The pattern detected by linear autocorrelation resembles
a four cycle, a structure from which none of the currently present strategies can profit.
We are led to argue that, by adding a rule that exploits this regularity, the four lags best
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responders, yet another periodic structure is to be observed in the time series. Figure 3.12
shows the results of the interaction of two lags up to six lags best responders in a game
of size N = 300. In this case a 7th order linear autocorrelation is detected. All other
lags are below the significance level: they are significantly smaller and mostly within
the confidence interval of the standard autocorrelation test when 100 observations are
considered (dotted line).
From this exercise, we learn that in a negative feedback framework, the presence of
a periodic structure in the time series can be linked to the absence of rules that exploit
such a structure. The linear periodic structure which is left in the data is not exploitable
by the present strategies. Another way to look at the same effect is that, using the words
of Arthur, “cycles are quickly arbitraged away” (p. 409 of Arthur, 1994). Moreover,
as we increase the number of competing rules the linear autocorrelation decreases at
mosts lags and informationally efficiency improves. We conjecture that in systems where
many different agents are competing we might even avoid to detect any significant linear
structure in the data without stability emerging.
An unexpected result is that the new rules are surviving only in the unstable region.
When the system is stable at the equilibrium only two rules are effectively present, op-
timists and pessimists. In this case the interaction of optimists and pessimists is thus
“stable” against the introduction of other rules, in the sense that no other rules are
managing to invade the initial population composed of optimists and pessimists. This
situation corresponds to the evolutionary stability result of Proposition 3.2 of Section 3.2.
The only difference is that in this context the mixed strategy has to be interpreted as a
distribution of population fractions between the two actions. The interaction of optimists
and pessimists is not stable against the introduction of other rules when the dynamics
is unstable. In this case the new rules survive and affect the global dynamics. Notably,
the introduction of new rules gives different outcomes in the stable and in the unstable
region.
3.6 The participation premium
Both the market entry experiment discussed in Section 3.2 and the behavioral model from
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 exhibit underparticipation, that is, the average participation rates
are below the steady state value s∗, when this steady state is unstable. This underpar-
ticipation may result in a ‘participation premium’: the lower right panel of Figure 3.2,
for example, shows that subjects in the experiment that participate more often typically
earn higher average payoffs. We conjecture that this participation premium results from
the payoff asymmetry in the payoffs of the two alternatives in the market entry game.
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That is, players choose between a strategically uncertain alternative (participating), for
which the payoff depends upon the actions of the other players and a sure alternative (not
participating), where the payoff is independent of other player’s actions. In this section
we consider route choice games to investigate this conjecture. For the route choice game
both alternatives are subject to strategic uncertainty and payoffs always depend upon the
choices of the other players.
In the route choice game the payoff of player i for participating, action a = 1, is the
same as the payoff for participating in market entry games, that is according to (3.1):
pii (1,a−i;Nc) =
{
α+ β − γ,
α− γ,
if
∑N
j=1,j 6=i aj < Nc,
if
∑N
j=1,j 6=i aj ≥ Nc.
Now also the payoff for abstaining, action a = 0, is decreasing in the number of other
agents choosing a = 0. We consider
pii (0,a−i;Nc) =
{
α− γ,
α+ β − γ,
if
∑N
j=1,j 6=i aj < Nc,
if
∑N
j=1,j 6=i aj ≥ Nc.
Sticking to a context of route choices, action 1 can be seen as choosing route 1 whereas
action 0 corresponds to choosing route 0. Route 1 is preferred when less than Nc agents
are choosing it, otherwise route 0 is preferred. The expected payoff for playing a mixed
strategy si changes from (3.2) for market entry games to:
pii (si, s−i;Nc, N) = α− γ + β(1− p (s−i;Nc, N)) + siβ (2p (s−i;Nc, N)− 1) . (3.20)
There are
(
N
Nc
)
PSNE such that exactly Nc players participate and the other, N − Nc,
players abstain. In contrast to market entry games, these equilibria are not strict. In fact
a player playing a = 0 is now indifferent between a = 0 and a = 1. There are
(
N
Nc+1
)
other
PSNE such that Nc + 1 players use a = 1 and the rest, N − (Nc + 1) players, uses a = 0.
Also these equilibria are not strict. In fact a player playing strategy a = 1 is indifferent
between the two pure strategies. Consequently there is an infinite number of asymmetric
MSNE. Importantly, as for market entry games, there is only one symmetric MSNE. By
equalizing pii(1, s
∗
−i) and pii(0, s
∗
−i) it can be derived that the symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium is s∗ = (s∗, . . . , s∗) with s∗ satisfying:
p (s∗;Nc, N) =
Nc−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(s∗)k (1− s∗)N−1−k = 1
2
. (3.21)
We now can compare (3.21) above to (3.4) which is the equivalent condition for the market
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entry game analyzed in Section 3.2. The symmetric MSNE does not depend upon the
ratio γ/β anymore. Notice that in the route choice game, for any value of α, and for any
γ < β, the probability s∗ is such that the distribution of the participation rate of N − 1
players playing the MSNE has Nc − 1 as median.
Notice that, our formulation of the route choice game is very close to the minority
game, a game introduced by physicists (see e.g. Challet and Zhang, 1997 and 1998) as a
setting to study coordination of “artificial” agents, using the traditional tools of statistical
mechanics. In particular a minority game is a route choice game as defined in (3.20) with
N odd and Nc = (N−1)/2. A minority game is in fact a participation game with negative
feedback where only the group taking the less popular decision is awarded with a prize.
See also Bottazzi and Devetag (2003) where an analysis of allocative and informational
efficiency of the outcome of an experiment of a minority game with N = 5 players is
performed.
Our route choice game can also be seen as a simplified version of the prediction game
introduced an investigated by Zambrano (2004). In a prediction game every player chooses
a number y in [0, N ]. Every number is awarded with a payoff
piy = −|y − y∗|,
where y∗ is the total number of other players choosing a value y which is below Nc. In
order to maximize his payoff a player has thus to predict how many other players are
choosing a number less than Nc. The route choice game corresponds to the prediction
game when each player has to choose a side, either 0 or 1, and when a player is awarded
α − β + γ only when the total number of other players who have chosen the same side
is lower than respectively N − Nc or Nc. Given the correspondence of the route choice
game with the prediction game in Zambrano (2004), it is not surprising that also in a
prediction game at the symmetric MSNE the median of the distribution of N − 1 players
playing the MSNE is Nc − 1.
3.6.1 Evolutionary competition
Following the approach of Sections 3.3 and 3.4, one can model the evolutionary competi-
tion of optimists and pessimists also when the underlying structure is given by the route
choice game. In this case optimists are those who are always choosing route 1, whereas
pessimists are those who are always choosing route 0. The terminology is less fit than in
the previous example but we hold on to it for ease of comparison. In terms of predictors,
optimists are predicting that route 1 will be the least used, or that less than Nc agents
predict that route 1 will be the least used, whereas pessimists are predicting that route
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0 will be the least used, or that less than N − Nc agents predict that route 0 will be
the least used. As we have shown in Section 3.5 for the market entry game, the anal-
ysis can be extended to incorporate rules that try to exploit the linear autocorrelation
structure of the participation rate time series. In Figure 3.13 we present the dynamics
of the participation rate resulting from the interaction of optimists, pessimists and two
lagged best responders. Also in this case two lagged best responders have an effect on
the global dynamics only when the size of the game is above the local stability threshold.
Notice that the condition for the local stability are different, namely the system loses
stability at a lower N . The exact value where the steady state s∗ loses stability can be
computed as we did in Proposition 3.4 for the market entry game. Also notice that for
route choice games fluctuations of the participation rate around the MSNE s∗ seem to be
symmetrically distributed, and underparticipation indeed disappears.
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Figure 3.13: Evolutionary competition of optimists, pessimists and two lags best responders
in a route choice setting. Left panel: participation rate for different game sizes N . Right panel:
100 periods time average of the fraction of two lags best responders for different values of N .
The time average is computed along the iterations shown in the left panel. Parameters are
b = 0.5, α = 1, β = 2γ, γ = 0.5.
3.6.2 Market entry versus route choice
The following result may help us in understanding the relationship between underpartic-
ipation and the asymmetric payoff structure of the market entry game.
Proposition 3.6 Consider an evolutionary competition between the optimistic and pes-
simistic rule and let b = 1/2 and β = 2γ. Denote by zt = xt − s∗ the deviations of the
participation rate from the MSNE and define ∆zt+1 = zt+1 − zt. For the market entry
game we can write ∆zt+1 = m (zt), where m (z) +m (−z) < 0, for z /∈
{−1
2
, 0, 1
2
}
. For
the route choice game we can write ∆zt+1 = r (zt), where −r (z) = r (−z).
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The left panel of Figure 3.14 shows the functions m (z) and r (z) and illustrates that,
outside the three steady states z = −1
2
, z = 0 and z = 1
2
, we have m (z) < r (z). This,
together with Proposition 3.6 suggests that there is a tendency for zt to be downward
biased in the market entry game, since innovations in z are lower than in the route choice
game (this is corroborated for example in the left panel of Figure 3.7). The origin of
the ‘asymmetry’ of m (z) lies in the denominator of (3.14), the population average payoff
pit =
∑
i xi,tpii,t. The right panel of Figure 3.14 shows that average payoffs pi are symmetric
in x around s∗ = 1
2
for the route choice game, but not for the market entry game.
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Figure 3.14: Comparison of the evolutionary competition of optimists and pessimists for market
entry games and route choice games. Left panel: Innovation function for the market entry game
and for the route choice game compared. Right panel: Population average payoffs, p¯i, in the two
cases. Parameters are b = 12 , α = 1, β = 2γ and γ =
1
2 .
This asymmetry in pi leads to underparticipation in the market entry game, and a
participation premium for those agents using the optimistic rule, since the project is
more often profitable. This is illustrated by the left panel of Figure 3.15 which shows the
difference between average payoff of optimists and pessimists for the market entry and the
route choice game. For the route choice game average payoffs of optimists and pessimists
are, due to symmetry, always the same. For the market entry game however, just as in
the experiment discussed in Section 3.2, optimists do better on average, whenever the
steady state s∗ is unstable.
One might expect that this payoff difference in the market entry game disappears
when some “memory” is introduced. In fact when memory plays a role more agents
should imitate the action of the optimists, which are performing better, and thus eliminate
underparticipation. Consider the evolutionary competition of optimists versus pessimists
where evolution is governed by a fitness measure that is a weighted average of past payoffs,
that is, Ft = µFt−1 + (1− µ) pi1,t−1. The resulting dynamical system is two dimensional,
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Figure 3.15: Optimists - pessimists time average payoff differences for market entry games and
route choice games. Left panel: Time average payoff difference without memory. Right panel:
Time average payoff difference with memory. Parameters are b = 12 , α = 1, β = 2γ, γ =
1
2 and
µ = 110 .
with variables xt and Ft, and given by:
xt+1 = f1 (xt, Ft) =
xtFt
xtFt + (1− xt)α, (3.22)
Ft+1 = f2 (xt, Ft) = µFt + (1− µ) (α− γ + βp (f1(xt, Ft);Nc, N) .)
The following proposition characterizes its behavior.
Proposition 3.7 The dynamics of the participation rate and of the optimists’ payoff
given by the system (3.22) has three steady states: (0, α− γ + β), (s∗, α) and (1, α− γ).
The steady states (0, α− γ + β) and (1, α− γ) are locally unstable. The interior steady
state (s∗, α) is locally stable when ψ ≡ s∗ (1− s∗) δ∗β
α
> −21+µ
1−µ .
The effect of memory is to stabilize the dynamics. For µ = 0 we retrieve the stability
condition from Proposition 3.4, but as µ increases the critical value of ψ increases. Nev-
ertheless, when the dynamics is unstable the same difference in time averages payoffs as
before emerges. The right panel of Figure 3.15 shows that when the steady state s∗ is un-
stable over time optimists outperform pessimists. Therefore, the participation premium
persists.
Summarizing, the asymmetric payoff-structure of the market entry game is indeed re-
sponsible for underparticipation and the participation premium. Note that if we assume
agents are driven by payoff differences instead of absolute payoffs, the market entry game
transfers naturally into a route choice problem. To see this, consider the payoff func-
tion (3.1 ) and define the payoff difference by φi (ai,a−i;Nc, N) = pii (ai,a−i;Nc, N) −
pii (1− ai,a−i;Nc, N). This payoff difference is equal to β − γ or −γ for participating
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players, and equal to γ − β or γ for players that do not participate, depending on the
number of participating players. Clearly, φi (1,a−i;Nc, N) + φi (0,a−i;Nc, N) = 0 and
choosing not to participate is subject to strategic uncertainty about payoff differences.
Therefore, if players care about payoff differences between the alternatives participation
rate dynamics are less stable and underparticipation is alleviated.
3.7 Conclusion
Many (economic) decision problems can be characterised as negative feedback participa-
tion games and understanding human behavior in these participation games is important.
The experiment from Section 3.2 shows that, although a reasonable description at an
aggregate level, the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does not explain individ-
ual behavior very well. In particular, rather than randomizing their decisions, subjects
typically use deterministic rules, possibly conditional on past outcomes. Moreover, the
participation rate is inherently unstable, in all experimental groups. A series of contribu-
tions from computational economics, starting with the famous El Farol bar problem from
Arthur (1994), also shows that complicated dynamics arise naturally in negative feedback
participation games. Other complex and computationally intensive models assume that
agents are randomizing their participation decision. In general, these models are difficult
to study analytically and results from this literature are typically based upon numerical
simulations.
In this paper we introduce an alternative type of behavioral model that is able to
explain the experimental and computational results, but still is sufficiently simple to be
analyzed theoretically. We consider an evolutionary competition between different deter-
ministic behavioral rules, where players switch between these rules on the basis of past
performance. For the simplest possible case, where the only available two rules are those
that specify to always participate, or to never participate, respectively, the participation
rate dynamics evolves according to a nonlinear one-dimensional difference equation. This
difference equation can be studied analytically, and local stability of the symmetric mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium turns out to depend upon the number of players. For a large
number of players this simple model exhibits perpetual fluctuations in the participation
rate, similar to those found in the experiments and the, much more complex, computa-
tional models. A testable prediction of our model is that these fluctuations, in contrast
to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, are not vanishing even when a very large group
of players is involved.
The erratic time series of participation rates has two other features. First, the time
series exhibits certain regularities. When agents use rules that try to exploit this struc-
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ture are introduced, this particular structure disappears, but fluctuations around the
symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium do not vanish. Instead, other (higher order)
regularities are introduced. Again, adding more sophisticated behavioral rules drives out
these regularities again, but does not stabilize the fluctuations, which therefore seem to
be quite robust. Secondly, the time series exhibits underparticipation and a premium for
participating. This is consistent with the experimental results. We establish that this is
due to the asymmetry in the strategic uncertainty of the market entry game. This has
interesting economic implications. In our future research we will try to use our behavioral
model to explain certain economic or financial stylized facts, such as excess volatility and
the so-called equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Consider, for example,
the decision to invest money in bonds, or in an index of stocks as an application of our
model. The uncertainty of investing in the stock index is high and may depend on other
agents choices, whereas investing in bonds is relatively safe. Our behavioral model pre-
dicts an excess return to investing in the stock index. This is consistent with the equity
premium puzzle, which refers to empirical evidence that, after adjusting for risk, investing
in stocks indeed is more profitable than investing in bonds.
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Appendix
3.A Proofs
Proofs of Section 3.2
Proof of Proposition 3.1 The symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium s∗ of the game
whose payoff for strategy s is given by eq. (3.1) in Section 3.2, solves
pii
(
1, s∗−i;Nc, N
)
= α + (βp (s∗;Nc, N)− γ) = α = pii
(
0, s∗−i;Nc, N
)
,
which is equivalent to:
p(s∗;Nc, N) =
Nc−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(s∗)k (1− s∗)N−1−k = γ
β
. (3.23)
The function p(x;Nc, N) in (3.23) is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of a
binomial distribution, with N − 1 degrees of freedom and probability of participating x,
evaluated at Nc−1. This implies that for every Nc < N , it holds true that p(0;Nc, N) = 1
and p(1;Nc, N) = 0. Furthermore dp(x;Nc, N)/dx < 0 as if we increase the probability
of participating the value of the c.d.f. at any fixed value between 0 and N − 1 decreases.
Consequently, since γ/β < 1, p(x;Nc, N) = γ/β has a unique solution s
∗ for any value of
N > 1, any Nc ∈ [0, N − 1] and any γ < β. Furthermore, since equation (3.23) does not
depend on α, neither does its solution s∗.
The value of s∗ is in general different from b = Nc/N . We first show that when
b = 1/2 and γ/β = 1/2 then s∗ = b = 1/2. In terms of the eq. (3.23) we have to
show that p(1/2;N/2, N) = 1/2, for all N > 1. We show the equivalent statement
that p(1/2;N/2, N) + p(1/2;N/2, N) = 1. The following chain of equalities proves this
statement
1 =
(
1
2
+ 1
2
)N−1
=
∑N−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
) (
1
2
)k (1
2
)N−1−k
=
∑N/2−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
) (
1
2
)k (1
2
)N−1−k
+
∑N−1
k=N/2
(
N−1
k
) (
1
2
)k (1
2
)N−1−k
= p(1/2;N/2, N) +
∑N/2−1
j=N−1−k=0
(
N−1
j
) (
1
2
)N−1−j (1
2
)j
= p(1/2;N/2, N) + p(1/2;N/2, N).
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In the last part of this proof we show that for general values of β, of γ < β, of N
and of b = Nc/N ∈ (0, 1) it holds true that s∗ → b as N → ∞. Define the random
variable n = N−1
N−1 , where N− 1 is a random variable with a Binomial distribution with
probability s∗ and N − 1 degrees of freedom. Given the fact that s∗ solves eq. (3.23), the
γ/β percentile of the distribution of n is given by bN − 1/(N − 1) = b− (1− b)/(N − 1).
Also notice that the distribution of n has mean s∗ and variance s∗(1−s∗)/(N−1). Notice
that when N → ∞ the distribution of n is concentrated more and more around s∗. We
reason by contradiction and show that the statement that there exists an ε > 0 such that
when N → ∞, |b − s∗| ≥ ε, leads to a contradiction. Assume there exists an ε > 0 such
that when N → ∞ |b − s∗| ≥ ε. This implies that either s∗ > b or s∗ < b. If it were
s∗ > b, then when N →∞, Pr(n ≤ b− (1−b)/(N−1))→ 0. This contradicts that s∗ has
been chosen such that the γ/β percentile of n, is b− (1− b)/N . On the other hand if it
were s∗ < b, then when N →∞, Pr(n ≤ b− (1− b)/(N − 1))→ 1. This also contradicts
that s∗ has been chosen such that the γ/β percentile of n, is b − (1 − b)/(N − 1). We
conclude that for every ε > 0, |b− s∗| < ε as N →∞. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.2 We use Proposition 4 in Palm (1984), where the concept of
evolutionary stable strategy is extended to N -person games, to show that s∗ is the unique
evolutionary stable strategy of the game analyzed in Section 3.2. First, for any N , define
the N − 1 dimensional vector x−i as (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, xN). With this notation if player
i plays a strategy si = s and faces opponents playing x−i then, according to eq. (3.2), his
expected payoff is:
pii(s,x−i;Nc, N) = α + s (βp (x−i;Nc, N)− γ) .
Now, since s∗ = (s∗, . . . , s∗) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium it holds that
pii(s
∗, s∗−i;Nc, N) = pii(x, s
∗
−i;Nc, N) ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
This holds ∀i since the game is symmetric. This and Proposition 4 of Palm (1984) imply
that the mixed strategy s∗ is an ESS if and only if:
pii(s
∗, s∗,x−i ;Nc, N) > pii(x, s
∗,x
−i ;Nc, N) ∀x ∈ [0, 1] \ {s∗} and ∀i, (3.24)
where the N − 1 dimensional vector s∗,x−1 is defined as (x, s∗, . . . , s∗). Now, since:
pii(s
∗, s∗,x−i ;Nc, N) = α+ s
∗ (βp (s∗,x−i ;Nc, N)− γ) ,
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and
pii(x, s
∗,x
−i ;Nc, N) = α+ x
(
βp
(
s∗,x−i ;Nc, N
)− γ) ,
inequality (3.24) becomes:
(s∗ − x)(βp (s∗,x−i ;Nc, N)− γ) > 0.
Consider player i; if one of the other N−1 players increases his probability x of participat-
ing while the other (N −2 use the same probability s∗ then p(s∗,x−i ;N − c,N) decreases. In
differential form dp
(
s∗,x−i ;Nc, N
)
/dx < 0. This, together with the fact that, by definition,
s∗ is the value such that βp (s∗−i;Nc, N) − γ = 0, implies that βp
(
s∗,x−i ;Nc, N
) − γ > 0
when x > s∗ and vice versa when x < s∗. As a result the inequality is always satisfied.
The strategy s∗ is the unique ESS because no other symmetric Nash equilibrium of the
game exist. We notice that this result does not dependent by the size of the game N . ¤
Proofs of Section 3.3
Proof of Proposition 3.3 The equilibrium condition of eq. (3.13) is given by:
x∗k =
x∗kpi
∗
k∑K
j=1 x
∗
jpi
∗
j
. (3.25)
Obviously, any point with structure x∗ = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) satisfies this equation.
These are the K equilibria where all the agents use only one rule. Now suppose that at
least two rules are used by a strictly positive fraction of agents. Define byK∗ ⊂ {1, . . . , K}
the set of indexes of these rules. Then from eq. (3.25) it follows that for any k ∈ K∗ it
should hold pi∗k =
∑
j∈K∗ x
∗
jpi
∗
j , and hence pi
∗
k has to be the same for all k ∈ K∗. According
to eq. (3.8) all the payoffs of the K∗ rule are the same when:
(1−p∗k)pia+p∗kpip(x∗;Nc, N) = (1−p∗k′)pia+p∗k′pip(x∗;Nc, N) for any couple of rules k, k′
where x =
∑
j∈K∗ x
∗
jp
∗
i and p
∗
k = fk(x
∗, . . . , x∗) for every k. In what we have called the
non-generic case, that is when p∗k = p
∗
k′ for every k, k
′ in K∗ the previous equation is
always satisfied. In the generic case, otherwise, all the solution must have pia equal to
pip(x
∗;Nc, N) which, is only possible when x∗ = s∗. ¤
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Proofs of Section 3.4
To prove Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 the following result is useful.
Lemma 3.2 Define, δ∗ = δ (s∗; b,N, ) = dp
dx
∣∣
x=s∗ then, for a fixed value of b, δ
∗ is de-
creasing in N and δ∗ → −∞ as N →∞.
Proof The cumulative distribution of a binomial distribution with parameters x and
N − 1 evaluated at bN − 1 can be written in terms of the Beta-function, B (x, y) =
(x−1)!(y−1)!
(x+y−1)! , as
p (x; bN,N) = 1−
∫ x
0
tNb−1 (1− t)N(1−b)−1 dt
B (Nb,N (1− b)) . (3.26)
Equation (3.26) implies that we have
δ (x; b,N) =
∂p (x; bN,N)
∂x
= −x
Nb−1 (1− x)N(1−b)−1
B (Nb,N (1− b)) .
The function δ (x; b,N) has a unique maximum at x̂b,N =
bN−1
N−2 . The associated minimum
value of δ is given by get
δ̂b,N = δ (x̂b,N ; b,N) = − (N − 1)!
(bN − 1)! (N (1− b)− 1)! (x̂b,N)
bN−1 (1− x̂b,N)N(1−b)−1
= − (N − 1) (N − 2)!
(bN − 1)! (N(1− b)− 1)! (x̂b,N)
bN−1 (1− x̂b,N)N(1−b)−1 .
Taking the logarithm of −δ̂b,N and applying the Stirling approximation formula, log (n!) =
n log (n)− n+ ξ(n) where ξ(n)→ 0 as n→∞, we getlog
log
(
−δ̂b,N
)
= log (N − 1) + (N − 2) log (N − 2)− (N − 2)
− (Nb− 1) log
(
Nb− 1
x̂b,N
)
− (N (1− b)− 1) log
(
N (1− b)− 1
1− x̂b,N
)
+ (N − 2) + ξ (N)
= log (N − 1) + ξ (N) ,
which goes to ∞ as N → ∞ with the same speed as log(N) and therefore δ̂b,N → −∞
as N → ∞. For the special case b = 1
2
we have x̂b,N =
1
2
for all values of N and, by
Proposition 3.1, s∗ = 1
2
for all even values of N . This implies that for b = 1
2
we have
δ∗ → −∞ as N →∞. For the general case with b 6= 1
2
, both s∗ and xˆb,N converge to b as
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N goes to infinity. Moreover, δ (x; b,N) is conitnuous in x. Consequently it must be the
case that also then δ∗ → −∞ as N →∞. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.4 A simple computation shows that the equation f (x; b,N) =
x, with f (x; b,N) given by (3.18) has three steady states: x = 0, x = 1 and x = s∗, where
s∗ is the unique number solving p (s∗; bN,N) = γ/β. The derivative of (3.18) is given by
f ′(x; b,N) =
α ((1− x)xβδ + (α+ βp (x; bN,N)− γ))
(xt (p (xt; bN,N) β − γ) + α)2
. (3.27)
From (3.27) it follows immediately that f ′ (1) = α
α−γ > 1 and f
′ (0) = α+β−γ
α
> 1 implying
that both steady states x = 1 and x = 0 are locally unstable. Evaluating (3.27) at s∗
gives
f ′ (s∗; b,N) = 1 +
(1− s∗) s∗βδ∗
α
= 1 + ψ,
where
ψ ≡ (1− s∗) s∗δ∗β/α. (3.28)
Notice that the negativity of δ∗ is always negative (see proof of Lemma 3.2) implies that
ψ is also negative and therefore f ′ (s∗; b,N) < 1. The steady state x = s∗ is therefore
stable if and only if ψ > −2. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.5 First observe that for any value of α, any γ > β and
any b ∈ (0, 1) the derivative of f (x; b,N), as given in (3.27), goes to −∞ as N → ∞.
The latter is true since (3.27) is proportional to δ∗ and from Lemma 3.2 it follows that
δ∗ → −∞ as N → +∞. When β = 2γ and b = 1
2
, we have s∗ = 1
2
(Proposition 3.1) for
every N . As a result (3.27) can be written as
f ′ (s∗; b,N) = 1 +
δ∗Nβ
4α
,
where
δ∗N = −
(
1
2
)N−2
(N − 1)!(
1
2
N − 1)! (1
2
N − 1)! . (3.29)
Notice that δ∗2 = 1 and that for N ≥ 4 we have δ∗N = −32 × 54 × · · · × N−1N−2 . Notice that δ∗N
is monotonically decreasing in N and that δ∗N → −∞ as N → ∞ (by Lemma 3.2). We
then have that ψ = ψN = − β4αδ∗N . Thus there exists an integer M such that ψN < −2
when N > M . Since this is the local stability condition of s∗, we have proved that there
exists an integer M such that s∗ is locally stable if and only if N ≤M . ¤
3.A. PROOFS 105
Proofs of Section 3.6
Proof of Proposition 3.6 Recall that a function f (x) is even when f (−x) = f (x)
for all x and odd when f (−x) = −f (x) for all x. Rewriting (3.14) in terms of z gives
∆zt+1 = m (zt) =
n (zt)
d (zt)
=
β
(
p(zt +
1
2
; N
2
, N)− 1
2
) (
zt +
1
2
) (
1
2
− zt
)(
zt +
1
2
)
β
(
p
(
zt +
1
2
; N
2
, N
)− 1
2
)
+ α
.
From (3.3) it follows that p
(
z + 1
2
; N
2
, N
)
+p
(−z + 1
2
; N
2
, N
)
= 1 or p
(
z + 1
2
; N
2
, N
)− 1
2
=
− (p (−z + 1
2
; N
2
, N
)− 1
2
)
. Together with the fact that
(
z + 1
2
) (
1
2
− z) is an even function
of z this implies that n (z) is odd, that is, n (−z) = −n (z). Now consider z ∈ (−1
2
, 0
)
.
We then have
d (z) = β
(
z +
1
2
)(
p
(
z +
1
2
;
N
2
, N
)
− 1
2
)
+ α > 0,
since p
(
z + 1
2
; N
2
, N
) − 1
2
is positive if and only if z is negative. Moreover, we then also
have
d (−z) = −β
(
1
2
− z
)(
p
(
z +
1
2
;
N
2
, N
)
− 1
2
)
+ α > 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that the d (−z) is bounded from below by
−β
4
+ α, which is positive since α− γ > 0 and β = 2γ. So for z ∈ (−1
2
, 0
)
we have
d (z)− d (−z) = β
(
p
(
z +
1
2
;
N
2
, N
)
− 1
2
)
> 0.
Summarizing, for all z ∈ (−1
2
, 0
)
we have d (z) > d (−z) > 0 and −n (−z) = n (z) > 0
which implies −m (−z) > m (z). Similarly, for z ∈ (0, 1
2
)
it can be shown that −m (z) >
m (−z). Combining those we find that m (z) +m (−z) < 0, for z /∈ {−1
2
, 0, 1
2
}
.
For the route choice problem straightforward computations from the equivalent of
(3.14) lead to:
∆zt+1 = r (zt) =
2β
(
p
(
zt +
1
2
; N
2
, N
)− 1
2
) (
zt +
1
2
) (
1
2
− zt
)
2ztβ
(
p
(
zt +
1
2
; N
2
, N
)− 1
2
)
+ α
.
Here the denominator is an even function and the numerator is odd, making r (z) an odd
function. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.7 The steady states of (3.22) solve x = xF
xF+(1−x)α and F =
α−γ+βp (x;Nc, N). The three steady states (x, F ) are given by (0, α + β − γ), (1, α− γ)
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and (s∗, α), respectively. The Jacobian of (3.22), J (x, pi1), is given by
J |(x,F ) =
(
αF
F 2
x(1−x)α
F
2
(1− µ) βδ αF
F
2 µ+ (1− µ) βδ x(1−x)α
F
2
)
,
where F = xF + (1− x)α. It follows immediately that J (0, α− γ + β) has eigenvalues
λ1 =
F
α
= α+β−γ
α
> 1 and λ2 = µ ∈ (0, 1) and that J (1, α− γ) has eigenvalues λ1 = αF =
α
α−γ > 1 and λ2 = µ ∈ (0, 1). These boundary steady states are therefore unstable for
any value of µ. The characteristic equation for the Jacobian evaluated at (s∗, α) is
λ2 − [1 + µ+ (1− µ)ψ]λ+ µ = 0, (3.30)
where, as before, ψ ≡ s∗ (1− s∗) δ∗β
α
. When µ ∈ (0, 1) one can show that the eigenval-
ues are complex as long as −(1+
√
µ)
2
1−µ < ψ < −
(1−√µ)2
1−µ . If this condition holds then we
have|λ1| = |λ2| = µ ∈ (0, 1) and the interior steady state is locally stable. If the eigenval-
ues are real the local stability conditions are given by λ1 < 1 and λ2 > −1 (where we have
labeled the eigenvalues such that λ1 > λ2). From (3.30) it follows that ψ(1− µ) < 0 im-
plies that λ1 < 1 always holds. On the other hand, λ2 > −1 as long as ψ > ψ∗ = −21+µ1−µ .
Moreover, since for ψ ≤ ψ∗ the eigenvalues are real it follows that the interior steady state
(s∗, α) is locallys stable if and only if ψ > ψ∗. ¤
Chapter 4
Informational differences in an asset
market
4.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the eighties, the validity of the efficient market hypothesis has
been questioned on the basis of empirical evaluation of so-called financial anomalies.
Well-known examples are excess volatility, as described by Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and
Porter (1981), mean reversion of asset prices, as documented by Poterba and Summers
(1988) and Fama and French (1988b), and correlation between returns and lagged returns
or lagged dividend yields, as shown by Shiller (1984) and Fama and French (1988a).
Stimulated by these findings, a part of the scientific community has investigated
whether such anomalies can be explained by assuming that the agents operating in the
market are boundedly rational. Although the exact implication of bounded rationality
varies among the different models, a common characteristic is that boundedly rational
agents act in an economic setting which they do not know in full detail. Furthermore,
agents are often assumed to be able to optimize an objective function under certain con-
straints but unable to optimally anticipate the effect of their and other agents’ actions.
In particular, boundedly rational agents are not assumed to be able to coordinate their
actions such that their beliefs are perfectly self fulfilling. In other words, expectations of
boundedly rational agents need not be rational.
In order to explain fluctuations in prices that are not due to fluctuations in eco-
nomic fundamentals, one class of models with boundedly rational agents concentrates on
the interaction of agents choosing different expectation schemes or different investment
strategies (see e.g. the survey paper of Hommes, 2006). An early example is Chiarella
(1992) where a model of a stylized financial market with fundamentalists and chartists is
shown to generate a number of dynamic regimes which are compatible with the empirical
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anomalies reported above. In a more recent paper, Brock and Hommes (1998) assume
that agents do not know whether it is more profitable to predict prices by relying on
fundamental information, or to extrapolate trends. In their model, agents use realized
profits or a similar performance measure to decide which strategy to use. This ongoing
choice for the best strategy leads to complex endogenous price fluctuations. Endogenous
fluctuations can already arise in the absence of exogenous influences such as time-varying
fundamentals. An advantage of this assumption is that the price dynamics can be specified
in terms of deviations from a benchmark fundamental price.
A limitation of models in this class is that they typically do not take into account
the direct effect of news about the economic fundamentals on agents’ behavior thus ex-
cluding one of the most trivial behavioral scenarios one might deem important in asset
price formation — the over- or under-reaction of agents, and hence the market, to new
information. Generally speaking, market models that tend to a stable equilibrium state in
the absence of news can still show fluctuations triggered by the arrival of new information.
Because a priori we do not know if market fluctuations are necessarily self-perpetuating
as in chaotic dynamics, we explicitly wish to examine the role of exogenous noise on
the price dynamics, thus keeping open the possibility of scenarios where ongoing market
fluctuations require repeated triggering by a sequence of exogenous shocks.
In view of this critique, there is another class of models in the literature of asset mar-
kets with boundedly rational agents, which explicitly takes into account the role of news
on fundamentals in the price dynamics. Early examples are Bulkley and Tonks (1989)
and Barsky and De Long (1993) who investigate the effect of agents trying to learn the
growth rate of dividends from movements in the stock price. More recent examples are
Timmermann (1993), Timmermann (1996) and Barucci, Monte, and Reno´ (2004), who
assume that agents estimate parameters defining the relationship between prices and div-
idends. In all these cases, agents use the rational expectations relationship that would
hold between endogenous variables (prices) and exogenous variables (dividends) as if the
underlying parameters were known. That is, agents do not take into account that their
learning effort is modifying the way dividends feed back into prices and do not take into
account estimation errors. When new information about dividends becomes available,
it influences returns not only directly but also indirectly as it affects the estimates of
the parameters that the agents use to forecast future prices and/or dividends. The ex-
pectations in these models converge to rational expectations when the agents learn the
parameters of the data generating process. A limitation of these models is that they all
assume the presence of a representative agent, so that agents’ interaction triggered by
informational differences or by different expectations does not play a role. Moreover, due
to the stochastic components associated with the incoming news about the fundamentals,
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results are practically always obtained by means of simulations.
The aim of this chapter is to construct a framework for examining markets with
boundedly rational agents where both parameter estimation and interaction of agents
play a role. When we use boundedly rational agents, we do not question that rational
behavior, and especially rational expectations, can be a good approximation to the equi-
librium of agents’ repeated interaction. Rather, we argue that the convergence to such an
equilibrium is worth investigating as it might explain part of the economic fluctuations
we observe in reality. Our objective is to characterize how both parameter estimation and
interaction of agents transform incoming information into realized market prices. Because
it is impossible to carry out this exercise under all conceivable behavioral assumptions,
we limit ourselves to a simple class of agent models, where all agents act upon the in-
formation available to them regarding fundamentals (including that revealed by prices).
The agent interaction is triggered by different expectations, which can be explained by
different degrees of information regarding the future value of dividends. This means that
agents neither extrapolate price trends or use other chartists’ rules per se, nor expect
other agents to do so, so that second or higher-order expectations play no role.
We investigate the extent to which our model is able to explain empirical properties
of asset prices. As it turns out, our price dynamics driven by exogenous noise leads
to a simple econometric model for prices that can account for several well-documented
anomalies such as autocorrelation of returns and large persistent deviations of the market
price from the fundamental price in the short run but convergence to it in the long run.
In fact, in line with the econometric model proposed by Summers (1986), our model leads
to a (log) price which is the sum of a persistent component, proportional to the (log)
dividend, and of a transitory component, proportional to the (log) dividend yield, which
turns out to follow a stationary AR(1) process with a time-varying AR(1) coefficient.
Our analysis shows that, whereas the transitory component follows an AR(1) process
as a direct consequence of agents’ learning the dividend growth rate, the fact that the
AR(1) coefficient is time-varying is due to agent interaction triggered by informational
differences. This offers theoretical support to the empirical evidence that the temporary
component in a mean reversion model is nonlinear and switching between regimes with
different rates of convergence, as documented both by Gallagher and Taylor (2001) and
by Manzan (2003).
A convenient feature of our model is that it contains two important benchmarks as
special cases. The first benchmark is given by the classical asset pricing model: the equi-
librium price we derive coincides with the correct present value price when one discards
both the role of informational differences and of agents learning the growth rate of divi-
dends. In this case log prices follow a random walk process driven by realized dividends.
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The second benchmark is given by the model developed in Barsky and De Long (1993)
where log prices have a persistent component (random walk) plus a stationary component.
Our equilibrium price coincides with the price derived in the model of Barsky and De Long
when we discard the role of informational differences. Our model can thus be seen as an
extension of the Barsky and De Long model, where agents with different information sets
are active in the market.
As we consider an asset market where agents have different degrees of information, our
framework is closely related to that of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) (henceforth GS). They
investigate whether the price is informationally efficient in a repeated market for a one
period living asset, in which agents can decide between two different degrees of information
about the value of the asset return at the end of the period. As GS, we also assume that
agents operating in the asset market can decide whether or not to be informed about next
period’s dividend. However as Bray (1982), Hellwig (1982) and Routledge (1999), we
consider a dynamic model rather than a static one. Rather than starting off by assuming
that agents have rational expectations, we merely see rational expectations as a possible
long run outcome of a learning process of boundedly rational agents using simpler rules.
Failure of the uninformed agents to learn the relationship between prices and dividends
implies deviations of the price from its fundamental value. Moreover, we assume that
the fractions of informed and uninformed agents are not constant but change over time
based on past performances of both strategies. The fraction of each type of agents is
thus an endogenously determined variable. Another difference with the framework of GS
and the papers mentioned above is that we model a market for an infinitely living asset
rather than of a sequence of identical markets for a single period asset. This implies that
agents need to form expectations not only on the value of the future dividend but also
on the remaining value of the asset. To our knowledge, Goldbaum (2005) is the first to
consider a dynamic multi-period market in a setting where agents have different degrees
of information. Whereas Goldbaum assumes the dividend to be stationary in differences,
in order to stay closer to real data, we assume the asset’s dividend to be stationary in
log-differences. Accordingly, we choose to derive our agents’ demand from mean variance
maximization of a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function rather than from
a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function as Goldbaum (2005). Other
papers that model the interaction of agents with CRRA utility function are e.g. Chiarella
and He (2001) and Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto (2006).
The impact of news in a financial market, where heterogeneous boundedly rational
agents are operating, has also been investigated by Hong and Stein (1999). Their model
reproduces stock prices that are under-reacting in the short run, and over-reacting in the
long run to the arrival of new information. In contrast to our framework, they assume
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that the fractions of agents of each group are constant and that the dividend generating
process is stationary in levels.
Our model shows that financial markets populated by agents with different degrees of
information can be seen as economic systems with negative feedback as those analyzed
in the previous two chapters. This establishes a precise correspondence with the famous
cobweb model, see Ezekiel (1938), and with the literature that originated from it, such as
Muth (1961) and Brock and Hommes (1997). Our equation for the evolution of the divi-
dend yield as a function of the uninformed agents’ expectations has a close correspondence
with the equilibrium price equation in a cobweb model in the case of linear supply and lin-
ear demand. We refer to this literature to justify the expectation formation of boundedly
rational agents. In particular Brock and Hommes (1997) and Chapter 2 in this thesis show
that if rational expectations come at a cost, boundedly rational agents keep switching be-
tween an expensive sophisticated and a cheap simple expectation scheme, thus generating
complicated price fluctuations. Because we want to keep our model as simple as possible,
we do not explicitly model agents’ choice between cheap simple expectations and expen-
sive sophisticated expectations. We concentrate on informational difference and model
expectations as adaptive. An analysis where both informational differences and the role
of expectation scheme choice play a role is performed by De Fontnouvelle (2000). He
shows that if agents are allowed to switch among different types of expectation schemes
and if rational expectations come at a cost, an asset market of the type proposed by GS
leads to similar price fluctuations as Brock and Hommes (1997) found for the cobweb
model. By considering informational differences as well as the choice of an expectation
scheme, even in the simpler case of a one period living asset, De Fontnouvelle arrives at a
rather complicated model, which is analyzed mostly by means of simulation, rather than
analytically.
The chapter unfolds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model in terms of its
three founding elements: the asset market, expectation formation and the evolution of
the fractions of informed and uninformed agents. Section 4.3 analyzes the co-evolution
of the market price and of the fractions of informed and uninformed agents in a world
without uncertainty about future growth rates of dividends. That is, we analyze the
deterministic skeleton of the system of difference equations developed in Section 4.2.
Section 4.4 analyzes the full model, i.e. the evolution of the market price and of fractions
of agents when uncertainty about future growth rates of dividends plays a role. There we
also relate the price dynamics generated by our model to the classical asset pricing model
and to the model developed in Barsky and De Long (1993). Section 4.5 concludes with
a discussion of our main results. The appendix at the end of the chapter contains proofs
and a micro-foundation of our model.
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4.2 The model
4.2.1 The asset market
We consider a market where shares of a financial asset are traded repeatedly in discrete
time periods. The market is populated by agents who believe that the discounted sum of
expected future dividends constitutes a “fair” value of the asset. As in GS, every agent
can decide whether or not to buy information about next period’s dividend. As a result,
in every period the population of agents is divided in two groups with different degrees
of information concerning fundamental variables. The current setting differs from GS in
that the asset represents a claim on an infinite sequence of future dividends rather than on
a single dividend, that is, the asset is infinitely lived and does not perish at the end of the
period. As a consequence agents, besides forming expectations on dividends, must also
form expectations on future asset prices. Another important difference with respect to the
GS framework is that in our model agents are boundedly rational. By this we mean that
agents are unable to compute the equilibrium relationship between price and dividends
that should arise in the market where informed and uninformed agents operate. The aim
of this section is to characterize how, in this setting, the market price of an asset/share,
pt, and the fraction of informed agents, λt, co-evolve given agents’ expectations and the
dividend process {dt}. In order to arrive at such a relationship we build up our model
starting from stating its underlying ingredients.
We take a stochastice dividend process, {dt}. In the benchmark case {dt} is given by
a geometric random walk. The dividend payed at time t, dt, is given by:
dt = dt−1(1 + g)ηt, (4.1)
where {ηt} is a sequence of independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables
with mean 1 and variance σ2η. The constant g is referred to as the growth rate of dividends.
Agents know that the dividend is growing over time at a certain rate which they
estimate using past dividend realizations. We let ge denote their estimate (beliefs) of the
growth rate of dividends. We assume that this belief is the same across agents and that
agents use it for predictions “as if” it is the true value in the dividend generating process
4.1. For the moment we consider ge as given and constant. In Subsection 4.2.2 we will
discuss how agents actually estimate the growth rate g.
All agents are “fundamentalists” in the sense that they follow the present value model,
i.e. the discounted sum of all future dividends is their “fair” value of the asset. The exact
relationship between today’s price and tomorrow’s expected dividend depends on the
agent’s information about future dividends. The information set of agents contains past
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dividend and price realizations and is different across groups of agents. We denote the
information set at time t for a group H as FHt . The fair value, i.e. the expected discounted
sum of future dividends, conditional on FHt is denoted by vHt :
vHt = E
[ ∞∑
i=1
dt+i
(1 + r)i
FHt
]
. (4.2)
The coefficient (1+ r) is the discount rate or required rate of return. We assume that the
discount rate is the same across agents and that agents use the same discount rate for all
future periods. The latter assumption is made because we want to concentrate on price
fluctuations determined by agents’ interaction and learning rather than agents changing
their discount rate. In general, the discount rate can be characterized as the sum of the
risk free rate and the risk premium, which depends on the risk preferences of agents. In
this case, to state that agents use the same constant discount rate means that agents
have the same constant risk preferences. See Appendix 4.A for a derivation of the risk
premium in a context where preferences of the agents are explicitly taken into account.
We also assume that the discount rate is always bigger than the agents’ estimate of the
long run growth rate of dividends.
At any time t, each agent can decide whether to buy information about the value of
dt+1 or not to buy it and thus remain uninformed. As a result, in every period there
are two groups of agents having a different degree of information regarding the next
realization of the dividend process. At time t, the informed agents, group I, are fully
informed regarding dt+1. This implies that their current expectation of the t+1 dividend
is
de,It,t+1 = dt+1, (4.3)
where the superscript e, I stands for expectations of the informed agents. We assume that
they pay a fixed cost c > 0 per period for this information. The uninformed agents, group
U , do not know dt+1 but can use public information, available in the form of realized
dividends ds and realized prices ps, s ≤ t, to form their expectations, de,Ut,t+1, about dt+1.
The superscript e, U stands for expectations of the uninformed agents. For example, if
uninformed agents relied solely on the public belief of the dividend growth rate, they
could use de,Ut,t+1 = (1 + g
e)dt. The alternative that we consider here, is that uninformed
agents try to get additional information revealed by the demands of the informed agents
through the current market price pt. Uninformed agents consider the relationship between
the dividend and the price to be of the form:
de,Ut,t+1 = y
ept, (4.4)
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where ye is the agents’ belief, or estimate, of the market dividend yield, that is, the ratio
between future dividend and current price. As for ge, we start with considering ye as
given and fixed. In Subsection 4.2.2 we will discuss how agents actually form their beliefs
of the market dividend yield. We let λ denote the fraction of informed agents, so that
1 − λ is the fraction of uninformed agents. A subscript t is added when we consider a
time dependent λ. We use time varying fractions only from Subsection 4.2.3 where we
describe how λt evolves endogenously.
At each time t, the ex-dividend market price of one share, pt, is given by the following
market equilibrium pricing equation:
pt = λv
I
t + (1− λ)vUt , (4.5)
where vIt and v
U
t denote the “fair” value of the asset conditional on the information of the
informed and uninformed respectively, derived below. Under this assumption the realized
price today is a weighted average, with weights equal to the fraction of each agent type,
of the agent’s estimate of the fair share value. Although this market equilibrium pricing
equation is admittedly stylized, it can be derived by assuming that agents can choose to
invest in a risky asset and in a risk free bond and use a mean variance utility to decide
how much of their wealth to allocate in each investment. If one starts from such a micro-
foundation of demands, equation (4.5) can be derived in a Walrasian framework where λ
(1-λ) is the fraction of wealth of informed (uninformed) agents. See Appendix 4.A for a
derivation of (4.5).
The next step is to derive the implication of agents’ behvaior on the price dynamics
in (4.5). First, we compute the fair value for the informed and for the uninformed agents.
Informed agents We have said that informed agents, like all other agents, know that
the dividend is growing over time at a certain rate, which they assume to be equal to
ge and which they use for predictions “as if” it is the true value of the growth rate of
the dividend process. Expectations of future share values are directly linked to expected
future dividends through equation (4.2). At time t the informed agents know the value
of dt+1 so that their information at time t is given by F It = {dt+1, dt, . . . , pt, pt−1, . . . }.
Hence their expectations of future dividends are:
de,It,t+j = dt+1(1 + g
e)j−1, for j ≥ 1. (4.6)
Notice that agents treat their estimate ge as if it is the true value of the growth rate
of dividends, that is, they do not take into account possible estimation errors in their
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dividend predictions. Plugging expectations (4.6) into (4.2) we arrive at the informed
agents’ estimate of the value of the stock,
vIt =
dt+1
(r − ge) . (4.7)
The informed agents’ stock valuation is thus in accordance with the Gordon model (see
e.g. Gordon, 1962). Equation (4.7) implies that informed agents are behaving similarly
to so-called fundamentalists in the interacting agents literature, see Hommes (2006) and
LeBaron (2006) for recent surveys. In fact, the informed agents’ fair value of the asset is
proportional to the dividend payed at time t+1. For this reason, we shall refer to vIt , the
fair price of the informed agents, as the fundamental price p∗t , that is, we define:
p∗t =
dt+1
(r − ge) . (4.8)
Notice that the value of the fundamental price depends on ge, the agent’s common belief
of the growth rate of dividends.
Uninformed agents Boundedly rational uninformed agents try to infer the value of
dt+1 from the market clearing price pt. In doing so, they use their model (4.4) concerning
the relationship between the current realized market price pt and expected future divi-
dends dt+1. Combining this with agents being fundamentalists and using g
e to estimate
the growth rate of dividends we obtain
de,Ut,t+j = y
ept(1 + g
e)j−1, for j ≥ 1, (4.9)
which, using (4.2), and the uninformed information set FUt = {dt, dt−1, . . . , pt, pt−1, . . . },
gives the uninformed agents’ valuation of the value of the stock:
vUt =
yept
(r − ge) . (4.10)
Notice that also for uninformed agents, there is a correspondence with the literature on
interacting agents. In fact, our “fundamentalists” uninformed agents are behaving “as
if” they are chartists, that is, they use current prices to estimate the value they attach
to the asset. This is an important characteristic of our model and we anticipate some
consequences here. Consider ge and ye as given. If at time t, ye/(r − ge) is bigger than
one, uninformed agents behave “as if” they are trend follower, and can drive prices well
above the fundamental levels. In this case the realized dividend yield, yt+1 = dt+1/pt, will
become lower than (r − ge). The converse happens when ye/(r − ge) < 1. In this case
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the uninformed agents behave “as if” they are contrarian. Summarizing, the uninformed
agents behave “as if” they are chartists but with a different trend coefficient for different
values of ge and ye.
Given the asset valuation for both types of agents, specified in (4.7) and (4.10), and
the market equilibrium pricing equation (4.5) we get,
pt =
dt+1
(r − ge)
λ(r − ge)
(r − ge − (1− λ)ye) . (4.11)
This equation shows that the realized price is proportional to the fundamental price
p∗t defined in (4.8) – a similar result one gets through the Gordon model – but there
is an additional factor due to the presence of the uninformed agents trying to extract
information from the market price. One can consider this as a generalization of the
Gordon equation to a simple setting where agents have different degrees of information.
Moreover, when λ = 1, i.e. all agents are informed, the realized prize pt in (4.11) is equal
to the fundamental price p∗t in (4.8), as in the Gordon model. On the other hand when
λ = 0, i.e. all agents are uninformed, either pt = 0 or, if y
e = r − ge, pt is indeterminate.
Thus, when λ = 0 our pricing equation (4.11) is not well defined, as the price contains no
information about the dividend.
Equation (4.11) can be rewritten as a relationship between the realized dividend yield
yt+1 = dt+1/pt, agents’ beliefs g
e and ye, and the fraction of informed agents’ λ:
yt+1 =
(r − ge)
λ
− (1− λ)
λ
ye := f(ye, ge, λ). (4.12)
We call the map f an expectational feedback map because, given a fraction of informed
agents λ and common beliefs about the growth rate of dividends ge, it establishes a
feedback between expectations of uninformed agents of the dividend yield and dividend
yield realizations. Using the expectational feedback map (4.12), it can be easily derived
that, for any λ ∈ (0, 1], if ye = r−ge then yt+1 = r−ge. When this is the case, the agents’
belief regarding the dividend yield is self-fulfilling and r − ge is thus the expectational
feedback equilibrium or rational expectation dividend yield. Notice that when ye = r−ge,
using equation (4.11), one finds that the market price equals the fundamental price p∗t ,
which we have defined in (4.8) as the fair value of the informed agents. For this reason
we denote
y∗ = r − ge (4.13)
as the fundamental dividend yield. The rational expectations dividend yield is thus equal
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to the fundamental dividend yield and, as we will specify later, it gives approximately
the same price process as derived by Timmermann (1993) or by Barsky and De Long
(1993) who also consider a model where agents update their estimate of the dividend
growth rate g. The novelty here is that, due to the presence of informed and uninformed
agents, yt+1 may fail to be equal to y
∗. In particular the presence of uninformed agents
can generate a price that differs from the fundamental price. In fact, equation (4.12)
establishes a negative feedback system between the realized dividend yield yt+1 and its
belief or estimate ye, since ∂f/∂ye = −(1−λ)/λ < 0. This implies that positive (negative)
deviations of ye from y∗, lead to negative (positive) realized deviations of yt+1 from y∗.
This observation links our model to the classical cobweb model (see e.g. Ezekiel, 1938, for
an early treatment). In fact equation (4.12) for the price dividend ratio is the same as
the equilibrium price equation in a cobweb model with linear supply and linear demand.
The general asset price dynamics will be more complicated however, since, according to
(4.12), asset prices will be also driven by the learning of the growth rate of the dividend
process and by the evolution of agents’ fractions as we shall see.
4.2.2 Expectation formation
Here we consider how agents form expectations on the growth rate of dividends and on the
dividend yield. As far as the growth rate of dividends is concerned we have assumed that
both informed and uninformed agents have homogeneous expectations on the dividend
growth rate. We follow Barsky and De Long (1993) and assume that agents use adaptive
expectations to estimate its long run value. Adaptive expectations are characterized by
get,t+1 = γg
e
t−1,t + (1− γ)
(
dt
dt−1
− 1
)
, (4.14)
where get,t+1 denotes the time t belief or estimate of the long run growth rate for period
t + 1, and where we refer to γ as the memory coefficient specifying the rate at which
agents discount past information. Naive expectations are obtained in the special case
γ = 0, whereas get,t+1 is the mean of all past observations of y when γ = (t − 1)/t.
Notice that when the growth rate is time-varying, one has to update the definition of the
fundamental price and of the fundamental dividend yield from expression (4.8) and (4.13)
to, respectively:
p∗t =
dt+1
r − get,t+1
, (4.15)
y∗t+1 = r − get,t+1. (4.16)
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The same expectation used for the estimation of the future growth rate of dividends is
assumed to be used for the estimation of the value of the future dividend yield ye. Notice
that only uninformed agents need to form expectations about tomorrow’s dividend yield,
as informed agents already know the value of dt+1. Adaptive expectations for the dividend
yield are specified by:
yet,t+1 = αy
e
t−1,t + (1− α)yt, (4.17)
where, as before, yet,t+1 denotes the belief or estimate of the dividend yield of time t + 1
based on the information up to time t, and the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is, as γ, the memory
parameter, which specifies the rate at which agents discount past information.
Substituting the time varying expectations of the growth rate of dividends and of the
dividend yield into the expectational feedback map (4.12) one obtains:
yt+1 = f(y
e
t,t+1, g
e
t,t+1, λ) =
(r − get,t+1)
λ
− (1− λ)
λ
yet,t+1. (4.18)
This equation evaluated at time t together with (4.17) explicitly gives the dynamics for
the expectations of the dividend:
yet,t+1 =
(1− α)(r − get−1,t)
λ
+
α + λ− 1
λ
yet−1,t.
This dynamic equation can also be written in terms of the realized dividend yield, y, using
the feedback map (4.12), which gives:
yt+1 =
r − get,t+1
λ
− α(r − g
e
t−1,t)
λ
+
α + λ− 1
λ
yt := h(yt, g
e
t,t+1, g
e
t−1,tλ). (4.19)
The map h establishes the dependence of the realized dividend yield yt+1, on its lagged
value yt, on agents’ beliefs of the growth rate of dividends at two subsequent dates, g
e
t,t+1
and get−1,t, and on the fractions of informed agents λ. We study this linear map in Section
4.3.
Notice that, given the negative expectational feedback map (4.12), adaptive expec-
tations for the dividend yield are not rational in the sense of Muth (1961). We assume
that boundedly rational agents use them for two reasons. First, empirical support in
favor of the use of adaptive expectations for the dividend yield in present values mode
has been given by Chow (1989). Second, Brock and Hommes (1997) and Chapter 2 of
this thesis show that with endogenously determined variables as price or dividend yield,
if rational expectations come at a cost, agents may switch continuously between costly
rational expectations and simpler expectations at no cost. As a result, when one models
this expectation choice, convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium is not ensured.
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In order to keep the structural form of our model simple, we do not model agent’s choice
of its expectation framework and assume that boundedly rational agents use adaptive
expectations. In fact adaptive expectation gives a reasonable trade-off between simplicity
of use and consistency with the outcomes of the models.
4.2.3 Evolution of the fraction of informed agents
So far we have assumed that the fractions of informed and uninformed agents are fixed.
In this subsection we model how these fractions change over time. The driving force
behind these changes is the trade-off between the costs of information and the precision
of the dividend yield estimator based on public information. Intuitively, given the costs of
information, the more precise the estimate of the dividend yield, the bigger the fraction
of uninformed agents. Or, given the precision of the dividend yield estimate, the higher
the costs of being informed, the smaller the fraction of informed agents.
The evolution of the fraction of informed agents λ is modeled by the replicator dynam-
ics mechanism, the same updating mechanim we have assumed in Chapter 3. We remind
here that the replicator dynamics can be motivated in the context of boundedly rational
agents who are learning and imitating which strategy to play in a strategic environment
(see e.g. Weibull, 1995 and Binmore and Samuelson, 1997). Furthermore, in this case
the replicator dynamics arises naturally in a framework where the equilibrium pricing
equation (4.5) is derived from the maximization of a mean variance utility function. In
fact, in this framework, as outlined in Appendix 4.B, λ is related to the fraction of the
total wealth possessed by the informed agents. Although it is beyond the scope of this
chapter to consider other specifications of the dynamics of λ, we believe the results to
be valid more generally than just for the replicator dynamics discussed here. Since the
objective of the agents is to gather information about future dividends, we assume that
the success of a strategy is given by the squared forecast error of the dividend predictor.
Informed agents have zero forecast error. Uninformed agents try to forecast future divi-
dends by estimating the dividend yield, so their squared forecast error for the realization
yt is (y
e
t−1,t − yt)2. The costs of information are c > 0 per time step for the informed
agents, and 0 for the uninformed. In addition, we assume that agents are granted a fixed
payoff ρ. As a result, we can define the fitness pit of the strategies at time t. The fitness
of the strategy to buy information is:
piIt = ρ− c, (4.20)
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while the fitness of the strategy of remaining uninformed is
piUt = ρ−
(
yet−1,t − yt
y∗t
)2
. (4.21)
Tecnically, the fixed payoff ρ assures that both (4.20) and (4.21) are always positive and
can be taken as fitnesses in a replicator dynamics framework. In fact, only when fitnesses
are positive, the replicator dynamics produces fractions in the interval [0, 1]. Notice that
in the case of (4.20) a positive fitness requires ρ > c.
The time-varying fundamental dividend yield y∗t defined in (4.16) is introduced in the
denominator of piUt for normalization. Given that dividend yield yt has y
∗
t as reference
value, this choice is convenient because it implies that the two fitness measures coincide
when, given c, a forecasting error of (100
√
c)% is made. For example, if c = 0.1, the two
fitness measures are equal when errors of approx. 30% around y∗t are made.
In the presence of a time varying fraction λt, (4.18) becomes:
yt+1 = f(y
e
t,t+1, g
e
t,t+1, λt) =
r − get,t+1
λt
− (1− λt)
λt
yet,t+1. (4.22)
We can use this relation between yt+1 and y
e
t,t+1 and rewrite the fitness of the uninformed
agents (4.21) as:
piUt = ρ−
(
y∗t − yet−1,t
λt−1y∗t
)2
. (4.23)
Given the fitness measure of both strategies we can now specify the dynamics for λ.
Under replicator dynamics the fraction λt of informed agents evolves according to
λt = (1− δ) λt−1pi
I
t
λt−1piIt + (1− λt−1)piUt
+
δ
2
, (4.24)
where the parameter δ is to be interpreted as a mutation or experimentation parameter
(see e.g. Young and Foster, 1991; Droste, Hommes, and Tuinstra, 2002). The parameter δ
is related to what we call evolutionary (or selection) pressure in the following way. When
δ = 0 the updating of the fractions is determined only by the selection mechanism. On the
other hand when δ = 1 the evolutionary pressure reaches its minimum and both fractions
are 1/2, independently on the fitness of the two strategies. Intermediate values of δ result
in a convex combination of selection pressure and experimentation. Based on expressions
(4.20) and (4.23), the replicator dynamics (4.24) gives,
λt = (1− δ) λt−1(−c+ ρ)
λt−1(−c)− (1− λt−1)
(
y∗t−yet−1,t
λt−1y∗t
)2
+ ρ
+
δ
2
. (4.25)
4.2. THE MODEL 121
The parameter ρ regulates the speed of adjustment of the replicator dynamics. When
ρ is large changes in λ are smaller, everything else being equal, than when ρ is small.
Moreover, in the limit ρ → ∞ the trajectories of 4.25 approach the trajectories of the
corresponding continuos dynamical system (see e.g. Weibull, 1995, Chapter 4). For this
reason we will refer to rho as to the inverse of the speed of adjustment. In Appendix
4.B we present an interpretation of this formula starting from wealth evolution of agents’
maximizing a mean variance CRRA utility function.
4.2.4 Market returns
To summarize, for every shock ηt such that dt = dt−1(1 + g)ηt, the full model developed
so far is given by the following four equations
get,t+1 = γg
e
t−1,t + (1− γ) ((1 + g)ηt − 1) , (4.26)
yet,t+1 = αy
e
t−1,t + (1− α)yt, (4.27)
yt+1 =
r − get,t+1
λt
− (1− λt)
λt
yet,t+1, (4.28)
λt = (1− δ) λt−1(−c+ ρ)
λt−1(−c)− (1− λt−1)
(
y∗t−yet−1,t
λt−1y∗t
)2
+ ρ
+
δ
2
. (4.29)
Equation (4.26) gives the common expectation formation regarding the growth rate of
dividends ge as defined in (4.14), taking into account of the dividend process defined in
(4.1). Equation (4.27) gives the expectation formation of the dividend yield ye by the
uninformed traders as defined in (4.17). Equation (4.28) is the time varying expectational
feedback map (4.22). Equation (4.29) expresses the dynamics of the fraction of informed
agents λ as in (4.25). The shocks and parameters are:
• g, the (unknown) dividend growth rate;
• ηt, the shocks on the dividend growth rate;
• γ, the memory agents use to estimate the dividend growth;
• α, the memory agents use to estimate the future dividend yield;
• r, the required rate of return;
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• δ, the experimentation or mutation rate;
• c, the costs of information per time step;
• ρ, the inverse speed of adjustment of the replicator dynamics.
Whenever yt converges to its steady state value, that is, whenever y
e
t,t+1 converges to the
rational expectations value y∗t = r−get,t+1 as in (4.16), the price follows p∗t = dt+1/r−get,t+1
as in (4.15). Notice that the fundamental price depends on the changing estimates of the
growth rate of dividends, and that it is the same price which has been derived by Barsky
and De Long (1993). If, moreover, get,t+1 → g, i.e. beliefs about the dividend growth rate
converge to its true value, the fundamental price converges to the “correct” present value
price, that is y∗t → r− g and p∗t → dt+1/(r− g). In that case the price follows a geometric
random walk. If yt fails to converge to r − g, deviations of the price from fundamental
price can have two origins. The first is the failure of the deterministic skeleton of the
system specified in (4.26–4.29) to converge to its fixed point, or equivalently adaptive
expectations do not converge to rational expectations. This is related to the work of GS
and to the fact that prices are not fully informative. The second possible reason is that,
even if the system converges to the fixed point, it could approach an equilibrium where
ge 6= g. This is a situation where the fundamental price p∗ is not equal to the “correct”
present value price dt+1/(r− g). This is specifically relevant when the estimate ge is time
varying so that the system in (4.26-4.29) is stochastic. In what follows, we analyze these
effects separately as well as their interplay. First, in Section 4.3, we analyze the conditions
of convergence of the deterministic system dynamics of y and λ to their equilibrium values.
Thereafter, in Section 4.4, we complement this analysis by investigating the effect of a
time varying stochastic ge and how the two sources interact.
4.3 Informational differences
In this section we analyze the impact of informational differences alone on the dynamics
of asset prices assuming that get,t+1 ≡ ge, without learning of the divided growth rate.
Technically, we analyze the system of equations (4.26–4.29) when the memory parameter
γ = 1. Without loss of generality we consider only the case ge = g. The generalization to
ge 6= g is straightforward and implies only a shift of the level of the steady state dividend
yield from r − g to r − ge. To simplify the notation, throughout the rest of the chapter
we write yet,t+1 ≡ yet+1 for the forecast of yt+1 made at time t.
When get,t+1 = g, the system (4.26–4.29) reduces to a two dimensional (2-D) system in
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the variables yet+1 and λt:
yet+1 =
(1− α)(r − g)
λt−1
+
α+ λt−1 − 1
λt−1
yet , (4.30)
λt = (1− δ) λt−1(−c+ ρ)
λt−1(−c)− (1− λt−1)
(
(r−g)−yet
λt−1(r−g)
)2
+ ρ
+
δ
2
. (4.31)
Given the dynamics of (yet+1, λt) specified by (4.30–4.31), the dynamics of the dividend
yield yt+1 can be derived by using the expectational feedback map f defined in (4.12).
Before investigating the full dynamics of (4.30–4.31) it is instructive to consider the 1-D
system obtained when the fraction λt of informed agents is fixed to a constant value λ.
Proofs of all the propositions can be found in Appendix 4.C.
4.3.1 Dividend yield dynamics
Taking λt ≡ λ, (4.30) becomes:
yet+1 =
(1− α)(r − g)
λ
+
α + λ− 1
λ
yet . (4.32)
Given the linearity of (4.32), the analysis of the dynamics is straightforward and it is
possible to compute the general solution of the difference equation. That is, given ye0 one
can compute the value of yet , for all t. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4.8 Given the memory parameter α ∈ (0, 1), the fraction of informed agents
λ ∈ (0, 1], and the required rate of return r > g, we have:
(i) The solution of the difference equation (4.32) with initial condition y0 is given by:
yet = (y
e
0 − y∗)
(
α+ λ− 1
λ
)t
+ y∗,
where
y∗ = r − g.
(ii) If
λ > λ¯ ≡ 1− α
2
, (4.33)
yet converges to the steady state y
∗, otherwise yet diverges to ±∞.
Notice that whenever the expected dividend yield yet+1 converges to its steady state y
∗,
also the realized dividend yield yt converges to y
∗ through the feedback map (4.12). At
the steady state y∗ the price equals the fundamental price p∗t in (4.8) and thus fully reveals
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the information concerning the future dividend. The shaded area in Figure 4.1 shows the
stability region of (4.32) in the parameter space, (α, λ), whereas the white area shows
the unstable region. The shaded area is divided in two gray scales. In the lighter region,
the convergence of the expected dividend yield to its the steady state y∗ is oscillatory,
whereas in the darker, the convergence is monotone. Notice that the border between the
stability and the instability region is characterized by oscillatory behavior of the expected
dividend yield yet , and thus of the realized dividend yield yt. This implies that failure
of the price to fully reveal the fundamental information should be characterized by price
fluctuations with negative autocorrelation.
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Figure 4.1: Left panel: Stability region for the 1-D dynamical system in (4.32). The expected
dividend yield converges to the steady state y∗ = r − g only for values of (α, λ) in the shaded
area. In the darker region the convergence to y∗ is monotone, whereas in the lighter region
the convergence is oscillatory. Right panel: Stability region in the 2-D dynamical system in
(4.30-4.31) as a function of the mutation rate δ and memory α, when k = ρ/c = 10. As in the
left panel, the solid line marks the border of the stability region, while the dotted line marks
the border of the region where the convergence of the expected dividend yield to y∗ is monotone
(darker region) or oscillatory (lighter region).
4.3.2 Dividend yield and fractions dynamics
In general, the fraction of informed agents λt is time dependent and the dynamics of the
dividend yield and of the fraction of informed agents is given by the nonlinear system
(4.30–4.31). We use local stability analysis to characterize the behavior of the state
variables (yet , λt) near the steady state of (4.30–4.31).
First consider the case of zero information costs. The following proposition character-
izes the steady states of the system and their local stability.
Proposition 4.9 Consider zero information costs, c = 0. Given the memory parameter
α ∈ (0, 1), the inverse speed of adjustment ρ > 0 and the required rate of return r > g, we
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have:
(i) When δ ∈ (0, 1), the unique steady state of the system (4.30–4.31) is the point (y∗, λ∗),
where
y∗ = r − g and λ∗ = 1
2
.
This steady state is globally stable for every parameter combination.
(ii) When δ = 0, every point (y∗, λ∗) with y∗ = r− g and λ∗ ∈ (0, 1] is a steady state. For
a given α ∈ (0, 1) the set of steady states such that λ∗ > λ¯ = (1 − α)/2, as in (4.33), is
globally stable.
Thus, with zero information cost, the expected dividend yield yet converges to the funda-
mental value y∗ defined in (4.13) and the fraction of informed agents is either 1/2, when
δ > 0, or any value that satisfies (4.33) when δ = 0. As a consequence the expectational
feedback map (4.12) converges to the rational expectations equilibrium and prices are fully
informative in the long run. This is not the case when one considers positive information
costs:
Proposition 4.10 Consider positive information costs, c > 0. Given the memory pa-
rameter α ∈ (0, 1), the experimentation level δ ∈ (0, 1), the ratio k between ρ, the inverse
speed of adjustment and c, the cost of being informed, such that k = ρ/c > 1 and the
required rate of return r > g, we have:
(i) The unique steady state of the system (4.30–4.31) is the point (y∗, λ∗) where
y∗ = r − g
and
λ∗ =
2− δ + 2kδ −√−8kδ + (2− δ + 2kδ)2
4
. (4.34)
Moreover, λ∗ ∈ (0, 1/2).
(ii) The Jacobian of (4.30–4.31) at the steady state is diagonal and given by
J|(y∗,λ∗) =
 α + λ
∗ − 1
λ∗
0
0 (1− δ) k(k − 1)
(k − λ∗)2
 . (4.35)
If
δ > δ¯ ≡ (1 + α)
1 + 2αk
(1−α)
=
(1 + α)
1 + 2αρ
(1−α)c
, (4.36)
the steady state (y∗, λ∗) is locally stable. This condition corresponds to the stability condi-
tion (4.33) of the 1-D dynamical system (4.32). That is the condition δ > δ¯, and λ∗ > λ¯
are equivalent.
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The local stability condition (4.36) is represented in terms of the parameters (α, δ) in
the right panel of Figure 4.1 for k = ρ/c = 10. In the white area the steady state (y∗, λ∗)
is unstable, while in the shaded area the steady state is stable. Recall that when the
expected dividend yield yet converges to y
∗, the realized dividend yield yt also converges
to y∗. Therefore, stability of the steady state (y∗, λ∗) implies convergence of the price to
the fundamental price p∗t and thus to a fully informative price.
Notice the steady state is well defined and locally stable, i.e. prices are fully informa-
tive, only when the experimentation rate δ is not too small, δ > δ¯. Under this condition
there always exists a fraction of agents that are prepared to buy fundamental informa-
tion. It can also happen that the steady state is well defined but not locally stable, that
is prices are not fully revealing. In fact, for any α ∈ (0, 1) there exists a sufficiently small
mutation rate 0 < δ < δ¯ such that the prices are not fully revealing and the system is
unstable. In particular, the definition of δ¯ in eq. (4.36) of Proposition 4.10 shows that,
for a given α, the stability region of the system (4.30–4.31) shrinks, when the cost of in-
formation c increases, or when the speed of adjustment 1/ρ increases. In the limit case of
no experimentation rate, δ = 0, from (4.34) one would get λ∗ = 0 so that the steady state
y∗ is not even defined. Summarizing, for a positive information cost, the price are not
always fully informative in the long run, dependently on the size of the experimentation
rate as compared to δ¯ in (4.36). Moreover, prices are never fully informative when the
experimentation rate δ = 0.
What happens to the dynamics of the expected dividend yield and of the fraction
of informed agents when the steady state is unstable and prices do not converge to be
fully informative? In order to answer this question we analyze the global dynamics of the
system (4.30–4.31) for small experimentation levels, δ < δ¯. Whereas in the 1-D system
the expected and realized dividend yield diverge unboundedly and unrealistically, when
the stability conditions (4.33) and (4.36) do not hold, in the 2-D system our simulations
show the emergence of bounded aperiodic cycles. The top left and top right panels of
Figure 4.2 show a typical evolution of the uninformed agents’ expected dividend yield,
ye, and of the fraction of informed agents, λ, respectively. At time t = 0, the fraction
of informed agents is above the dotted line, which marks the value λ¯ in (4.33) and gives
the stability condition for the steady state of the yet dynamics. As a result, at t = 0
both the value of yet and, through (4.12), the value of yt, are close to their steady state
value, y∗. This implies that the price is close to being fully informative, there is no
advantage in buying information so that the fraction of informed agents decreases. This
process continues until the fraction of informed agents is smaller than the value λ¯. At this
moment there are so few informed agents that the asset price starts to diverge from the
fundamental. The dynamics of the expected dividend yield yet is unstable and y
e
t starts to
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Figure 4.2: Top panels: time series for the expected dividend yield yet (left panel) and the
fraction of informed agents λt (right panel) from (4.30-4.31). In the top right panel the dotted
line corresponds to λ¯ in (4.33), that is to the critical stability border, whereas the solid line
corresponds to the steady state λ∗ in (4.34). The bottom left panel shows the state space
representation (yet , λt). In the bottom right panel, the log price dynamics derived form the
dynamics of yet and λt . Fundamental prices are given by the dotted line and realized prices by
the continuous line. Notice that the two price series levels should be read using two different
scales. The left scale gives the value of log prices whereas the right scale gives the value of
fundamental log prices. The dividend process is characterized by ση = 0.02. Parameter values
are α = 0.99, c = 0.1, ρ = 1 (so that k = ρ/c = 10), r = 0.1, g = 0 and δ = 0.000575.
diverge from the steady state y∗. The fraction of informed agents continues to decrease
until the price carries so little information about p∗ that informed agents are better off.
Eventually, paying the cost of being informed leads to a higher fitness than using a freely
available estimate with a large error. As a result, the fraction of informed agents grows
sharply, see e.g. the top right plot around period t = 50. The fraction of informed agents
reverts to a region where the price is sufficiently informative so that yet returns to values
close to y∗. As time continues the process repeats, with λ decreasing again, and so on and
so forth. The left and right bottom panels of Figure 4.2 show, respectively, the dynamics
we have just illustrated in the (ye, λ) space and the corresponding dynamics of the log
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price compared to the log fundamental price.
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Figure 4.3: Phase plots of the expected dividend yield yet and the fraction of informed agents
λt produced by the system of difference equations (4.30-4.31). Parameter values are α = 0.99,
c = 0.1, ρ = 1 (so that k = ρ/c = 10), r = 0.1 and g = 0. Top left panel: δ = 0.000675, top
right panel: δ = 0.00066. Bottom left panel: δ = 0.000625, bottom right panel: δ = 0.000575.
The phase plots shown in Figure 4.3 suggest that the fluctuations of yet and λt, are
associated with a so-called homoclinic bifurcation. Similar phenomena are encountered
in other multidimensional nonlinear systems and emerge from the interplay between local
instability and global stability of the dynamics. Brock and Hommes (1997) and Droste,
Hommes, and Tuinstra (2002) present other economic frameworks where homoclinic bi-
furcation arise. They also offer detailed discussions of the mathematical aspects behind
these interesting phenomena.
Before turning to an economic interpretation of the results of this section and to
comparison with the results of GS, it is instructive to characterize the convergence of the
fraction of informed agents in the stability region. Close to the equilibrium λ turns out
to change very slowly.
Proposition 4.11 Given a memory parameter α ∈ (0, 1), an experimentation rate δ ∈
(0, 1) and a inverse speed of adjustment larger than the cost of information, ρ > c, if we
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call ν2 the eigenvalue characterizing the dynamics of λ in a neighborhood of (y
∗, λ∗), we
have
1 > ν2 > (1− δ)
(
1− c
ρ
)
.
This proposition shows that when the experimentation rate δ is small and the ratio be-
tween the inverse of the speed of adjustment and the cost of information, k, is large, the
value of ν2 is very close to one. As a result, when the system is stable, changes in the
value of the fraction of informed agents λ are very slow, and hence λ is very persistent.
We will find confirmation of this statement in the next section, when we appraise the
effect of agent learning the growth rate of dividends on the dynamics.
4.3.3 Economic interpretation
In a financial market, when agents face informational differences, the use of homogeneous
rational expectations poses puzzling consequences. This is the paradox as found by GS,
they consider an asset pricing model where agents can either buy information on funda-
mentals or try to extract such information from the asset price. In a repeated single period
model with fully rational agents, they show that an equilibrium value of the fraction of
informed agents for which the price fully reveals the information about future dividends
can not exist. If an equilibrium existed then nobody would pay for the information and
prices could not possibly reveal any information. In order to resolve this paradox, GS
need two key assumptions: (1) the supply of shocks is noisy (this is equivalent to saying
that there are noise traders in the market) and (2) the informational content of the divi-
dend signal is not perfect. Under these assumptions a rational expectations “equilibrium
degree of disequilibrium”, where informed and uninformed agents coexist and prices fail
to be fully informative, exists.
The model analyzed in this section is inspired by that of GS, but there are three
important differences. First, our agents are not rational but boundedly rational, that is,
they do not use rational but adaptive expectations. Second, we consider a multi period
model where future returns are determined by capital gains in addition to dividends, and
agents form expectations about both future prices and dividends. Third, the fraction of
informed and uninformed agents are dynamic variables in our model. The results from our
model are as follow. When the experimentation rate is positive, δ > 0, there are enough
agents willing to buy information, even if they could extract it from prices, so that an
equilibrium where prices are fully informative is well defined. This equilibrium is (locally)
stable only when the experimentation rate is big enough, δ > δ¯. In this case, prices
converge to fully informative prices and the GS paradox is resolved by experimentation (or
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noise), as in GS. On the other hand, when δ < δ¯ fluctuations around the fully informative
equilibrium price arise. This is also the case for a zero experimentation rate (δ = 0).
In this case, an equilibrium is not even defined, and fluctuations of prices and agents’
fractions are observed. How do these two cases, δ = 0 and δ < δ¯, relate to the GS
paradox? The dynamics is now responsible for resolving the GS paradox, as, even if no
equilibrium emerges in the long run, orbits of the system are still well defined. Along these
orbits prices fluctuate between being close to fully informative and being non informative.
By assuming that agents are boundedly rational and that fractions are endogenously
determined, the learning process of the uninformed boundedly rational agents balances the
cost of information and the informational content of the price, resolving the GS paradox.
In our framework we thus obtain a “dynamic equilibrium degree of disequilibrium” due to
endogenous price fluctuations produced by the interaction of boundedly rational agents.
De Fontnouvelle (2000) and Goldbaum (2005) are earlier contributions where bounded
rationality and learning offer an explanation for the existence of an equilibrium degree of
disequilibrium. Their framework differs from ours in many ways, most importantly in that
they consider a dividend process which follows a random walk rather than a geometric
random walk as we do here. Furthermore, their resulting systems of the joint evolution
of the asset price and the fractions of agents is fairly complicated so that their analysis is
performed only via simulations.
4.4 Informational differences and parameter learning
In the previous section we have assumed that the agents’ estimate of the growth rate
of dividends is constant. As a result, the equation for the dividend yield is fully deter-
ministic. In this section we analyze the simultaneous impact of informational differences
and of agents’ learning of the growth rate of dividends as new information about the
fundamentals becomes available. As a result we have to deal with a stochastic system.
A similar analysis has been performed by Barsky and De Long (1993) and Timmermann
(1993), among others, in a context where there are no informational differences among
agents. In particular Barsky and De Long (1993) also assume that agents use adaptive
expectations to estimate g. Recalling the results from Section 4.2, adaptive expectations
are specified by (4.14) which, when the dividend follows a geometric random walk with
innovations (1 + g)ηt gives:
get+1 = γg
e
t + (1− γ) ((1 + g)ηt − 1) .
This stochastic equation, together with the evolution of the dividend yield, its expecta-
tions, and the fraction of informed agents as specified in (4.26-4.29), lead to a stochastic
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version of the deterministic skeleton (4.30-4.31) namely
get+1 = γg
e
t + (1− γ) ((1 + g)ηt − 1) , (4.37)
yet+1 =
(1− α)(r − get )
λt−1
+
α + λt−1 − 1
λt−1
yet , (4.38)
λt = (1− δ) λt−1(−c+ ρ)
λt−1(−c)− (1− λt−1)
(
(r−get )−yet
λt−1(r−g)
)2
+ ρ
+
δ
2
. (4.39)
Shocks {ηt} on the growth rate of dividends are the stochastic component that drives the
co-evolution of agents expectations of the growth rate of dividend, of the dividend yield,
and of the fraction of informed agents. Given the evolution of the expected growth rate
of dividend, get+1, of the expected dividend yield, y
e
t+1, and of the fraction of informed
agents, λt, the dividend yield itself, yt+1, is set by the feedback map (4.22). Before we
start with the analysis of the impact of shocks on the dynamics of (4.37-4.39), we show
that our model contains two important benchmarks as special cases.
Classical Asset Pricing model The first benchmark is the classical asset pricing
model, which assumes that all agents know the dividend growth rate g, and that agents
use rational expectations. In this case, if only few agents are informed about dt+1, the
other can correctly extract this information from prices, and the market price and the
market dividend yield are given by:
p∗∗t =
dt+1
r − g , y
∗∗
t+1 = r − g. (4.40)
As before, the price p∗∗t denotes the “correct” present value price as given by the Gordon
model (see e.g. Gordon, 1962). Our model boils down to the classical asset pricing model
when at every time t all agents are informed, λt = 1, and use the correct dividend growth
rate, get = g. In fact taking λt = 1 and g
e
t = g in equation (4.38) and using the feedback
map (4.22) to transform the expected dividend yield yet+1 into realized dividend yield yt+1,
gives yt+1 = r − g which corresponds to y∗∗t+1 defined in (4.40).
Barsky and De Long model The second benchmark is the model proposed by Barsky
and De Long (1993). They consider agents without informational differences who have to
form expectations about the growth rate g. In their case the price and the dividend yield
are given by:
p∗t =
dt+1
r − get+1
, y∗t+1 = r − get+1, (4.41)
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where get+1 is given by adaptive expectations as in (4.37). These are respectively the
fundamental price and the fundamental dividend yield defined in (4.15) and (4.16). Our
model corresponds to the model of Barsky and De Long (1993) under the assumptions that
all the agents that at every time t all agents are informed, λt = 1. In fact by substituting
λt = 1 in (4.38) and using the feedback map (4.22) one retrieves yt+1 = r − get+1, with
get+1 defined in (4.37), which corresponds to y
∗
t+1 defined in (4.41).
A way of evaluating the differences between our model and the two benchmarks is to
write an evolution equation for the dividend yield as a function of lagged dividend yields
and shocks on the growth rate of dividends for each model. In the classical asset pricing
model the dividend yield is constant and given by y∗∗ = r − g. In the Barsky and De
Long model, one can use y∗t+1 = r − get+1 to rewrite (4.37) as:
y∗t+1 = (1− γ)(1 + r) + γy∗t − (1− γ)(1 + g)ηt. (4.42)
That is, the dividend yield follows an AR(1) process with shocks given by the shocks {ηt}
on the growth rate of dividends. The memory parameter γ is related to both the AR(1)
coefficient and the variance of the innovations, (1−γ)2(1+g)2σ2η. The mean of the process
is independent of the memory parameter and equal to the constant classical asset pricing
dividend yield y∗∗ = r − g.
In our model, fixing for the moment the value of λ, the map h defined in (4.19), i.e.
the dynamic equation (4.38) for the expected dividend yield yet+1 rewritten in terms of
the realized dividend yield yt+1 using the feedback map (4.22), gives:
yt+1 =
(rt − get+1)− α(rt−1 − get )
λ
+
α + λ− 1
λ
yt. (4.43)
This equation expresses that, when the fraction of informed agents is fixed at λ, the
dividend yield follows an AR(1) process with shocks that are correlated with the shocks
of the growth rate of dividends. As for the dividend process implied by the Barsky and
De Long model in (4.43), the long run mean of the dividend process implied by our model
is given by the classical asset pricing dividend yield y∗∗. When γ = α, that is, when
agents use the same memory parameter to estimate the growth rate of dividend and the
dividend yield, (4.43) has a simple appealing formulation:
yt+1 =
(1− γ)((1 + r)− (1 + g)ηt)
λ
+
γ + λ− 1
λ
yt.
If we define
γ˜ = γ˜(λ) ≡ 1− (1− γ)/λ = γ − (1− γ)1− λ
λ
, (4.44)
4.4. INFORMATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND PARAMETER LEARNING 133
we can rewrite (4.43) as
yt+1 = (1− γ˜(λ))(1 + r) + γ˜(λ)yt − (1− γ˜(λ))(1 + g)ηt. (4.45)
The result is that, when γ = α, our model specified by (4.45) and the model of Barsky
and De Long (1993) specified by (4.42) differ only in the value of the memory parameter
γ. Since γ is the real memory agents use to discount new information, we can refer to
γ˜(λ) as the effective memory. The definition (4.44) shows that the effective memory has
two components, one given by the real memory and the other related to the presence of
uninformed agents. This second effect becomes less important as more informed agents are
present in the market. The general result is that γ˜(λ) in (4.44) is an increasing function
of λ with γ˜(λ) ≤ γ for all λ, and γ˜(1) = γ. That is, the presence of uninformed agents is
equivalent to all agents being informed and using an effective memory which is lower then
the real memory. The value of γ˜ determines both the AR(1) coefficients and the variance
of the shocks but not the long run mean which is always y∗∗ = r − g. In particular the
lower is the effective memory, the higher is the impact of the shocks on the dynamics of
the dividend yield and the faster is the reversion of the process to its mean. That is,
a lower effective memory creates a bigger short run effect and a smaller long run effect.
Also, since the effective memory γ˜ is a function of λ, our model allows for variation of
the memory parameter as the fraction of informed agents λ varies. Changes in λ have an
impact on γ˜ and thus on the variance of shocks and on the speed of convergence. In what
follows we explore the importance of both the effective memory being lower than the real
memory and the effective memory being time varying on the dynamics of the dividend
yield implied by our model (4.45) compared to the two benchmarks in (4.40) and (4.43).
4.4.1 Nonlinear mean reversion
Our model (4.45) clearly differs, both structurally and regarding parameter values, from
that of Barsky and De Long in (4.42) when the fraction of informed agents is time varying.
If this is the case, our model implies an AR(1) process for the dividend yield where both
the rate of convergence of the dividend yield to its mean and the variance of shocks are time
varying. This consideration links our model to the econometric analysis of nonlinear mean
reversion that has recently been proposed to characterize fluctuations of stock indices. By
using the fact that p∗∗t ≡ dt+1/(r− g), i.e. the price implied by model (4.40), and defining
xt = yt+1/(r − g), given the definition of the dividend yield one can write:
log(pt) = log(dt+1)− log(yt+1) = log(p∗∗t )− log(xt).
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If xt is close to its long run average of 1 one can rewrite the previous expression and
expand the logarithm around one. Using the variable zt = 1− xt one gets
log(pt) ≈ log(p∗∗t ) + zt, (4.46)
where the dynamics of zt can be easily derived using its definition in terms of xt, the
definition of xt and (4.45). The resulting dynamics of the component zt of the log price
is given by:
zt = γ˜(λt)zt−1 +
(1− γ˜(λt))(1 + g)
(r − g) (ηt−1 − 1). (4.47)
This equation shows that we have a model whose realized log price in (4.46) is the sum
of a persistent component log(p∗∗t ), which follows a random walk with drift, and of a
temporary component, zt, which follows a stationary autoregressive process (4.47) with
a time-varying AR(1) coefficient γ˜(λt). Empirical investigation of the properties of stock
prices are in accordance with this statement. Both Gallagher and Taylor (2001) and Man-
zan (2003) reject the null hypothesis that the temporary component in a mean reversion
model follows a stationary process with fixed parameters. In particular Gallagher and
Taylor (2001) show that quarterly data of the logarithm of the dividend yield of the index
SP500 are well fitted by an ESTAR(4) (Exponentially Smooth Transition AR) ARCH(1)
model whose two regimes have AR(1) coefficients equal to 0.72 and 0.20 respectively. As
the model of Barsky and De Long (1993) suggests, the fact that the dividend yield follows
an autoregressive process might be related to the agents’ learning of the model parameters.
In addition to this effect, our model suggests that changing “learning” coefficients and
heteroskedasticity can be related to agent interaction. In fact, both the AR(1) coefficient
and the shocks variance in (4.47) are a function of γ˜(λt) which is a nonlinear function of
the time varying fraction of informed agents λt.
4.4.2 Simulation study
In presenting the qualitative effect of the shocks on the growth rate of dividends on the
dividend yield and fraction dynamics, we proceed by analyzing the impact of a single
shock ηt, and then by analyzing the cumulative impact of a sequence of shocks {ηt}. We
present results not only for dividend yields and prices generated by our model, but also
for dividend yields and prices generated by the classical asset pricing model (4.40) and by
the model of Barsky and De Long (4.41). In addition we also present results for a model
similar to that of Barsky and De Long with the difference that real memory is taken as
the average memory of the time varying effective memory generated by our model. We
refer to this model as the “modified” Barsky and De Long model and its series of prices
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and dividend yields by p∗γ˜ and y
∗
γ˜. We use the “modified” Barsky and De Long model
to appraise the role of time variability of effective memory. We simulate all models with
dividends generated according to (4.1), that is, dt+1 = dt(1 + g)ηt+1, where {ηt} is a
sequence of i.i.d. log normal shocks with mean zero and variance ση.
It is instructive to start the analysis by comparing the effect of a single shock on the
dividend growth rate g. We perform this analysis for the four different models, namely for
our model, the model of Barsky and De Long, the “modified” Barsky and De Long model,
and the classical asset pricing model. Figure 4.4 shows the resulting price dynamics. In
all the cases there is an initial overreaction followed by convergence to the equilibrium
value, which is given by p∗∗, the price implied by the classical asset pricing model.
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Figure 4.4: Effect of a single shock on the growth rate g. Before and after the shock, g = 0.
The shock is η31 = 0.01. Left panel: log prices as a function of time. The time series p∗∗ gives
the value of the log price as implied by the classical asset pricing model (4.40). The time series
p∗ and p give respectively the value of the log price as implied by Barsky and De Long model
(4.42) and by our model (4.37-4.39) respectively. The time series p∗γ˜ gives the log price implied
by the “ modified” Barsky and De Long model (4.42) when γ = γ˜(λ0), where λ0 is the fraction
of informed agents before the shock. Right panel: evolution of the effective memory γ˜. The
parameter values are γ = α = 0.99, δ = 0.02, c = 0.1 and ρ = 1.0.
Since, for λ < 1, the effective memory γ˜ is lower than the real memory γ, the variance
of the shocks is larger in our model than in the model of Barsky and De Long, so that
the overreaction is more pronounced. At the same time, when γ˜ < γ, the value of the
autoregressive coefficient is closer to zero so that convergence is faster. The overall effect
is that the shock has a higher short run impact but a shorter half life for p than for p∗.
The right panel of Figure 4.4 shows the response of the effective memory γ˜ to changes
in λ. From the Jacobian of the 2-D system (see Proposition 2) we know that changes in
y only have second order effects on λ, and as a result changes in λ are negligible in the
short run. But, from Proposition 3, we also know that the eigenvalue ν2 is close to one
so that changes in λ are very persistent. Both results are confirmed by the changes in γ˜
shown in the right panel. A confirmation of the fact that one shock has no considerable
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consequence on changes of γ˜ comes from the time series for p∗γ˜ shown in the left panel.
The price p∗γ˜ is the price obtained using the “modified” Barsky and De Long model, that
is equation (4.42) with γ = γ˜(λ0), where λ0 is the value of the fraction of informed agents
before the shock. The overall comparison of the dynamics of p, p∗ and p∗γ˜ shows that in
the single shock case the fact that the effective memory is lower than the real memory
plays an important role whereas the fact that the effective memory is time varying is
negligible, i.e. p is close to p∗γ˜. Notice also that with informed agents in the market, the
price anticipates the shock on the dividend, i.e. the price takes into account the change in
the dividend before such a change is realized and much before such change has an effect
on the value of the effective memory.
We now turn to investigating the effect of a sequence of shocks. Figure 4.5 shows the
impact of a sequence of 500 i.i.d. shocks {η}. The growth rate of dividends, g, and the
variance of the growth rate shocks, σ2η, are taken in accordance with historical quarterly
data of the S&P500 index for the period 1880-2005 (source: Shiller database available
from R. J. Shiller’s homepage). The discount rate r is taken such that y∗∗ = 0.05, that is
the price implied by the present value model is 20 times the value of the dividend. If we
think of quarters, 500 dividends correspond to 125 years. The top left panel shows the
time series of the dividend yield y generated by our model whereas the right panel shows
the time series of y∗ generated by the model of Barsky and De Long. In both cases the
horizontal line represents the long run mean y∗∗ = r− g. The same results as for a single
shock emerge: the dynamics of the dividend yield is less persistent in our model where
the fraction of informed agents is time varying and smaller than in the model of Barsky
and De Long (1993). Also, deviations from y∗∗ are larger. The central and bottom rows
offer a comparison of the systems in terms of log prices.
How important is the fact that the effective memory is time varying? The left panel of
Figure 4.6 shows the changes in the effective memory for the same simulation run. These
changes are due to changes in the fraction of informed agents λ via the transformation
γ˜(λ) defined in (4.44). As a confirmation of our previous results and of our theoretical
analysis, changes in γ˜ (that is, changes in λ) are rather persistent. The right panel of
Figure 4.6 shows deviations of log prices generated by our model and log prices generated
by the “modified” Barsky and De Long model. We call this last series y∗γ˜. Notice that
deviations of up to more than ten percent arise. Our conclusion is that when subsequent
shocks are present, both the fact that the effective memory is lower than the real memory
and that the effective memory is time varying play an important role. Naturally, these
properties are dependent on the choice of updating mechanism for λt and hence of the
fitness measures as presented in Subsection 4.2.3. We do not claim that the mechanism
we propose here to characterize the changes in the fraction of informed agents is more
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Figure 4.5: Top left panel: time series of the dividend yield yt generated by our model (4.37-
4.39) (solid line) compared with the benchmark y∗∗ (4.40) (horizontal dotted line). Top right
panel: time series of the dividend yield y∗ as in Barsky and De long (4.42) (solid line) compared
with y∗∗. Middle left panel: logarithm of price corresponding to y, log(p) (solid line), and
logarithm of the price corresponding to y∗∗, log(p∗∗) (dotted line). Middle right panel: logarithm
of price corresponding to y∗, log(p∗) (solid line), and logarithm of the price implied corresponding
to y∗∗. The bottom panels give the deviations of the log prices series shown in the middle panels.
Values of parameters are α = γ = 0.99, ρ = 1, c = 0.1, δ = 0.02 (these three parameters imply
λ∗ ≈ 0.09), ση = 0.04, µ = 0.003. The discount rate is r = 0.05 + g.
realistic than others. We merely offer a qualitative argument to show that time varying
informational differences might explain the nonlinearity in the mean reversion that has
been shown to exist in the empirical literature.
Another way of comparing the various models is to check for correlation in the time
series of returns produced by the evolution of y∗ and y. The left panel of Figure 4.7 shows
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Figure 4.6: Left panel: values of the effective memory γ˜. Right panel: deviations of the two
series of log prices generated by our model y and by the ”modified” Barsky and De Long model
y∗γ˜ . Deviations are due to fluctuations of γ˜ around its mean value, γ˜ = 0.9644. Other parameters
as in Figure 4.5, in particular the real memory is γ = 0.99.
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Figure 4.7: Left panel: autocorrelation of the log return time series for a typical run
of our model (4.37-4.39). Right Panel, variance test of log lagged returns. v(∆t) =
(σ2(q∆t)/∆t)/(σ2(q4y)/4) where σ
2(q4y) = 0.00355) and q
∆t is the total return over a period
∆t generated by the model in system (4.37-4.39). In both plots three lines refer to data gener-
ated with our model, y, to the model of Barsky and De Long in (4.42), y∗, and to the “modified”
Barsky and De Long model. Parameters are the same as for Figure 4.5. Both panels refer to a
simulation of 200, 000 periods.
the autocorrelation of the asset log return series qt,
qt = log(pt + dt)− log(pt−1), (4.48)
for a typical run of our model (4.37-4.39). The autocorrelation of returns shows that our
model and the “modified” Barsky and De Long model have higher short term autocor-
relation and lower long term autocorrelation. Such results are in accordance with the
results shown in the left panel of Figure 4.4: if the effective memory is lower than the real
memory, shocks have a higher short run impact but a shorter half life for p then for p∗.
A test that has been used in the literature to evaluate the statistical importance
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of departure of the models from a random walk with drift is the variance ratio test.
The variance ratio has been used by Poterba and Summers (1988) to appraise the mean
reversion properties of stock prices. Under the null hypothesis that log prices follows a
random walk (possibly with drift) the variance of the series of returns in (4.48) is a linear
function of the return time span. Results of the variance ratio test for our model and for
its restrictions are given in the right panel of Figure 4.7. The results suggest that both
the fact that the effective memory is lower than the real memory and but also that the
effective memory γ˜(λ) is time varying affect the statistical time series properties of lagged
returns. Further research will be devoted to investigating these issues in greater detail
and relate them to the statistical properties of empirical market returns.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
We have investigated the combined effect of informational differences and learning in a
stylized asset market model where agents are boundedly rational. As far as the theoretical
guidelines behind our model are concerned, we have shown that our model naturally and
parsimoniously extends and links many other contributions in this fields. In particular,
we refer to papers that concentrate on informational differences, such as Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), that analyze the impact of learning, such as Barsky and De Long (1993),
and that investigate the interaction of agents who are using different predictor schemes
or different strategies, such as Brock and Hommes (1998).
In Section 4.3 we have analyzed the impact of informational differences alone and we
have given a dynamic solution of the GS paradox. We have shown that our model results in
a “dynamic equilibrium degree of disequilibrium”, with a pattern of a-periodic oscillations
where prices are not fully informative. Moreover, the informational content of the price is
time varying and switches repeatedly between being nearly fully informative and hardly
informative. The economic intuition behind this is quite clear: when the fraction of
informed agents is sufficiently high, we are in a region where the adaptive expectations
of boundedly rational uninformed agents are converging to rational expectations and the
price is close to being fully informative. This pushes down the fraction of informed agents.
As a result, with only few agents being informed, the uninformed agents using adaptive
expectations do not converge to rational expectations anymore and the price starts to
diverge from its fundamental value and, as a consequence, carries little information. This
creates incentives to buy information and pushes the fraction of informed agents up again,
and the story repeats. This trade-off between local instability (when too few agents are
informed) and global stability (when many agents are informed) leads to complicated
dynamic behavior. In our model, the “dynamic equilibrium degree of disequilibrium” is
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therefore a time-varying learning equilibrium where prices fluctuate between being close
to fully revealing and being uninformative, and agents switch between costly information
gathering and free riding.
In Section 4.4, using the insights gained from the analysis of Section 4.3, we have
investigated the role of informational differences in a model where boundedly rational
agents are learning the growth rate of dividends. We have compared our model to that
of Barsky and De Long (1993), who have studied a similar framework without taking
informational differences into account. Both models lead to mean reversion behavior of
stock prices, i.e. in both cases the log price is given by the sum of a persistent component,
which follows a random walk with drift, and of a temporary component, which follows a
stationary AR(1) process. The innovative contribution of our model consists in showing
that including the effect of informational differences has an impact on the parameters of
the temporary component. In particular, both the linear coefficient and the variance of
the shocks become time-varying, as they are both dependent on the time-varying fraction
of informed agents. As a result, our model has the same features of recent empirical
investigations of mean reversion conditions for stock prices, such as Gallagher and Taylor
(2001) and Manzan (2003) where time varying parameters of the transitory component
have been detected.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to calibrate our model to reproduce the stock
price evolution given the historical dividend process. Our theoretical model is based on
several simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless we find it instructive to note that time
varying parameters in a mean reversion model can be related to what in general may
be referred to as agents’ interaction, which, in our case, is triggered by informational
differences. That agent interaction can be responsible for nonlinearity in the behavior
of stock prices is also argued by Boswijk, Hommes, and Manzan (2007), who estimate a
modified version of the model of Brock and Hommes (1998) using yearly data of the index
SP500. Further efforts to characterize the effect of informational differences, for example
by linking it to other observable characteristics such as the volume of transactions, might
provide a basis for the design of new econometric tests for structure in financial time
series.
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Appendix
4.A Derivation of the equilibrium price equation
This appendix provides a micro-foundation of the equilibrium price equation (4.5). Con-
sider a group of agents choosing at every time t whether to invest in a risk free asset,
whose single period return is rf , or to invest in a risky asset, whose single period return
rate, rt+1, depends on dividend payed at time t+ 1, dt+1, and on the price (or remaining
value) of the asset at time t+ 1, pt+1:
rt+1 =
pt+1 + dt+1 − pt
pt
. (4.49)
At every time t, we assume that each agent maximizes a CRRA mean variance utility
function in order to decide which fraction xt of his wealth to invest in the risky asset. The
CRRA utility function to be maximized is
U(xt) = Et[xtrt+1 + (1− xt)rf ]− β
2
Vt[xtrt+1],
where Et and Vt denote, respectively, the mean and the variance conditional on the
information available at time t and β is the coefficient of risk aversion which we assume
constant across agents. Assume also that for each agent Vt[rt+1] = σ
2. The solution of
the maximization of U(xt) gives:
xt =
Et[rt+1 − rf ]
βσ2
, (4.50)
as the fraction of wealth to be invested in the risky asset at time t. Consider now the
case where assumptions (i) − (iv) of Section 4.2 hold. Since informed and uninformed
agents have different information, they have different expectations Et[rt+1] and therefore
different demands for risky assets. Call xIt (x
U
t ) and w
I
t (w
U
T ), respectively, the fraction
of wealth to be invested at time t and the wealth at time t of the informed (uninformed)
agents. Assume a net positive supply of shares st and call pt the price of each share at
time t. The Walrasian equilibrium equation at time t is given by:
stpt = x
I
tw
I
t + x
U
t w
U
t . (4.51)
Now, define λt as the fraction of wealth, or market power, of the informed agents at time
t. This implies λt = w
I
t /wt with wt = w
I
t + w
U
t . Call θt the average proportion, at time
t, of wealth invested in the risky assets, i.e. θt = stpt/wt. The Walrasian equilibrium
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equation (4.51) becomes
θt = λtx
I
t + (1− λt)xUt ,
which, given the expression for x in (4.50) and rearranging terms, becomes
rf + θtβσ
2 = λtE[rt+1|F It ] + (1− λt)E[rt+1|FUt ], (4.52)
where the informed and uniformed agents condition their expectations of the return of
the risky asset on different information sets. Eq. (4.52) shows that θt is related to the
risk premium required by the community of traders to hold the risky asset.
If we assume that both informed and uninformed agents are fundamentalists, their
expectations of the future price is equal to the discounted sum of all future dividends,
i.e., as specified in equation (4.2),
E [pt+1| FHt ] = vHt+1 = E
[ ∞∑
i=1
dt+1+i
(1 + r)i
FHt
]
.
for the general information set FHt . This implies that the informed agents use:
E[rt+1|F It ] =
dt+1(1 + r)
(r − ge)pt − 1, (4.53)
whereas the uninformed agents use:
E[rt+1|FUt ] =
pty
e
t+1(1 + r)
(r − ge)pt − 1. (4.54)
As a result the equilibrium equation (4.52) becomes:
pt
1 + rf + θtβσ
2
1 + r
= λt
dt+1
(r − ge) + (1− λt)
pty
e
t+1
(r − ge) . (4.55)
At this point, by fixing r − rf = θtβσ2, that is by imposing that the asset excess return
required by the agents, which is an exogenous variable of the model, is equal to the
endogenous variable θtβσ
2, we get Eq. (4.5) which solved for pt gives Eq. (4.11).
By fixing r − rf = θtβσ2 we are implicitly assuming that the endogenous expected
equilibrium return of our model is given by the exogenous parameter r. In fact, when
the price is informationally efficient, the resulting expected and realized dividend yield
are equal to y∗ = r − ge so that using Eq. (4.54), or equivalently (4.53), to compute the
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expected equilibrium asset return we get:
E[rt+1|FUt ] = E[rt+1|F It ] =
ye(1 + r)
(r − ge) − 1 = r.
In order to derive the asset return, rt, endogenously as a function of the exogenous pa-
rameters rf , σ
2, β, st and of the discount rate r, one should solve the equilibrium price
equation (4.55), without fixing stpt/wt proportional to r − rf . Levy, Levy, and Solomon
(1994) are, to our knowledge, the first to perform this kind of analysis. They use com-
puter simulations to investigate the evolution of wealth and prices in an asset market
where, as in our framework, agents are using CRRA utility function and the underlying
dividend process follows a geometric random walk. In a recent paper Anufriev and Dindo
(2006) offer analytic support of their simulations. Other analytic models where agents
are using a CRRA utility function are Chiarella and He (2001) and Anufriev, Bottazzi,
and Pancotto (2006). Here, having assumed that Et[rt+1] = r, we are fixing the long run
asset return and we concentrate on the properties of the fluctuations induced by agents
interaction around this long run equilibrium level.
4.B Derivation of the dynamics of fractions
The micro-foundation of the equilibrium price equation (4.55) offers an appealing inter-
pretation of λt as the fraction of wealth of the informed agents, and a natural way to
endogenize its evolution. In fact the wealth fraction at time t, λt, is endogenously deter-
mined as a function of the fraction at time t− 1, λt−1, the fraction of wealth invested in
the risky asset by both groups of agents at time t, xIt−1 and x
U
t−1, and of the return of
the market at time t, rt in (4.49). Using the definition of the fraction of wealth of the
informed agent λt = w
I
t /(w
I
t + w
U
t ) and wealth evolution
wHt = w
H
t−1(1 + rf ) + w
H
t−1(rt − rf )xHt−1, for H = I, U,
one can derive the equation that governs the evolution of the fraction of wealth of the
informed agents λt:
λt =
λt−1piIt
λt−1piIt + (1− λt−1)piUt
, (4.56)
where
piIt = (1 + rf ) + (rt − rf )xIt−1, (4.57)
and
piUt = (1 + rf ) + (rt − rf )xUt−1, (4.58)
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are the realized excess profit per unit of wealth for informed and for uninformed agents
respectively. When the realized single period return of the asset rt+1 is higher than rf ,
if the informed agents invest a higher (lower) share of their wealth compared to the
share of uninformed agents, their fraction of wealth increases (decreases) compared to the
fraction of wealth of the uninformed agents. Equation (4.56) corresponds to the replicator
dynamics equation given in Eq. (4.24) when δ = 0. To obtain exactly (4.24) one has to
further assume that (4.20) and (4.21) can be used as proxies of the realized profits per unit
of wealth for respectively the informed agent, as (4.57), and for the uninformed agent,
as (4.58). In fact one has to assume that the dynamics of the fractions is driven by the
forecasting error of the uninformed compared to the costs of information for the informed,
rather than by their realized profits. Investigation of this second framework would lead
to a more complicated system due to the presence of rt, and thus of both yt and pt/pt−1,
in the expression of agents’ profits. To conclude the correspondence between Eq. (4.56)
and Eq. (4.24) we have to discuss the case δ 6= 0. Assume that, in every period, a number
of agents which holds a fraction δ of total agents’ wealth exits the market and is replaced
by new agents with the same amount of wealth. Also assume that these new agents split
evenly between being informed and being uninformed. This would mean that at period t
the total fraction of informed agents is given by:
λt = (1− δ) λt−1((1 + rf ) + pi
I
t )
(1 + rf ) + λt−1piIt + (1− λt−1)piUt
+
δ
2
, (4.59)
which is as (4.24) in Subsection 4.2.3 for every δ ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that irrespectively of the
fitness measure, realized profits or forecasting errors, both expressions (4.24) and (4.59)
for the fraction of informed agents λt have the same dependence on the previous fraction
of informed agents λt−1.
4.C Proofs
Proofs of Section 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.8 Given the linear difference equation in (4.32), that is
yet =
r − g
λ
+
α + λ− 1
λ
yet−1,
and the initial condition y0, from the theory of linear systems follows that
yet = (y
e
0 − (r − g))
(
α+ λ− 1
λ
)t
+ (r − g),
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is the unique solution. The solution converges to y∗ = r − g as long as λ > (1 − α)/2
otherwise it diverges to ±∞. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.9 When c = 0 and δ > 0 solving for the fixed point of (4.30-
4.31) leads to y∗ = r − g and to λ∗ = 1/2. When c = 0 and also δ = 0, solving for the
fixed point of (4.30-4.31) leads to y∗ = r − g and to any λ∗ ∈ (0, 1]. For global stability
we proceed by showing that for every initial condition the dynamics converges to (y∗, λ∗).
Rewrite equation (4.30) in deviations from the fixed point y∗ = r − g and get:
yet+1 − y∗ =
α + λt−1 − 1
λt−1
(yet − y∗). (4.60)
Whenever λt−1 > (1 − α)/2 = λ¯, ye → y∗ as the linear coefficient of equation (4.60)
is always lower then one. Since α ∈ (0, 1), the condition λ > λ¯ is always satisfied when
λt−1 ≥ 1/2. We show that, in the long run, it always holds λ ≥ 1/2. Take first λt−1 ≥ 1/2,
by using equation (4.31) one can derive that:
λt − 1
2
= (1− δ)
λt−1ρ− (1− λt−1)
(
ρ−
(
(r−g)−yet
λt−1(r−g)
)2)
2
(
−(1− λt−1)
(
(r−g)−yet
λt−1(r−g)
)2
+ ρ
) ≥ 0, (4.61)
if one assumes that fractions are always positive, i.e. that
ρ−
(
(r − g)− yet
λt−1(r − g)
)2
> 0.
As a consequence when λt−1 ≥ 1/2 also λt ≥ 1/2. If, on the other hand, λt−1 < 1/2, one
can similarly show that the condition (λt− λt−1) > 0 holds, implying that λ converges to
one point of the set [1/2, 1]. As a consequence also when λt−1 < 1/2, λ ≥ 1/2 in the long
run. To conclude the proof of global stability notice that when ye → y∗ also λ → λ∗ via
equation (4.31). ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.10 When c > 0, solving for the fixed point of (4.30-4.31) leads
to y∗ = r − g and to λ∗ solution of the following second order equation
cλ2 + (cδ/2− c− δρ)λ+ δρ/2 = 0,
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which can be shown to have two real roots. Take α ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1) and k = ρ/c > 1.
From:
2− δ + 2kδ − 1 > 0,
it follows that
2− δ + 2kδ +√(2− δ + 2kδ)2 − 8kδ
4
> 1.
That is one real root is always larger then 1 and thus not in the co-domain of our state
variable λ. The other solution can be shown to be always in the interval [0, 1/2]. In fact
0 < λ∗ =
2− δ + 2kδ −√(2− δ + 2kδ)2 − 8kδ
4
<
1
2
,
reduces to
0 < 8kδ and − 4(1− δ) < 0.
Both inequalities ara always satisfied. The Jacobian follows from evaluating the deriva-
tives of (4.30-4.31) at the fixed point (y∗, λ∗). For the stability condition notice that
the matrix is diagonal and the second eigenvalue, ν2 ∈ (0, 1). In fact since δ < 1,
k > 1 > 0.5 > λ∗ one has:
0 < ν2 = (1− δ) k(k − 1)
(k − λ∗)2 <
k(k − 1)
k(k − 1) + (0.5)2 < 1. (4.62)
The value of the first eigenvalue, ν1, depends upon the value of λ
∗. This eigenvalue is the
same as the linear coefficient of equation (4.19), that is, it is ν1 < 1 given α ∈ (0, 1) and
λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and ν1 > −1 as long as
λ∗ >
(1− α)
2
.
Given the value of λ∗ one can check that the previous inequality is satisfied if and only if
δ >
(1 + α)
1 + 2αk
(1−α)
.
¤
Proof of Proposition 4.11 The matrix J|(y∗,λ∗) in (4.35) is diagonal. As a result the
dynamics of y and λ around (y∗, λ∗) can be linearized along the orthogonal basis with
eigenvalues given by the diagonal entries of the matrix. Thus the eigenvalues that governs
the dynamics of λ, (4.62), is given by the entry (2, 2) of the matrix (4.35). We recall from
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the previous proof that
ν2 = (1− δ) k(k − 1)
(k − λ∗)2 ,
and we have already shown that ν2 < 1. The lower bound, ν2 > (1− δ)(1− 1/k), follows
from the previous expression and λ∗ > 0 for all δ > 0 and for all α. ¤

Chapter 5
Summary
In this thesis we aim at appraising the effect of modeling human decision making as
boundedly rational in a number of economic settings. In particular we concentrate on
cases where a large number of individuals or firms compete to use the same limited
resource, being it a market, a highway, a bar or the information of profitability of a
firm. A characteristic of all these frameworks is that agents’ participation produces some
negative externalities on the utility of profitability of other participating agents. In these
systems, if agents were rational, they would account for the effects due to their interaction
and coordinate their actions to the equilibrium level where they would all gain the same
profit. The nature of this equilibrium will depend upon the exogenous variables that
characterize the fundamentals of the model. Convergence to the equilibrium need not a
priori take place when agents are boundedly rational. In this case the interaction of agents
may or may not settle down to the equilibrium. Modeling agents as boundedly rational
could thus help explaining the observed size and variability of fluctuations of economic
variables, such as prices or profits, even when no changes of the underlying fundamentals
occurs.
Boundedly rational agents can be specified as using simple rules of thumb in their
decision making. An important aspect is that the population of agents is heterogeneous,
that is, agents can choose from different rules to solve the same problem. The set of
rules is disciplined by a selection mechanism, where the best performing rule, measured
according some fitness rule, attracts the most number of agents. This feature implies that
our models are dynamics, with agents switching among the different rules at different
periods of time.
In departing from the traditional approach where a representative rational agent is
present, we have two main goals. First, we appraise when a frequently used argument in
favor of rationality, namely that rationality is the outcome of the repeated interaction of
heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, is justified. This part of the analysis has thus
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a theoretical motivation. Second, having shown in what respect our results differ from
the rational benchmark, we characterize whether our interacting agents framework can
reproduce empirically observed phenomena in the specific economic settings we consider.
An important role in triggering the switching of rules is played by the feedback between
agents’ expectations of some relevant economic variables and their realizations. This
feedback system, which we call expectational feedback, translates agents’ interaction into
a mutual dependence between choices of economic actors and the environment against
which these choices are evaluated. Having to do with this feedback, rational agents
are usually assumed to have rational expectations, that is, to find actions such that
expectations and realizations are consistent and the system is at equilibrium. Boundedly
rational agents, instead, are not assumed to be aware of the expectational feedback so
that their interaction may or may not settle down to an equilibrium. It is the dynamics
that tell us when convergence is observed and when not. In this respect, as the functional
dependence of fractions of agents in terms of economic variables and previous fractions
is typical nonlinear, our systems are nonlinear so that a number of different types of
behavior other than convergence and divergence can be observed, such as bounded erratic
fluctuations. For the systems we analyze the most common outcome is given by irregular
fluctuations where agents keep switching between different rules, each rule being most
chosen at different periods of time and no rule dominating in the long run.
Inside this framework, in chapter 2, we concentrate on the cobweb model and we
analyze the impact of increasing deliberation costs as the sophistication of a decision rule
increases. In a cobweb model producers of a perishable consumption good have to decide
how much to produce at every period. In order to do so they rely on expectations of
next periods prices. The characteristic of this model is that high (low) expected prices
trigger high (low) producers output which clears the market at a low (high) expected
prices. Agents with rational expectation are able to detect this effect and set an output
level such that ex-ante and ex-post prices are the same. In our framework we assume that
agents who use this rational expectations rule face a high deliberation cost. An alternative
is to use simpler rules such as naive expectations, that is, the price of today is taken as
the predictor of the price of tomorrow. This rules are available at a lower deliberation
cost. We investigate the effect on prices on agents switching between the two prediction
strategies.
In previous contributions it is assumed that agents are backward looking in the sense
that strategy selection is based on
experience measured by past realized profits. In particular, Brock and Hommes (1997)
show that when the selection pressure to switch to the more profitable strategy is high,
instability and complicated chaotic price fluctuations arise. Brock and Hommes call this
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phenomenon a rational route to randomness. In Chapter 2, we develop a cobweb model
with strategy switching, where strategy selection is based upon expected profits rather
than realized profits. When the deliberation cost is high enough, we find that the same
local instability of the equilibrium price. Nevertheless, this time, the amplitude of price
fluctuations is dampened. In particular the route to randomness result of Brock and
Hommes is not always observed. Our conclusion is that key elements of the route to
randomness result are unanticipated errors of agents using rational and naive strategies.
We show that when these unanticipated errors are not present the rational route to ran-
domness disappears.
In Chapter 3 we analyze the interaction of boundedly rational agents using heteroge-
neous rules all repeatedly competing to use the same limited resource when no market
institutions are present. We formalize this general interaction structure as a participa-
tion game. We concentrate on participation games for which the payoff for participating
decreases as the number of participating agents increases. Well-known examples of these
type of participation games analyzed in the literature are market entry games, where
firms have to decide whether to enter a market and compete, or stay out of it. Another
example is given by route choice games, where a group of commuters repeatedly choose,
between two routes, the fastest way from their homes to their offices. A third example is
give by the El Farol bar problem of Arthur (1994).
Our aim is to obtain a simple analytic model that can replicate the main experimental
and computational findings in the area of participation games with negative feedback.
We set up an analytic model with heterogeneous boundedly rational agents choosing
between simple rules. Fractions of agents using each rule are endogenous and evolve
according to the past performance of each rule as described by the replicator dynamics. We
concentrate on the evolutionary dynamics produced by the competition between different
deterministic rules that condition the participation decision on the outcome of the previous
rounds. We characterize the resulting participation rate dynamics as the number of
players increases. The interaction of a large number of players leads to complicated
participation rate patterns and we argue that the average participation rate along these
patterns is consistent with the symmetric Nash equilibrium and the existing experimental
and computational evidence. We also investigate how agents’ interaction is affected by the
presence of agents choosing rules that try to exploit the linear autocorrelation structure of
the past participation rates. Agents who try to exploit past inefficiencies of the aggregate
to improve their performances, act as some kind of arbitrageurs and we show that their
behavior does not affect the stability of the system and the size of the fluctuations.
In Chapter 4 we study a market for a financial asset populated by boundedly rational
agents and we concentrate on the role of informational differences. The starting point
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is an asset pricing model in which agents can choose among two different degrees of
information on fundamentals. At the same time agents are also learning the growth rate
of the dividend generating process.
After having developed and analyzed the full model, we investigate the extent to which
our model is able to explain empirical properties of asset prices such as excess volatility,
clustered volatility, correlations of returns, persistent deviations from fundamental values.
In particular we offer theoretical support to the empirical evidence that the log price of a
financial asset is the sum of a persistent component and a nonlinear temporary component,
which switches between two different regimes. The empirical evidence for this so-called
nonlinear mean reversion is documented in the literature, see e.g. by Gallagher and Taylor
(2001) and Manzan (2003).
This chapter is closely related to the work on informational efficiency by Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) who show that when agents can choose between being informed or
not, there is no rational expectation equilibrium. This result has been referred to as
the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. In order to solve it Grossman and Stiglitz assume an
exogenous noise process. In this case, the model of Grossman and Stiglitz leads to a
static equilibrium degree of disequilibrium, where agents’ fractions and price distribution
are constant over time and a function of the exogenous noise parameters.
In our analysis we relax the assumption of agents’ rationality. We also endogenize
the dynamics of the fraction of agents choosing to buy costly information or to extract
information about future dividends from the price. We show that the interaction of
boundedly rational agents, triggered by informational differences, can act as a source of
endogenous noise to the price dynamics and can offer a different solution to the Grossman-
Stiglitz paradox. Since our approach is dynamics, we offer a dynamic equilibrium degree
of disequilibrium, in contrast with the static solution of Grossman and Stiglitz.
Since all the models we consider are related to the same economic framework, the
repeated exploitation of a limited resource, they all share the same type of expectational
feedback. In particular, we can call it a negative expectational feedback as positive
(negative) deviations from the equilibrium at one time results in a negative (positive)
deviations at the other time. The case where positive (negative) deviations are followed
by positive (negative) relations is instead called positive expectational feedback.
Theoretical results of this thesis show, for systems with negative feedback, that overall
convergence to the rational equilibrium is on average correct. Nevertheless, we also show
that boundedly rational agents’ interaction and adaptation trigger ongoing fluctuations
around such an equilibrium. This is consistent with experiments of systems with negative
feedbacks as reported for market entry games and in route choice games. This is also
consistent with excess volatility in financial markets. In general, these endogenous fluc-
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tuations can be characterized as irregular cycles along which rules perform better than
others in different periods of time, but no rule is “dominating” the scene for every period.
In this respect our results also support the observation that within systems with negative
feedback incentives work in the direction of heterogeneity, that is, agents are better off
if they do not imitate each other. In fact, such incentives explain why the persistence of
heterogeneity, and consequently of endogenous fluctuations, is a robust characteristic of
our models.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
In dit proefschrift stellen we ons tot doel om de gevolgen te evalueren van het modelleren
van menselijke beslissingen in termen van begrensde rationaliteit in verschillende eco-
nomische situaties. We concentreren ons in het bijzonder op gevallen waarin een groot
aantal individuen of bedrijven wedijveren om dezelfde schaarse goederen, of dat nu be-
trekking heeft op de aandelenmarkt, een snelweg, het aantal vrije plaatsen in een cafe´ of
op informatie omtrent de winstgevendheid van een bedrijf. Al deze voorbeelden delen de
eigenschap dat de keuze van een agent om het schaarse goed te benutten negatieve ex-
ternaliteiten heeft voor de overige aanwezige agenten. Binnen dergelijke systemen zouden
rationele agenten rekening houden met de effecten van hun interactie, en hun acties zo
coo¨rdineren dat er een evenwichtssituatie zou onstaan waarin alle agenten even goed af
zouden zijn. De aard van dit evenwicht zal afhangen van de details van de effecten van
exogene variabelen op de fundamentele variabelen van het model. Convergentie naar een
evenwicht treedt niet altijd op in het geval dat agenten begrensd rationeel zijn. Het model-
leren van agenten als begrensd rationeel kan dus een mogelijke verklaring bieden voor de
grootte en de veranderlijkheid van waargenomen fluctuaties van economische variabelen,
zoals prijzen of winsten, zelfs als de fundamentele variabelen niet veranderen.
Begrensd rationele agenten kunnen worden gespecificeerd door middel van een aantal
vuistregels met behulp waarvan zij beslissingen nemen. Een belangrijk aspect is hete-
rogeniteit van de populatie van agenten, wat inhoudt dat agenten verschillende regels
kunnen kiezen om hetzelfde probleem op te lossen. De verzameling regels is onderhevig
aan een selectiemechanisme, waarbij de regel die, volgens een bepaalde norm, het best
heeft gepresteerd, het grootste aantal aanhangers onder agenten krijgt. Deze eigenschap
zorgt ervoor dat onze modellen dynamisch gedrag vertonen waarin agenten hun regelkeuze
vaak herzien.
Met het verlaten van de traditionele aanpak met een representatieve agent beogen we
twee hoofddoelstellingen. Ten eerste evalueren we wanneer een veel gehoord argument
voor rationaliteit, namelijk dat rationaliteit de uitkomst is van herhaalde interactie van
heterogene begrensd rationele agenten, gerechtvaardigd is. Dit deel van de analyse heeft
dus een theoretische motivatie. Ten tweede bekijken we, nadat we hebben laten zien in
163
welke zin onze resultaten afwijken van de rationele standaard, of modellen met inter-
agerende agenten in staat zijn empirisch waargenomen fenomenen te reproduceren in de
specifieke economische situaties die we beschouwen.
Bij het bepalen van de regelkeuze door agenten is er een belangrijke rol weggelegd
voor de terugkoppeling van verwachtingen omtrent economische variabelen van agenten,
door middel van gerealiseerde waarden van deze variabelen. Deze terugkoppeling van
verwachtingen vertaalt de interactie tussen agenten naar een wederzijdse afhankelijkheid
tussen enerzijds de keuzen van de agenten, en anderzijds de omgeving waarin deze keuzen
worden gee¨valueerd. Voor rationele agenten zou dit inhouden dat hun verwachtingen en
bijbehorende acties zodanig zijn dat zij consistent zijn met toekomstige realisaties, en het
systeem in evenwicht is. Begrensd rationele agenten, daarentegen, hoeven zich niet bewust
te zijn van de terugkoppeling van verwachtingen, en dientengevolge hoeft hun interactie
niet tot evenwicht te leiden. De resulterende dynamica zal bepalen of er evenwicht onstaat
of niet. Omdat de fractie van agenten die kiest voor een bepaalde strategie typischerwijs
geen lineaire functie is van voorgaande fracties en waargenomen economische variabelen,
verkrijgen we een niet-lineair systeem waarin een verscheidenheid aan gedrag kan optre-
den, waaronder chaotische fluctuaties. Voor de systemen die wij analyseren bestaat het
gedrag typisch uit begrensde onregelmatige fluctuaties waarin agenten voortdurend hun
regelkeuze blijven aanpassen, met als gevolg dat verschillende regels op verschillende tij-
den het meest gekozen worden, en het lange termijn gedrag niet door e´e´n regel wordt
bepaald.
Binnen dit raamwerk concentreren we ons in hoofdstuk 2 op het spinnewebmodel en
analyseren de gevolgen van toenemende afwegingskosten voor meer geavanceerde beslis-
singsregels. In een spinnewebmodel moeten de producenten van een niet-houdbaar goed
in elke periode beslissen hoeveel ze in de komende periode willen produceren. Deze keuze
hangt af van hun verwachtingen omtrent toekomstige prijzen. In dit model leiden hoge
(lage) verwachte prijzen tot hoge (lage) productie en daarmee tot lage (hoge) gerealiseerde
toekomstige prijzen. Rationele agenten zijn in staat om dit effect te detecteren en zullen
precies zoveel produceren dat de ex-ante en ex-post prijzen met elkaar overeenkomen.
Wij zullen hier aannemen dat agenten die dergelijke verwachtingen hebben daar hoge
afwegingskosten voor moeten betalen. Het alternatief is om eenvoudige regels te ge-
bruiken zoals na¨ıeve verwachtingen waarvoor de verwachte toekomstige prijs gelijk is aan
de huidige prijs. Dergelijke regels zijn te gebruiken tegen veel lagere afwegingskosten.
We onderzoeken de gevolgen voor het gedrag van prijzen wanneer agenten herhaaldelijk
tussen deze twee voorspellers kunnen kiezen.
In eerder werk werd vaak aangenomen dat agenten terugkijken, waarmee wordt bedoeld
dat de gekozen strategie gebaseerd is op in het verleden gerealiseerde winstgevendheid van
de strategiee¨n. In het bijzonder hebben Brock en Hommes (1997) laten zien dat wanneer
de gevoeligheid van agenten voor het maken van een onjuiste keuze toeneemt, instabiliteit
en complexe chaotische prijsfluctuaties kunnen ontstaan. Brock en Hommes noemen dit
fenomeen een rational route to randomness (rationele weg tot willekeurige fluctuaties). In
hoofdstuk 2 beschouwen we een spinnewebmodel waarin de strategiekeuze gebaseerd is op
verwachte winsten in plaats van gerealiseerde winsten. Als de afwegingskosten voldoende
hoog zijn, vinden we een soortgelijke lokale instabiliteit van de evenwichtsprijs. Dit keer
blijft de amplitude van de prijsfluctuaties echter begrensd. In het bijzonder treedt de
‘route to randomness’ van Brock en Hommes hier niet altijd op. Onze conclusie is dat
de belangrijkste ingredie¨nten van de ‘route to randomness’ onvoorziene fouten van zowel
rationele als na¨ıeve agenten zijn. We tonen aan dat in de afwezigheid van dergelijke fouten
de ‘rational route to randomness’ niet optreedt.
In hoofdstuk 3 analyseren we de interactie tussen heterogene, begrensd rationele,
agenten die herhaaldelijk om hetzelfde schaarse middel wedijveren in afwezigheid van
marktregulerende instanties. We formaliseren deze algemene interactiestructuur als een
deelnamespel. We concentreren ons op deelnamespelen waarin de winst van deelname
afneemt naarmate meerdere agenten besluiten om deelenemen. Bekende voorbeelden van
dergelijke spelen die in de literatuur beschreven zijn, zijn markttoetredingsspelen, waarin
bedrijven moeten besluiten om toe te treden tot een bepaalde markt en daarbinnen te
gaan concurreren, of afzijdig te blijven van die markt. Een ander voorbeeld is dat van
routekeuzespelen, waarin een forensen herhaaldelijk kiezen tussen twee mogelijk routes
met als doel om zo snel mogelijk van hun huis naar hun kantoor te komen. Een derde
voorbeeld bestaat uit het El Farol bar probleem van Arthur (1994).
Ons doel is om een eenvoudig analytisch model op te stellen dat de belangrijkste em-
pirische en numerieke resultaten kan reproduceren op het gebied van deelnamespelen met
negatieve terugkoppeling. We stellen een analytisch model op met begrensd rationele
heterogene agenten die tussen eenvoudige regels kiezen. De fracties van agenten die elk
van de regels gebruiken is endogeen en ontwikkeld zich op grond van prestaties uit het
verleden volgens de replicator dynamica. We concentreren ons op de evolutionaire dy-
namica die voortkomt uit de competitie tussen een aantal deterministische regels die de
keuze voor deelname laten afhangen van de uitkomsten in vorige ronden. We bestuderen
de resulterende dynamica van de fractie deelnemende agenten als het aantal spelers toe-
neemt. De interactie tussen een groot aantal spelers leidt tot ingewikkelde patronen in de
deelnamefractie, en we maken aannemelijk dat de gemiddelde deelnamefractie consistent
is met het symmetrische Nash evenwicht en met bestaand experimenteel en numeriek
bewijs. We onderzoeken tevens hoe de interactie tussen agenten wordt be¨ınvloed door
de aanwezigheid van agenten die de lineaire autocorrelatiestructuur van deelnamefrac-
ties uit het verleden proberen uit te buiten. Agenten die proberen om gebruik te maken
van dergelijke inefficie¨nties gedragen zich in feite als arbitrageurs, en we laten zien dat
hun aanwezigheid noch de stabiliteit van het systeem noch de grootte van de fluctuaties
be¨ınvloedt.
In hoofdstuk 4 bestuderen we een model voor een aandelenmarkt die bevolkt wordt
door begrensd rationele agenten, en concentreren ons op de rol van informatieverschillen
onder agenten. We gaan uit van een model voor aandelenprijzen waarin agenten kunnen
kiezen tussen twee gradaties van informatie omtrent toekomstige dividenden. Tevens is
de gemiddelde mate van groei van het dividend genererende proces niet bekend bij de
agenten, maar dienen zij deze te achterhalen uit gerealiseerde dividenden.
Nadat we het model hebben opgezet en geanaliseerd, bekijken we in welke mate het
model in staat is om empirische eigenschappen van aandelenprijzen te reproduceren, zoals
‘excess volatility’ (bovenmatige beweeglijkheid), volatiliteitsclustering, autocorrelaties en
de persistentie van afwijkingen van fundamentele waarden. In het bijzonder leiden we
een theoretisch model af dat een verklaring biedt voor het empirische bewijs dat de lo-
garitme van aandelenprijzen bestaan uit een som van een persistente component en een
niet-lineaire vergankelijke component. Het empirische bewijs voor dergelijke beweging-
en rondom de fundamentele prijs is beschreven in de literatuur door, onder anderen,
Callagher en Taylor (2001) en Manzan (2003).
Dit hoofdstuk is nauw verwant aan het werk op het gebied van informationele efficie¨ntie
door Grossman en Stiglitz (1980) die aantonen dat wanneer agenten kunnen kiezen tussen
al dan niet ge¨ınformeerd worden, er geen rationele verwachtingen evenwicht bestaat. Dit
resultaat staat bekend als de Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. Grossman en Stiglitz lossen
dit op door een exogeen ruisproces te veronderstellen. In dat geval leidt hun model tot
een statisch evenwicht van uit-evenwicht-zijn, waarin zowel de fractie van ge¨ınformeerde
agenten als de prijsverdeling constant zijn over de tijd, met eigenschappen die bepaald
worden door die van de exogene ruisbron.
In onze analyse laten we de aanname van rationaliteit los. Verder laten we de fracties
agenten die willen betalen voor informatie en die informatie uit prijzen willen achterhalen,
zich endogeen ontwikkelen. We tonen aan dat de interactie van begrensd rationele agen-
ten sich in dit geval gedraagd als een endogene ruis op de prijsdynamica, die zodoende
een alternatieve oplossing biedt voor de Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. Omdat onze opzet
dynamisch is, leidt dit tot een dynamisch evenwicht van uit-evenwicht-zijn in plaats van
de statische oplossing van Grossman en Stiglitz.
Omdat de behandelde modellen alle gerelateerd zijn aan hetzelfde economische raam-
werk, het herhaaldelijk exploiteren van een schaars goed, hebben al deze modellen een-
zelfde type terugkoppeling van verwachtingen. We noemen dit een een negatieve terugkop-
peling van verwachtingen omdat positieve (negatieve) afwijkingen van evenwicht op het
ene moment leiden tot negatieve (positieve) afwijkingen op het volgende moment. In
het geval van positieve terugkoppeling van verwachtingen, daarentegen, worden positieve
(negatieve) afwijkingen gevolgd door positieve (negatieve).
De theoretische resultaten in dit proefschrift tonen aan dat voor modellen met een
negatieve terugkoppeling gemiddeld gesproken convergentie naar het rationele evenwicht
optreedt. Het blijkt echter ook dat de interactie en aanpassingen van begrensd rationele
agenten aanleiding geven tot voortdurende fluctutaties rond dit evenwicht. Dit is consis-
tent met experimenten met negatieve terugkoppeling zoals die beschreven zijn voor spelen
voor markttoetreding en routekeuze. Dit is ook consistent met bovenmatige beweeglijk-
heid in financie¨le markten. Over het algemeen kunnen deze endogene fluctuaties worden
gekarakteriseerd als onregelmatige banen waarlangs bepaalde regels soms beter presteren,
en andere weer op andere tijden, maar er geen regel “dominant” is in elke periode. In
die zin ondersteunen onze resultaten de waarneming dat binnen systemen met negatieve
terugkoppeling prikkels in de richting van heterogeniteit werken. Dat wil zeggen dat
agenten beter af zijn als ze elkaar niet imiteren. Dit is de reden dat de persistentie van
de heterogeniteit en de endogene fluctuaties een robuuste karakteristieke eigenschap van
onze modellen vormen.
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